95. Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- President Carter’s Conversation With Chancellor Schmidt
The President spoke with the Chancellor (from the private study) from about 10:18 to 10:38 this morning. The tone of the conversation was warm and friendly throughout. The following is a paraphrase of their remarks:
The President: Good morning to you.
The Chancellor: Good morning Mr. President, your foreign secretary has just left. We were in a press conference when you called earlier.2
The President: Yes, they told me. Was it a good meeting?
The Chancellor: Oh yes. We dealt with a wide range of issues, from Moscow to South Africa back to Europe again and on to Washington.
The President: I didn’t know that he would be meeting with you at the same time. I would like to talk about a few points. We sent notice to you on our domestic approaches on nuclear fuel reprocessing.3 I will be making a statement on it next week, and wanted to give you prior notice. Do you have a few minutes to talk about it?
The Chancellor: Yes.
The President: Secretary Vance gave you the key elements of it, and we welcome your comments on it, and whether anything in it causes you concern.
(Reading): “Many countries see nuclear power as the only real opportunity, at least in this century, to reduce the dependence of their economic well-being on foreign oil . . . the U.S. has a major domestic energy source—coal.” But even here “our plans also call for the use of nuclear power as a share in our energy production.”
The Chancellor: May I insert something here, and say that we fully share this point.
The President: The second point: There is a problem of unrestricted use, particularly if it leads to atomic explosives. We have said to the American people that we have the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been signed by more than 100 nations. But we need to go farther. There are real risks of development of nuclear weapons or explosive capabilities.
“These risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of sensitive technologies. . . . We are now completing an extremely thorough review . . .” This includes “the serious consequences of proliferation and direct implications for peace and security—as well as scientific and economic evidence . . .”
I should say that we have had this done with 20 of our most distinguished nuclear physicists. Dr. Schlesinger has been working on it for 6 to 8 weeks, and I have put in a lot of my time. I have some technical background, though I am no expert.
We have concluded that we need to make “a major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies and programs; and a concerted effort among all nations to find better answers to the problems and risks accompanying the increased use of nuclear power.”
Today, I wanted to say that I will be announcing next week some points on what we will do, and I had better read this verbatim.
“First, we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs.” We are deferring the Barnwell project, even though it has cost many hundreds of millions of dollars.4
The Chancellor: Do you wish me to comment here?
The President: Yes sir.
The Chancellor: If this is a statement of new U.S. policies, then we would have no complaint. But if it is structured as an example for others to follow, then we would have something to complain about.
The President: I understand.
The Chancellor: If a country has enough natural uranium, like the United States, then this approach is all right. But if a country does not have natural uranium—like Germany—then it depends on imports as much as it does on oil. There is great pressure to reprocess. Also, in countries without great areas of land, then it is necessary to reduce the waste storage problem through reprocessing. This is not a problem for a large country like the United States. But for smaller countries, with dense population, it is, and there is dependence on uranium imports. Therefore, problems have a different shape.
It would be helpful if you would say that your stand is as an American for the United States, not necessarily an example to be imposed (sic) on others. We will cooperate closely and willingly on reports and analyses for an international regime for the uranium cycle.
The President: I take your point, we have no disagreement. There will be two phases. The first will be strictly domestic. And in the second we will pursue close mutual and international discussions to try to circumvent the problem, and I’m sure there won’t be one. We will try something on providing storage under international control. And we will try something to assure supplies of natural uranium and deuterium and enriched uranium for countries that have a supply shortage. We will keep trying to reduce problems and not go forward on the international side until after consultations. There will be no pressure. Is this fair?
The Chancellor: Yes. Let me say something in four sentences. I was given your preliminary outline of the statement on Tuesday by your ambassador, who is a very effective person.5
The President: I asked him to do it.
The Chancellor: Today, in only about 48 hours, I gave Mr. Vance a preliminary paper commenting on the outline of your statement.6 This was a written preliminary comment.
The President: I look forward to getting it. What we sent you was just a rough draft, and it has been modified. We will distinguish between immediate domestic parts of our program, then later will go into the international side, working with all of you abroad who are concerned.
The Chancellor: I would like to have in your statement that U.S. policy is for inside the United States. And that in your international policy you are seeking the advice and cooperation and consultation of others, for a written treaty, to put it in international law—as I understand your approach.
The President: I think you will see that point. (Reading) “Second, we will restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program to give greater priority to alternative designs of the plutonium breeder, and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be placed into commercial use.” We have had a substantial breeder reactor program. In my budget which I worked over since coming to office, I’ve taken about $200 million out. We are going to go forward at a slower rate, with no crash program.
The Chancellor: Yes. (Note: In the sense of acknowledging he had heard.)
The President: (Reading) “Third, we will redirect funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs to accelerate our research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct access to nuclear weapons useable materials.”
The Chancellor: Yep.
The President: We will do our best on research to get other ways.
The Chancellor: Do you include solar energy and fusion?
The President: Yes, but this statement is only about nuclear. But we will also expand solar and other energy efforts. In London we can talk—with you and leaders of Britain and France and Japan. We will ask if you all can share in the R & D effort (i.e., the expense). For example, if you are interested in a particular part of it, then we would reduce our effort.
The Chancellor: We will prepare something on this for London.
The President: (Reading). “Fourth, we will increase U.S. production capacity for enriched uranium to provide adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels for domestic and foreign needs.
“Fifth, we will take the necessary legislative steps to permit the U.S. to offer nuclear fuel supply contracts and guarantee delivery of such nuclear fuel to other countries.” We will remove the prohibition here.
“Sixth, we will continue to embargo the export of equipment or technology that would permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing.” Of course, this applies only to us. It was our policy before, and it will continue.
“Seventh, we will continue discussions with supplying and recipient countries alike, of a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that will permit all nations to achieve their energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear weapons. Among other things, we will explore the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program aimed at developing alternative fuel cycles and a variety of international and U.S. measures to assure access by all nations to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel storage.” That is the totality of it.
The Chancellor: Thank you. I have commented in a preliminary way to Secretary Vance on your outline, which was somewhat vague. This is much more precise, and I understand better what you are proposing. There is room for amending what I said to Mr. Vance. Let me mention two points.
The President: Please.
The Chancellor: I understand you will make your statement early next week. You will hear from Secretary Vance that a little later would be better, in terms of our understanding the details.
The President: We will talk with you before the speech.
The Chancellor: In 24 hours?
The President: All right. (Note: This appeared to represent diplomatic contact, not another summit call.)
The Chancellor: There would be some advantage in delaying two or three days more, if one aims at an idea raised briefly with Secretary Vance: if at the same time that the U.S. puts its policy out, wouldn’t it be wise to have in parallel a joint statement by our two administrations on our willingness to cooperate, and to enhance non-proliferation policies, generally. Perhaps we should be more specific. This is something to be wished and desired, and may be even necessary for public use.
The President: This would be valuable to me.
The Chancellor: It would show our will for cooperation.
The President: If we waited until later in the week, would this (joint statement) be possible?
The Chancellor: Yes. If you read the text Secretary Vance is bringing back, the first few paragraphs could be used as a first draft. The willingness to cooperate is stated there. Other aspects, such as the agreement with Brazil, are not expressed in the paper. But we can have a long talk when you will be here (in Europe). These issues need not hamper our joint statement on our joint approach (to international aspects of nuclear policy), if you wish to do this.
The President: I will give it my attention, thank you.7 I am looking forward to seeing you in London.
The Chancellor: I hope we can have a bilateral talk.
The President: That would please me very much. I have scheduled a meeting with President Assad somewhere in Europe. I think it is in Geneva.
The Chancellor: Secretary Vance said it was Geneva.
The President: We can find some time, perhaps either during the day or at night when the other leaders are in London.8
The Chancellor: I would prefer at night, so it can be open-ended.
The President: Thank you very much.
The Chancellor: This would be fortunate (?).
The President: I would be pleased, too.
The Chancellor: I would like to schedule when I could see you there. I have another official meeting in Canada in June. Would it be possible to come to Washington after Ottawa? This would have public value for me.
The President: I will officially invite you right now, and our diplomatic people can work out the details.9
The Chancellor: I mentioned this to Secretary Vance.
The President: I look forward to it. It would be helpful to me domestically here, and I think to you, as well, in showing that we are cooperating.
Have a good day.
The Chancellor: Thank you, goodbye.
The President: It was a pleasure to talk with you, goodbye.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77. Secret; Sensitive. Telegram Tosec 30179 to Vance in Bonn, March 31, provided a summary of the telephone conversation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0344 and P84007–1517)↩
- Reference is to a joint press conference held by Vance and Schmidt following their March 31 talks. See “Vance Assures Two Allies that Detente is Still Alive,” New York Times, April 1, 1977, p. 8. A record of the March 31 talks is in telegram Secto 3077 from Vance, April 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0356 and P840076–0326.↩
- Telegram 67973 to Bonn, Brasilia, Brussels, Berlin, The Hague, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Prague, Rome, Stockholm, Tehran, Tokyo, Warsaw, USNATO, the Missions to the EC, the IAEA, and the UN, and Vance’s Delegation in Moscow, March 27, instructed each Mission to inform its host government about Carter’s planned statement on nuclear policy and conveyed a non-paper for host governments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0195 and P840076–0698, N770002–0195)↩
- Reference is to the nuclear fuel plant located at Barnwell, South Carolina.↩
- Telegram 5585 from Bonn, March 29, reported Stoessel’s meeting that day with Schmidt, during which the latter requested more time for consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N700002–2704 and P840084–2207) Telegram 5682 from Bonn, March 31, reported that on March 30, Loeck, who had attended the March 29 discussion, told an Embassy official that the “proposals had come as something of a bombshell, since it made dealing with the Brazilian situation even more difficult,” that “the FRG found itself in a ‘cruel’ situation, since the French had already delivered their drawings and blueprints to the Pakistanis,” and that “the US position strengthened the opponents of the German nuclear program who were not exactly the kind of people either of us would like to support.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–1493)↩
- Telegram 5753 from Bonn, March 31, transmitted the German non-paper, which Schmidt had given to Vance during their talk and which responded to the non-paper Stoessel presented to Schmidt on May 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0338 and 850050–0297)↩
- In telegram 5854 from Bonn, April 4, Stoessel wrote: “In my view, joining with the FRG in a common statement would seem to imply some responsibility by the US for a decision taken and would suggest that we had been forced down from our position regarding transfer of sensitive technologies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770002–0428, P800023–1012 and P840086–0587) On April 7, the United States and the FRG issued separate public statements on peaceful uses of atomic energy. For Carter’s statement, see “Nuclear Power Policy: Statement on Decisions Reached Following a Review,” Public Papers: Carter, 1977, pp. 587–588; for an excerpt from the West German statement, see AAPBD 1977, Document 70, note 8.↩
- Carter met Schmidt in London on May 7; a record of their meeting is in Memorandum of Conversation, May 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 3/77.↩
- Schmidt visited Washington from July 13 to 15 for talks with Carter, Vance, and Blumenthal; see Document 98.↩