Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

96. Message From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the White House¹

Belgrade, June 15, 1977, 1600Z

FM Robert Hunter, Belgrade 102.

TO: “Eyes Only Aaron, Hyland, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs”.

Scotty Reston (protect) Tuesday² spoke to me at length about his conversation Monday³ with Schmidt, and asked that it be passed along. Schmidt had asked to see him, and appeared to have prepared his comments. Before London, Schmidt had been concerned about some of the President’s attitudes and policies, but felt reassured by the meetings there. On the basis of these talks, he had been in touch with the East Germans, Tito, and Brezhnev, and indicated that Carter had made his point on human rights, and that in future he would not place so much emphasis on the subject.⁴ But the overblown campaign had continued—including the most recent magazine editors interview—and “made a liar” out of Schmidt.⁵

Schmidt had seen in detente an opportunity to get 200,000 ethnic Germans out of Eastern Europe. This had been proceeding nicely, but was threatened by the President’s approach. He felt he had made this clear to the President in London, and been understood. Now, however, he felt he had been “misled”. The President also does not seem to understand what is happening in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev cannot easily continue his support for detente, and the President’s approach to human rights—the continued pressing—is making Brezhnev’s position more difficult, and thus is posing risks for the West.

Reston said he emphasized that Carter had stressed the importance of working closely with the Allies. Schmidt said that he had heard that, too, but the effect of the President’s actions (as on the human rights campaign) was directly the opposite. If he is President for 8 years, he will never have more sympathetic leaders than himself, Giscard and Callaghan, but doesn’t seem to understand their needs. Schmidt also stressed the risks in leftward movement in France and Italy—including fears of U.S. troop withdrawals, forced by Congress, if Communists come to power (or at least a very unwelcome dramatization of the Bonn–Washington axis). Plus there are grave dangers in Begin’s election.⁶ Another Middle East war is more likely, but would be intolerable in Europe. Schmidt also repeated his theme about the need for parity in SALT to be balanced with parity in conventional forces (MBFR), where he feels U.S. policy is not on track.⁷

Reston said that if Schmidt felt so much concern about the President’s policies, he should be in direct contact. (Schmidt seemed to be trying to give the impression that he also spoke for Giscard and Callaghan, but Reston dismisses the validity of this idea). Schmidt said he was worried—based on what he had been told—that the President would react too strongly to a letter or phone call, so had kept silent.

Reston said he had professional doubts about passing all this on, but felt he should, in view of the depth of Schmidt’s feelings, and his reluctance to make those feelings known.

The above is hinted at in Reston’s NYT piece of June 16.⁸ On CSCE conference: Opening meeting today solely procedural. British are briefing today on decision sheet, U.S. will do so tomorrow. Widespread interest in possible impact of Toth case on meeting here, though nothing apparent yet. Sherer doing effective job in briefing press. All waiting to see how abortive “demonstration” here this morning will be played in Western press. Incident considered here to be non-event.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, codeword, 7–7–1. Secret; Immediate; [less than 1 line not declassified]; Eyes Only.
2. June 14.
3. June 13.
4. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “Schmidt is mistaken.”
5. Reference is to Carter’s May 20 interview; see “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With a Group of Publishers, Editors, and Broadcasters,” Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 945–954.
6. On May 17, the Likud Party won parliamentary elections in Israel, allowing Begin to begin negotiations to form a coalition government. (“Upset Stuns Israelis; Speculation Intense on Coalition Cabinet,” New York Times, May 19, 1977, pp. A1, A15)
7. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words: “he feels US policy is not on track.” In the adjacent margin, he wrote: “We talked freely for hours. He’s apparently changed his ideas and concerns J.”
8. Reference is to James Reston, “A View From Bonn,” New York Times, June 15, 1977, p. 21; see also James Reston, “Letter From Belgrade,” New York Times, June 17, 1977, p. A27.