Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy

25. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Camp David, Maryland, May 3, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Edmund Muskie, Secretary of State-Designate
• Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State
• David Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Ben Read, Under Secretary of State for Management
• Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
• Peter Tarnoff, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State
• Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Henry Owen, Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs

The President began by saying that he had not had an opportunity to meet with key advisers in the State Department. He expressed the opinion that the effectiveness of this meeting would be related to its frankness in dealing with the problems of organization of the State Department, the role of the Secretary and our consideration of major foreign policy issues. He was interested in how we might resolve these problems or at least establish a mechanism for resolution of these matters.

He said the United States faces serious challenges. There are no simple answers. We need planning, consultation with our Allies, negotiation, and the President added that we must be prepared for disappointment.

The President also said it was important how we communicate to the American people. We must present a clear and consistent picture of American foreign policy. The President said he is committed to a strong, peaceful America. He wants to minimize election constraints. He anticipated that we will face a lot of criticism which will exacerbate our problems because this is a political year, but we have to be a little more ready to answer questions than we would otherwise.

The President said we have a good opportunity with Ed Muskie coming on board to strengthen our relationship with the Congress. The President said he was eager to participate in this task. He said he had brought people into the White House for supper and for breakfast, but he found that Bob Byrd² objected to inviting Senators to the White House for such discussions. The President said that Senator Muskie might negotiate some ground rules with Bob Byrd on contacts with Members of the Senate.

The President expressed the hope that he could meet with the State Department officers that were present over at the Department to discuss problems and he said he also planned to work closely with the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the CIA. The President said he thought it was a good time to reassess our policies. He said we have made mistakes and that needs to be faced. The current meeting, he said, was precipitated by Secretary Vance’s resignation.³ The President said he regretted Secretary Vance’s decision, but he had not tried to change it.

The President said that if he had one main problem with the Department of State, it was inadequate communication. He said that he had been isolated from the Department. He wanted a small group in the Department of State to put forward more dynamic ideas. Too often, he said, he receives a proposal that is the product of consensus. Thus, he said, he gets more probing although sometimes fallacious sets of ideas from the National Security Council. He said he gets almost no new ideas or criticisms from the Department of State.

The President said he did not know whether it was possible to overcome the bureaucracy. He would like more sessions with ambassadors who return from overseas. On the other hand, he did not want to be meeting all the time.

Mr. Christopher said that people at the top level would welcome more contact. He said they had refrained because they were worried about the President’s time. He said they would be delighted to respond and in their meetings at the State Department they would like you to meet with the Presidential appointees for lunch and then with a smaller group of more important policy making officials.

Mr. Christopher noted that Senator Muskie had planned to continue the morning meetings, but with a smaller group. From the standpoint of personnel, the Department was in good shape. He had talked to Senator Muskie about this and a lot of changes were not needed. Certainly no exodus was anticipated. Moreover, as far as overseas positions were concerned, the Department had eight outstanding ambassadors waiting to fill slots that might become available abroad or at home. At the same time, Mr. Christopher said Senator Muskie wants to move some new people into this system. This, he felt, could be accommodated.

The Acting Secretary said that the State Department is an organizational anomaly. There is a Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, four Under Secretaries and twenty-two Assistant Secretaries. Management consultants, like Booz Allen would anticipate that decisions would flow through the Under Secretary to the Deputy Secretary and Secretary. But there is an anomaly in the Department because the Secretary must deal directly with the Assistant Secretaries on matters in which he is personally involved. Moreover, the Secretary is nominally the chief of four agencies which are loosely related to the State Department—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the International Communication Agency, IDCA and AID. Moreover, there was the UN Mission, which is an important bureaucratic force and is not just another part of the State Department.

Mr. Christopher said it was a big job to inspire and coordinate all these institutions. The roles of the Secretary are manifold and he has to choose between them.

Mr. Christopher outlined several different roles for the Secretary of State.

First, the Secretary of State must communicate and explain our foreign policy. There was no one better than Senator Muskie to do this.

Second, the Secretary of State had to be the principal adviser to the President on foreign policy matters. This role must not be diminished. Mr. Christopher said he was urging Senator Muskie to increase this aspect of his job rather than decrease it.

Third, relations with the Hill were very important but very time-consuming. The Acting Secretary thought that other spokesmen for the Department and the Administration could help carry the burden that Secretary Vance had borne in this regard.

The President commented that Secretary Brown could help in this regard. The Secretary of Defense said this was true, but that he spent a lot of time on the Hill already and the problem is that people up there want to talk to the most senior Administration officials.

Secretary Christopher said he believed that the new Secretary of State should limit his appearances to key presentations. He said that we fell into the habit of briefing the Senate and House every day on Iran. He said we should get out of this habit.

Fourth, said Mr. Christopher, the Secretary had his role as a negotiator. He thought that the Secretary cannot do as much of this as Secretary Vance had done. Sol Linowitz had been designated as the negotiator for the Middle East and this should help relieve the burdens of negotiation on the Secretary.

Fifth, it was the Secretary’s responsibility to manage the Department. The task here was both to delegate responsibilities and to inspire members of the Department.

Sixth is the protocol function of the Secretary of State. He said this was very wearisome and ought to be cut back. Secretary Brown commented that it was a matter of the penalty you pay for not going through the protocol rather than the positive gain you make for doing it.

All in all, Secretary Christopher said, the new Secretary of State over the next eight months and four years ought to be more visible.

The President said that one of the things that Secretary Vance had wanted to do was to cut down on negotiations and to be a spokesman. Unfortunately, this simply did not happen. He noted that he himself was inundated by visitors. When they come to town, he has to see them, even though they often visit the United States on their own initiative. Perhaps we could reduce, he said, the number of Foreign Ministers’ visits to the United States. The President then asked how responsibility is fixed in the Department, for example, on Cuba. Mr. Christopher replied that it rests with the Assistant Secretary for the regional area, in this case, Bill Bowdler. For example, he would talk to him on calling off issuing any more visas at the Interests Section in Havana. He said that generally speaking the responsibility for the conduct of relations in any part of the world was fixed in the regional bureau heads. They, in turn, are under David Newsom who is the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs leads the economic bureau. In this connection, Mr. Christopher said that we have not done as well in integrating economic policy in the Department and in the government as we have done in integrating our diplomacy through the Under Secretary.

The President asked who was in charge of Europe. The Acting Secretary replied that George Vest was in charge. His recommendations go through Dave Newsom. Harold Brown added that Vest’s responsibility covers Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, in the latter case the Secretary also had a Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs, Marshall Shulman.

The Acting Secretary said Europe is a place where we really need to do some work. Our relationship is not as bad as it looks, but we cannot do it without more contacts with the Europeans and without a more dynamic approach. Secretary Christopher said we need some special ambassadors roving about Western Europe, for example, Gerry Smith going to the Federal Republic and spending a week or two simply talking with German officials and political leaders.

The President said that he does not have the impression that someone is looking at Chancellor Schmidt, someone who is really focusing on him and on Giscard and sending suggestions on how to handle them to the President, giving the feeling of someone being in charge. He said he has had more of a relationship with Dick Holbrooke and Hal Saunders than in the European area. He said he would like to have the feeling that George Vest gets his ass kicked if something erupts in Europe that we have not anticipated.

Secretary Christopher replied that there is a German desk officer who worries about Germany and Chancellor Schmidt and makes suggestions but if the President does not feel it, then of course the State Department is not doing its job. He acknowledged that the State Department had not given as much attention to the Federal Republic as they should and said that they do have to focus up on it.

In reply, the President said that perhaps 90 percent of the problem was his own. He said that he has good relationships with the Europeans when he is with them but then they deteriorate. He said he needs to be personally more closely involved in our relationships with our Allies. Secretary Christopher observed that we in particular have this problem with the FRG.

David Newsom interjected that the ambassadors are also important and that it was essential to inspire them as well. He said he was also concerned about layering. He said that he personally did not want to get in the way of the Assistant Secretaries in their relationship with the Secretary. He thought they should be dealing directly with the Secretary when necessary. Moreover, as far as Europe was concerned, there are three other areas which were key to our relationship with the Europeans: Marshall Shulman’s shop on Soviet Affairs, the Political-Military Bureau run by Reginald Bartholomew and Tony Lake’s Policy Planning Staff. But none of this, added Mr. Christopher, is getting through to the President.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the President does get the input from INR from the daily summary which we find to be the best intelligence summary in the government.

The Acting Secretary continued that the one bureau that has serious problems is the Near East Bureau. It covers the globe from Morocco to India. It deals with the Middle East negotiations and with the Iranian crisis. The Bureau simply is not operating as it should. We are considering reestablishing a South Asian Bureau that would make the problem more manageable.

The President said the one thing early on which he felt the need for is what we are trying to do in each country. He said that he had asked that country papers setting forth our objectives in each country be prepared for his consideration. He said that he had read the papers; perhaps he was the only one to do so. However, Cy wanted to stop this effort. He apparently thought it was a waste of time. The President said the ambassadors should keep this up. It might only be a two-page list: to improve trade, etc. He asked if it was a paperwork burden.

Peter Tarnoff replied that they were producing longer studies of our objectives in each country and perhaps Secretary Vance felt it just wasn’t an accurate portrayal of our activities and objectives in these countries. The President responded that he simply wanted a single page which spelled out our objectives and possibly some alternatives. The Acting Secretary said that he thought we should go back to a country list of our strategic objectives. Tony Lake said that it would be hard to do it in one page. The President said it could simply cover bullet topics: increased trade, improve human rights. Dr. Brzezinski added that it ought to be specific and measurable. Harold Brown added that he does this with the major commanders; ambassadors could be asked to do the same. Tony Lake concluded by saying that we could update the papers with one-pagers each year.

Secretary-Designate Muskie said that during his trip on the President’s behalf last year, he had asked the ambassadors for additional material which he could present to the President. He found them quite enthusiastic about communicating directly with the President.

Secretary-Designate Muskie said that his main impression, coming into the State Department and the impression in the Congress, is that State Department is first a massive bureaucracy, which is irrelevant to the concerns of the Congress and the President, and secondly, it is a bureaucracy whose clients and constituents are abroad and not at home. Secretary-Designate Muskie said that in looking at the State Department, he was reminded of the position he was in as Governor of Maine: his Cabinet was appointed and it overlapped with his own term in office. Thus, he was stuck with a Cabinet that was not his own. In order to overcome them and to achieve his own objectives, he had to go over their heads to the people. Secretary-Designate Muskie said that from the standpoint of the Hill, State Department’s attitude toward the Congress seemed to be that the Members of Congress were children; they were naive and they were leakers.

Harold Brown said that the Senator was not of course commenting on the justice of those perceptions. Secretary-Designate Muskie said no, but that he would straighten that out from now on. Continuing, the Secretary-Designate said that the other major concern is the relationship between the NSC and the State Department. He said that Henry Kissinger had called him and said he would endorse him publicly. He also said he had made a great mistake in making the State Department a secondary voice in the making of foreign policy. He, too, said Muskie was concerned about the division between the NSC and State.

He said he would like to evaluate the reaction to his own appointment. He said he would like to present his own evaluation to his appointment. He said, first of all, he thought he should play a role in making policy less complex, more unified and to go to the American people to explain it. In considering the role of the Secretary of State, as soon as he had a firm grip on the major thrust of our policies, he felt he should do some speaking out. This he said was his first priority, in order to offset the unease and uncertainty as to what is our foreign policy. He said that having a Secretary of State a politician can make our foreign policy more credible and effective.

Secondly, he said it must be perceived that the President and he are consulting closely. He acknowledged that it would take time before he was a creative architect of American foreign policy but the fact that the President and he would be seen consulting with regularity will be reassuring to the Congress. He did not believe that there was a real problem with consulting the Congress but that it was a misimpression that needs correction.

Third, the Secretary-Designate said that he wanted to reshape the impression of the State Department. He said that the State Department needs to be integrated, to be creative and to be responsive. It must be a foreign policy tool and it must include our embassies and ambassadors. He said that he hoped that he didn’t use up all of his energy in other roles; that the Department would regard him as just another Secretary. He asked how many people were under his responsibility. (Ben Read replied 10,000; the same as in 1960.) In any event, he wants to turn the Department around. He felt that first impressions were particularly important for a bureaucracy.

The Secretary-Designate expressed reservations about the concept of roving ambassadors. He said he thought that would make the Ambassadors in the host country feel they were being by-passed. He said he personally was impressed by most of the ambassadors that he had seen. He thought they ran from good to outstanding. In sum, he said managing the Department and speaking out is what he wanted to focus on.

As for the role of negotiator, he said this is what he did best. But he said he felt he did not have time to do that. He also noted that there will be meetings in May and June in which he would be getting together with some of his colleagues in the North Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere. These meetings in his view were a “laying on hands”, not negotiating arrangements. As for protocol, he said he didn’t look forward to it but he felt he just had to do it.

The President said that he thought the Secretary-Designate could do a great deal to cut back on his protocol responsibilities. He noted that he had cut out the return dinner which had been part of State visits from time immemorial.

The President agreed that for the Secretary to be bogged down in negotiations would be a mistake. He said that we can appoint special negotiators such as Lloyd Cutler in the area of fisheries or Sol Linowitz in the Middle East. He felt that we have all gotten too much involved in negotiations to the detriment of articulating our foreign policy. He also felt that the trips that the Secretary-Designate would make to Europe ought to be minimized. He felt that a speech that the Secretary-Designate might make in Bangor would be top news in Bonn.

The President said he also would like the Secretary-Designate to elevate himself from the “nitty gritty” to a policy-evolving and policy-evoking position. The President said he would like to sit down for an hour with the Secretary-Designate and the NSC and with the others in the room to talk about what we might do with the Soviets. He said he does not get recommendations from the State Department on how he should proceed and by default, he has to turn to the NSC. He also said there was no reason for Dr. Brzezinski to be the spokesman for the Administration. Indeed, it was Dr. Brzezinski’s advice that the Secretary of State play this role.

The President also noted that we do not have a good relationship in the foreign policy area with the American press. He said that Helmut Schmidt has a better relationship with the American press than we do. He felt that the Secretary-Designate should meet once a week with key columnists instead of Hodding Carter meeting with the press. He said it would be useful if the Secretary-Designate would do that, not only with those who cover the State Department but those who also cover the White House and the Congress. He urged that he bring in editorial writers, even those who do Op-Ed columns.

Ben Read asked if he might comment on Ed’s point concerning his role as a spokesman. He endorsed the idea. He felt that the Secretary should be the spokesman, an adviser and an articulator of foreign policy. He felt that we have gotten sloppy. He had seen the same tendencies in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. There tend to be fewer and fewer advisers and a smaller and smaller circle of advice. He said the State Department had within it institutional loyalty to the Presidency that was profound. The problem is how to use that loyalty in the most useful way.

Mr. Read continued that he recalled that McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow both said that they would never go on television and never meet with foreign ambassadors. Unfortunately, today the National Security Adviser does give backgrounders, he does hold meetings with the ambassadors that the Secretary doesn’t learn about except from the foreign ambassadors themselves. He felt there was not an adequate amount of feedback to the State Department nor a sense of sharing. This gave foreign governments an opportunity to drive wedges between the White House and the State Department. He felt it was important to put the focus on Senator Muskie and feed all information to him.

Mr. Read added that the President too was getting too much into detail. For example, the approval of individual Iranian visas. He said this was not intentional but it does distract from keeping our focus on the major issues. This was an opportunity he said to start anew.

The President said that the NSC staff, the Defense Department and the State Department are all there to serve the President and that any disharmony hurts him. He added that with one exception, despite many entreaties, he has dealt only with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary during the time of Cy Vance. The President said, for example, Tony Lake helped him in a superior way during the transition. However, since he went to the State Department, he hasn’t seen him. The President said he had asked Cy Vance to meet with his top advisers but it never happened. He thought the State Department does a good job but it does not relate in a satisfactory way to the Presidency. And it has been worst at letting him know about alternatives. It has been an alien building. Cy Vance was close to him personally but this did not get through to the bureaucracy. On one occasion, up at Camp David, there was a glorious time when there was real coordination and real team work. It was positive and it was successful. But the President said he did not believe it exists now.

Perhaps it is better than he thought said the President. But he hoped that all of the agencies of this government would work together, not as alien bodies but on a team where the members worked together.

The President also said he hoped that Senator Muskie will be aggressive in carrying out his role as a spokesman. If not, it is left to himself, Dr. Brzezinski or the Vice President to articulate American foreign policy. He added that that is Dr. Brzezinski’s view as well. The President said we have a chance now, not only at the top but at lower levels, to get working together. It spills into the press when the agencies are not working harmoniously. When the State Department is excluded from the President, they tend to blame it on the National Security Council.

The President said he knew that Dr. Brzezinski’s organization created problems for the State Department. He recalled that there had been a meeting over a year ago to discuss those matters⁴ and it had resulted in significant improvements. Dr. Brzezinski, he said, is a feisty, innovative, aggressive and creative individual and there is a lot more respect for the State Department in the White House than the State Department officers would think.

Addressing the group, he said if you go back three years, we have had a remarkable degree of harmony on basic issues but we do have problems and we have to work together at all levels.

Secretary Brown said that the President’s comments reminded me of John Kennedy’s Administration in the early 1960s. He said many of the problems we are discussing today are enduring problems. And these problems relate to how the Secretary runs the Department. Some rely on the Department such as Cy Vance and Dean Rusk. Others rely on a small group. That was the style of Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger. They tend to be closer to the President. Conflicts with the National Security Council are to some extent inevitable. He did not know if all of this could be corrected in eight months and he did not believe that it was possible to interact with 10,000 people. He himself had a much larger organization with which to interact and he found it was best to do that through a small group.

The President said that other agencies bring in small groups of officials in meetings with the President. He said the officials are honored and pleased. The Acting Secretary said that it was helpful to hear this. We had heard that the President wanted small meetings and Cy wanted to be the one to deal with the issues. Mr. Christopher said he thought the NSC thought that was the President’s attitude as well. For the President to clarify this helped a great deal. It would be terrific for morale in the State Department.

The President said he thought that Cy Vance had an aversion to it. Not every meeting should include eight people from the State Department, for example, at the Friday breakfast. But he would like to sit down and discuss some key issues with a group from the Department and the NSC: the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Cuban refugees. He suggested that the State Department plan a good meeting jointly with the National Security Council.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he agreed with the roles for the Secretary of State as outlined by Warren Christopher and Senator Muskie: in particular, that the Secretary be an aggressive spokesman for the Administration’s foreign policy. However, he said that policy must be seen not only as the Secretary of State’s policy but as the President’s policy. Dr. Brzezinski had seen cases in which there was a Presidential policy or a Secretary of State’s policy but that was not the State Department’s policy.

As for the problems in the current arrangements, Dr. Brzezinski said that he would rather hear from Warren Christopher or Harold Brown about them rather than from Ben Read who is not in on most of the activities. For example, he was not aware of any problems which had arisen in connection with his having seen ambassadors. He had never felt that he was undercutting the Acting Secretary by talking to foreign ambassadors and he would propose to continue to talk to foreign ambassadors.

As far as public relations is concerned, there was a gap in the Administration. There was an absence of a spokesman. Secretary-Designate Muskie should anticipate that there will be enormous demands on his time for appearances. Dr. Brzezinski volunteered to be supportive. He pointed out that he called Warren Christopher when he was recently on television and coordinated the line that he should take. However, not everyone in the State Department knows that this coordination takes place. So there are expressions of jealousy in the rank and file.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that there is within the Administration a fundamental consensus on key issues. In the past this had not always been the case. But now the course through the elections was set and he thought things would go smoother as a result.

The President agreed. Dr. Brzezinski said there had been differences in the past over the role of the Soviet Union and Africa, over our opening to China. But these had been resolved. He suggested that Senator Muskie read the State of the Union speech to get a feel for the general thrust of the President’s overall policy.

As for the problem of the span of control in the State Department identified by Harold Brown, the President saw no reason to assume that that problem can’t be solved. He said that he did not need to know fifty people in the State Department but he did need to know six or eight key people.

Tony Lake said that he agreed with Dr. Brzezinski that the differences between the NSC and the State Department had been exaggerated. He said there was a great well of institutional loyalty in the State Department to the President. There would be no resignations beyond Hodding Carter’s. He thought that the personal relations between the State Department and the NSC staff were good. The problem is the pressure of time—Iran, Afghanistan crises meant that meetings could not be well-prepared in advance. This he thought could be fixed. As far as unhelpful press speculation is concerned, he said he had worked with David Aaron to try to dampen this down but it was not always successful. Indeed, there was an occasion in which David Aaron and he had both spoken to the same journalist giving a caricature of the views of what was supposed to be the other side’s position and even then the article came out that the NSC were hawks and the State Department were doves.

As far as the inter-agency system was concerned, Mr. Lake stressed the need for agenda. There is also a need for reviewing the conclusions and seeing how they are in fact reported to the President. He recommended that the participants see the minutes before they go to the President. We receive Presidential decisions, said Mr. Lake, but we don’t see how the options go forward.

Mr. Lake also proposed that there be more joint analytical papers. Part of the reason we don’t get initiative is the lack of sense of participation in the building. Unfortunately, officials in the State Department are reluctant to put forward their own ideas out of fear of undercutting the Secretary. If we do more joint papers, we can put in more options before the Secretary reaches his decision. Once a meeting takes place, if there is no paper beforehand, it would be disloyal to recommend ideas which are contrary to those of the Secretary of State.

Turning to the speechwriting process, Mr. Lake said that the system had been eroded. He said there is a subterranean relationship between the Policy Planning Staff and the speechwriters in the White House. He said the State Department recognized the need to hold speeches closely and he said that he thought it would be possible to work out with the NSC an arrangement where they could develop an outline for Presidential speeches together.

Contrary to what Mr. Lake had just said, the President emphasized that he did not want rounded off speeches produced by consensus. He would rather have different views in brackets so that he could decide. He got consensus speeches from Cy Vance and that is the reason he turns to the NSC for something bolder. Mr. Lake responded that if we had an opportunity to talk through ideas, we would do a better job of shaping clearer policy formulations. He was not proposing that desk officers clear all these speeches so that no one would notice them. Secretary-Designate Muskie added that it should be understood that the President wants alternatives in his speeches. The President added that what Mr. Lake said last was important. Because what he worries about is that the bureaucracy tones down its speeches so much that they prove to be too bland.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out the vast majority of the NSC staff are in fact State Department officers so the issue of initiative and ideas and creativity is more a question of the institutional context.

David Newsom said he would like to return to the issue of the erosion of the process. Mr. Newsom said that the relationship between the State Department and the NSC was not so bad. In fact, it was much better than during the Nixon Administration. He said that David Aaron and he worked particularly well together.

However, in the Iran Crisis Management meetings which take place daily, the minutes go to the President and the State Department does not know if alternatives which they have in mind go to him as well. For that reason, they would like to be able to review the minutes before they go to the President.

Also, he thought there had been a blurred line between the SCCs and the PRCs and he wondered whether we shouldn’t have a PRC both for Iran and Afghanistan chaired by the Secretary of State to look at our long-range alternatives.

As for the role of the Assistant Secretaries, Mr. Newsom said he wanted to emphasize that there had been a major input into the State Department policies from Assistant Secretary Vest, for example. Mr. Vest had been very helpful on Iranian sanctions and on TNF. Hal Saunders has obviously made very important contributions on the Middle East. The President said it was his impression that when PRCs are set up, the Secretary of State doesn’t show up to chair them.

Warren Christopher explained that in PD–2,⁵ two committees were set up. The SCC was to handle arms control, crisis management and a few other things. The PRC was to handle particular foreign policy questions. Since the 15th of March, there have been 60 SCCs and zero PRCs. In April, the ratio was 13 to 1.

The Acting Secretary acknowledged that we had been operating in a daily crisis mode and therefore there had been no papers prepared in advance. However, Ed’s arrival gave an opportunity to take a look at the system and see whether we can’t get the process back in better balance. He felt there were 20–25 subjects on which PRCs could usefully be scheduled. He concluded by agreeing with the President that the PRC lacks authority unless the Secretary of State is in the chair.

Dr. Brzezinski agreed with the Acting Secretary. He said in the first two years, the number of PRCs and SCCs were about equal. The SCCs were devoted to arms control, intelligence and matters of that sort. The disproportionate numbers at this time result from daily meetings on Iran. As for scheduling of PRCs, sometimes we take the initiative, he said, and sometimes the State Department takes the initiative. Mr. Christopher added that the State Department had not been taking the initiative enough in recent months.

The President asked who prepared the minutes of these meetings. Dr. Brzezinski replied the NSC staff. The President asked why Tony Lake could not sit in on the drafting of the minutes.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the minutes go back to the Department, and so we have every incentive to be honest and straightforward in our presentation of the meetings. If we have the State Department join with us in the preparation of the minutes, we will end up with two meetings—the first being the real meeting and the second the meeting to rearticulate in the better form what had not been said in the first meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski said he had not been informed of any deficiencies or distortions in minutes which he had prepared for the President. Indeed, sometimes when it is a particularly delicate subject, the agencies are invited to attach statements to the minutes of their own position.

Warren Christopher asked if the Secretary of State could not see the minutes of his own meetings—the PRCs which he chairs. The President thought this was a reasonable suggestion.

David Newsom noted that even at the SCCs, new issues arise which are not staffed out and therefore it would be useful to have a chance to review the minutes to be certain that the State Department views expressed at the meeting were properly reflected.

Harold Brown asked whether the question was procedural or substantive. He said he got a lot of decisions he did not like, but the problem was not the minutes, it was the decisions the President made.

Secretary-Designate Muskie said that the Congress deals with committees all the time, so he understood the problem. The question is whether the minutes reflect the differences of opinion and whether they are fairly reported. The President said that Harold Brown and Dr. Brzezinski think they do and noted that Cy Vance never came to him with any complaints. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that Senator Muskie try the system and see how it works. He also noted that the suggestions that the minutes be reviewed before they go to the President were a reflection on his integrity which as far as he could see had no foundation in fact.

The President said there was a question of timing. The SCCs meet in the morning, they report by the afternoon and there is a decision to the bureaucracy by that evening or the next day. We are dealing with fast-moving situations, said the President, and he does not want an extra day spent on reviewing the minutes. If David Newsom or Tony Lake have something specific they are concerned about, they can put down the actual words that they want to see reflected in the minutes, but he did not wish to see the minutes lengthened. When it comes to the PRC which is chaired by the Secretary of State, we could take an extra day to get the minutes to the President. Tony Lake said that he was only suggesting that the minutes be reviewed from the PRC.

The President said that we would then plan to have the minutes of the PRC reviewed by the Chairman of the PRC before they go to the President.

David Aaron referred to the suggestion for joint studies. He said that this was a very important concept which we needed to deal with a number of very complicated matters in the government. We have not been able to systematically review complex problems since the early days of the Administration when we tried to do so with Presidential Review Memoranda. However, these had so many people involved that they immediately leaked to the press long before they were ever reviewed at the senior levels of the government. If we are now to go forward with more joint studies, they must be tightly held. The President endorsed the latter point, emphasizing that the PRMs were always in the paper before he ever had an opportunity to read them.

Henry Owen said there were no problems in the economic area. He said that the economic group meets for lunch, hashes things out and operates as a good team. The President added that it is a relationship that he wished worked for all the national security area. Secretary-Designate Muskie said he thought it could be worked out. The President continued that the international economic policy operation is a pleasure. He said that he needed diverse views. He does not want the NSC absorbed into the State Department. He noted that Henry Owen consults on a wide variety of issues with AID, with State and with Treasury. As a result, he gets a wide variety of useful advice. However, he did not believe there was an adequate relationship of that sort between the NSC and the State Department on other issues.

(There was then a short break.)

When the meeting reconvened, the President said that he was well-pleased with the relationship that was being established between the State Department and the NSC. He noted that in the morning, the group had focused on process. He asked that David Aaron and David Newsom get together to work up recommendations that could be presented to him concerning the status of the PRCs, the SCCs and the integration and cooperation among the two staffs. The President said if the State Department has a problem with him or the Defense Department or the CIA has a problem, there has to be a way to get that problem to him. That is something he wanted worked out.

Ben Read said that the changes to be made in the process should include not having the National Security Adviser provide backgrounders to the press. The President responded by saying that Secretary-Designate Muskie should be the spokesman for the Department. The President would be the spokesman for the White House and let Dr. Brzezinski and David Aaron speak, too. The President said he cannot muzzle Dr. Brzezinski, but he thought it could be worked out adequately between Dr. Brzezinski and the Secretary-Designate. He said Ed Muskie would be his principal spokesman and that Dr. Brzezinski had recommended this. Dr. Brzezinski added that he had some already existing engagements which had been worked out with the political people before the campaign and he would need to follow through on those speaking engagements.

Secretary-Designate Muskie suggested that the President come to the State Department for two meetings—one with the top policy people and the other with the Department as a whole. He said this could have much to do with emphasizing the role of the State Department. He thought that there was a perceptual conflict between the State Department and the NSC that does not exist in reality. Secretary-Designate Muskie said he did not want to go on talk shows, but when he does so, it will be because we have an important statement to make.

The President noted that he has a foreign policy speech scheduled for Philadelphia.⁶ He anticipated a 15-minute speech with questions and answers afterwards.

The President said that after Senator Muskie assumes the Office of Secretary of State, he would like to meet with a small group of advisers and then have lunch with them. Then he could meet in the auditorium without the press to answer questions from the members of the Department.

(There was then a break for lunch.)

After lunch, the President began the discussion by saying that he had looked at the substantive briefing books for the meeting and there was nothing good in them. He said we had a bitch of a problem with the Soviet Union. We want trade. We want arms control but the invasion of Afghanistan rocks all this. In his view, we must be firm concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

One of the results, he said, is that SALT II, SALT III and TNF arms control are all mixed up and we have to see how we might be able to resolve the matter. He thought that we might have to leapfrog SALT II and go directly into the negotiations of SALT III and TNF, otherwise he thought we would lose a major cohesive element in the alliance.

The President thought the Allies were quite timid and reluctant to deal with the challenges that we face today. And that we must keep the heat on them.

The President thought that our normalization of relations with the Peoples Republic of China was a major step for stability in the world and in the Pacific. He said we imposed limits on ourselves on how much we will favor the PRC over the USSR, for example, in the sale of lethal weapons. Returning to the question of the Allies, he thought that our problems with them are greatly exaggerated but that there is a problem. For example, all the writers say—or all the editorialists and columnists say that we don’t consult the Europeans adequately. However, he felt our consultations with them and our relationship was better than it was in 1976. He also thought the situation in regard to TNF was deteriorating. He was concerned about Belgium and even Italian backsliding.

Chancellor Schmidt was a particular problem. He behaves alright in his discussions with me, said the President, but when he goes home and talks to other leaders it is very different. The President said he was surprised recently when for the first time he got a secret report that Schmidt was actually defending the President. In this connection, the President said that all the major leaders of the seven nations are either facing elections or just come through them. He thought that Schmidt’s political situation was the more serious than any of the others with the possible exception of the Italians.

Turning to the Middle East, the President said we face a new crisis. He thought that Prime Minister Begin would not do anything in the autonomy negotiations. He noted that we have problems here at home in how far we can push the Israelis. He said that Sadat has pledged himself to be flexible but all he has received is a narrow, biased and abusive response from Begin. Moreover, he thought Begin would exploit the killings in Hebron. The President concluded that we are facing a showdown in the Middle East. Turning to other areas of the world, the President said that we have problems with Pakistan, our relationship with South Korea is not too bad but the situation is dangerous. In Africa, he said he thought we had openings. For example, in Angola and possibly Mozambique. The President’s view was that the American people will accept a better relationship with Marxist regimes in Africa. As for the new leader of Liberia, Sergeant Doe, the President didn’t think that he knew what he wanted. Finally, the President said he would like to strengthen our relationship with Nigeria and for that purpose he suggested the Nigerian head of state be invited to come to the United States.

On Southeast Asia, he said that refugees continue to be a problem. But even worse were the refugees coming from Cuba. The President said he wants to communicate with Castro and see if Castro is willing to solve this problem. In his second term, said the President, he would hope to lift the economic blockade of Cuba. In fact, he hoped early in this Administration to do so but circumstances prohibited it.

Finally, on Iran, the President noted that Bani-Sadr had said that the hostages had not been moved from the Embassy. However, the President thought they had been moved. Harold Brown interjected that we see evidence at Tabriz that they may have taken some of the hostages there. Dr. Brzezinski added that it was important now to make a big issue of Red Cross access so that we know what has happened to our hostages.

The President noted that sanctions by the Europeans would be voted on May 17. He thought this would be a positive step but it would not solve the problem. The President said he, personally, was not so worried about sanctions or other actions moving the Iranians into the Soviet orbit. He thought the Iranians had a profound fear of the Soviets.

The President said he wanted to deescalate the situation for a while because we have no alternative to patience. He said he did not know whether deescalation would work. The President concluded that we have to let the American people know what we are doing, and what we have done well, but, at the same time, not cover up real problems. At the same time, he said, we need initiatives that will look like a success. The problems we face, he thought, were over-emphasized but they were nonetheless real.

Secretary-Designate Muskie said that he should be the last to speak out but he thought that his coming on board can be presented as a success in itself or at least a pathway to success. He said the Europeans are all interested in evaluating him. In the process of getting to know them, he could emphasize the positive dimensions of our foreign policy. In particular, the idea that they can rely on us. Secretary-Designate Muskie said he felt the notion that we are erratic is hogwash. He thought that working with the Europeans could be presented as a new initiative and this could lead to a perception of the Western Alliance rallying around the United States.

Henry Owen thought that we could do something with the Western Europeans because they are scared of Ronald Reagan. He thought it wouldn’t hurt if they spoke up in defense of the President. Our record is good with a long-term defense program and successful trade negotiations. For this reason, they should be willing to speak up. Henry Owen thought that the President’s speech in Philadelphia should paint the same picture. It should focus on underlying policies, and talk about the fact that there would be no shortcuts. If the opponents think that there are, they are either lying or deceiving the American people.

The Acting Secretary thought that some problems with the Allies result from US leadership. On Afghanistan, for example, they are uncomfortable with our leadership. On the Olympics, they are giving us support. The important thing was to pick a few targets and be successful. He thought we should be focusing our primary attention on the Soviet Union. Warren Christopher added that before the meeting breaks up, he would like the President to hear Peter Tarnoff who heads up the State Department Secretariat. He stressed how valuable Peter Tarnoff was and said that if he had one person to take with him on a trip, it would be Peter Tarnoff.

Peter Tarnoff explained that the new secretary does not have to accept the system that currently exists in the Department. It can be molded. Henry Kissinger’s system was very different from Cy Vance’s system. He thought that other people had covered the main points: the role of the Secretary of State, the process, the issue of policy contribution. He thought that the new Secretary-Designate would want to modify the system but he stressed that he would have the resources to make that modification. The word of how this meeting at Camp David was conducted will be very inspiring to the people in the Department.

Secretary-Designate Muskie commented that he has been in the Senate for 22 years and he has seen many reforms. Indeed, he was seen as a reformer himself and having seen the effect of those reforms, he wishes that a lot of them had never taken place.

David Aaron interjected at this point to say that there was one positive development on the horizon that the President could make into an important personal success. This was the meeting at Venice with the other seven heads of state. If properly prepared and conducted without great expectations being built up, he thought that it could be presented as an important personal success at a very important time for the President.

The President agreed with this assessment. He added that ways to improve consultations with our Allies should be on the agenda of the summit meeting. He said that as far as meetings are concerned, the French are always the problem. He thought we should try to set up the mechanism among the seven because it was difficult to exclude other countries. The Guadeloupe meeting arranged by the French embarrassed the Italians and the Japanese. The President said he wants to meet every six months with other heads of state and have more frequent contacts at other levels.

Henry Owen interjected that at some point we ought to set up a committee of the seven to deal with one another on a continuing basis. The President added that preparations and arrangements for the seven should be worked out at a meeting of the four.

Warren Christopher pointed out that there is a problem in dealing with the seven ambassadors here in Washington [1½ lines not declassified] Henry Owen [3 lines not declassified]

David Newsom turned to a different question—that of resources. He said this was not just a question of the amount of resources available to conduct our foreign policy whether it is in the aid area, the military assistance area or travel but it was the flexibility to use these forces [resources] and he wanted to signal this as a major concern which the Administration should work on for the future because it had a broad impact on the foreign policy.

The President said that he had talked with groups in the House and he had talked to President Ford about this problem. He said if we are to be successful, we have to work with Secretary-Designate Muskie’s advice to make it clear to the American people and to the Congress that a billion dollars in aid is just as important to our security as a billion dollars in the defense budget. Perhaps even more so. He endorsed the idea of a more flexible policy on aid. For example, he said that Angola may be a plum ripe for the picking if we could simply make some aid available. He said we need to go to the American people and make clear the facts about aid, the overwhelming bulk of which goes to Israel and Egypt.

Harold Brown said this problem is compounded by making our foreign military sales credit program part of the aid account when it is not aid at all.

Secretary-Designate Muskie jokingly suggested that he could combine the foreign affairs and defense function in the Congressional budget resolution. He then noted that when he ran for the Senate, he ran on a pro-foreign aid platform. He said there is a case based on our nation’s security and interest for foreign aid. The President noted that he, too, can convince 150 Congressmen for fifteen minutes that aid is important but when they get back on the Hill, they revert to their old ways.

Henry Owen said we are entering a critical period in this regard. We have five big bills on the Hill dealing with assistance in various forms. Without the President’s leadership, he said, we simply won’t make it.

In summing up, the President said to Secretary-Designate Muskie that he hoped he would not be wedded to the past. Protocol and travel can be handled by Warren Christopher. The Secretary-Designate can say that he is devoting himself to the key points. He thought we had a good chance for a clean break but if Secretary-Designate Muskie goes to the airports with the Foreign Ministers and goes to the ASEAN meetings, he said that we simply won’t be able to change the pattern of our activities. He suggested that the new Secretary might even wish to consider putting out a statement to this effect. The Secretary-Designate responded that he might be able to do that in connection with his confirmation hearings.⁷

David Newsom added a precautionary note. He said it is possible to separate the protocol functions but it is important to provide access. He said that our ambassadors in almost all countries have access to the head of state and the foreign ministers unlike what their ambassadors get here. So access and good treatment for the foreign ministers when they are here is an important contribution to our relationship.

The President said this was fine but it could be arranged so that there was a meeting with David Newsom and then a fifteen-minute meeting with the Secretary. The President stressed in closing that now was the time to make changes in the allocation of the Secretary-Designate’s time.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 57, Chron 5/1–11/80. Top Secret.
2. Senator Robert Byrd was the Senate Majority Leader.
3. See Documents 21, 22, and 23.
4. Carter met with Department of State officials on February 6, 1979, and with NSC Staff members the next day. He described the meetings in White House Diary, pp. 288–289.
5. See Document 7.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 147.
7. For Muskie’s May 7 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of his nomination, in which he discussed the role of the Secretary of State, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 146.