Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

97. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 12, 1977

SUBJECT

• Schmidt Visit

This memorandum provides context and a general framework for the Schmidt visit. At Tab A is Cy’s basic overview and issues memorandum.² At Tab B is a memorandum setting out the dimensions of current political and economic uncertainty in Europe, which frame both the Schmidt and Andreotti visits.³ Henry Owen’s memorandum on Summit follow-up is at Tab C.⁴ At Tab D is a good CIA paper that provides additional background to the German economic situation.⁵ Schedules are at Tab E, and suggested talking points for the arrival ceremony and your toast are at Tab F.⁶

The visit is unusually important. It will be less an occasion to negotiate specific issues than to examine general conceptions of, and perhaps conflicts over, where we and our Allies go from here in two main areas:

1. Questions of East–West relations—prospects for detente, SALT (including the cruise missile), MBFR, CSCE and human rights, the Middle East and non-proliferation.

2. Major economic questions—what can be done about the economic and political malaise in Europe in general, what specific steps might be necessary to bolster moderate forces in France, Italy or the Mediterranean countries, your view of growth, trade problems, EC enlargement and follow-up to the London Summit.

The Political Context

The current discord in relations with Bonn reflects various anxieties on Schmidt’s part.

First of all, his own political future is extremely clouded. It is an open secret in Germany that his coalition partner, the Free Democrats under Vice Chancellor Genscher, are building bridges to the opposition, and keeping open the possibility of forming a new coalition government with the Christian Democrats next spring or summer. Elections in two German states next year (Hesse and Lower Saxony) could be decisive.

Schmidt’s political demise is not inevitable. The opposition is not united and is led by a colorless figure (Helmut Kohl). Yet Schmidt needs some dramatic initiative to regain his former popularity. Since his domestic policies are constrained by the conservatism of Genscher’s party, his only field for showing movement is foreign policy.

The European Community, despite its fundamental importance, is dull and uninteresting to the German public. What catches the imagination, and appeals to deep-seated fears, is Eastern policy—relations with the Soviets and with East Germany. Moreover, the pressures in his own party—especially from the Brandt group—point him toward the East to show that he is in fact easing the division of Germany and shoring up Germany’s security by keeping the line open to Moscow. That is why he is deeply upset by our human rights policy and the uncertain prospects for U.S.–Soviet relations if there is no SALT agreement. He knows that he cannot conduct an independent Eastern policy in opposition to the United States (at least not for very long). But it will be political disaster if he is to endure a period of rising tensions out of loyalty to the United States. This would almost guarantee the return to power of the Christian Democrats.

Second, his political future is likely to be affected by events in France and Italy. There is a growing concern in Germany that the Federal Republic will become an “island in a Red Sea.” Schmidt personally is appalled by Mitterand’s common front with the Communists. And the German Social Democrats, including many former Communists, have fundamental concerns about the rise of “Eurocommunism,” and the trend toward coalitions with them. If the Left wins in France, the probable reaction will be a shift to the Right in Germany, virtually sealing Schmidt’s doom and beginning to divide the European great powers.⁷ All Europeans recognize, however, that Europe cannot be constructed without a fundamental Franco–German understanding.

Third, Schmidt prides himself on being the most knowledgeable European leader in economics. He resents U.S. advice and bristles at U.S. pressures on his economic policies. For Schmidt and for most Germans, high unemployment and spiraling inflation raise the spectre of social unrest and political radicalization, in a country whose history cannot permit either phenomenon.

Finally, there is the specific question of the Brazilian nuclear arrangement and its feedback into German politics. For Schmidt, fulfilling his contractual obligations is a matter of German “honor,” especially so with all the Third World watching. He argues that Germany of all countries cannot earn a reputation for reneging on international commitments. Nor can Germany any longer afford to repudiate an agreement that encounters American disapproval. What is frustrating for the Germans is that they basically share your non-proliferation goals, but for the foregoing reasons, feel that the Brazilian deal allows for little compromise.

Schmidt has been complaining about this Administration’s policies in recent weeks to almost anyone who will listen—to Reston, to his own press and to his EC colleagues.⁸ Some of his unhappiness no doubt reflects the pique of a temperamental—even slightly paranoid—man at having been supplanted by you as the West’s most attractive leader. Another part is sheer frustration occasioned by his own political situation. Yet, from his perspective, none of our policy initiatives has helped him politically, and most have hurt. Urging him to reflate the economy played to the inflation phobia. He may regard our non-proliferation policy as likely to cost him employment; he may see arms transfer restraint in a similar light. And our activism on human rights has trapped him between the worry that Germany’s success in getting (in many cases, buying) ethnic Germans out of Eastern Europe will be jeopardized, on the one hand, and the taunts of his right-wing opposition that he is soft on human rights, on the other.

Schmidt finds himself in the position where the U.S. can decisively influence his political future. Under the traditional conditions that have governed German–American relations, he should want this visit to show a broad area of cooperation. But in present circumstances, it is also not necessarily a disadvantage to stand up to the Americans where German national interests are involved. In effect, he has been signalling that he intends to be firm and to press you for clarification of American policy.

Your Objectives

You are in a position to lay Schmidt’s concern to rest, since most of his apprehensions are groundless:

1. East–West Relations. You can analyze for him the basic factors that should work for an improvement in relations with the USSR, including a SALT agreement. Moreover, you can invite him to take an initiative in MBFR negotiations, since the Germans have the most immediate interests at stake. And you can explain, as you have, that your human rights policy is not directed specifically against the Soviet Union, but that inevitably there will be friction and tensions if the Soviets continue to repress and harass their own dissidents while proclaiming fidelity to the Helsinki principles. Finally on the CSCE, you can outline to him your view that this should become an institution for creating links between East and West, permitting the East Europeans some freedom of actions, and, if possible, softening some features of Soviet life. In short, you and the Chancellor share the same basic concerns about East-West relations: the basic decisions have to be taken in Moscow, not Washington, and this is where Schmidt can make a significant contribution by disabusing Brezhnev of his apprehensions.

2. Economics. You will want to emphasize the link between economic and political stability in Western Europe, especially in Turkey, Spain, Portugal and France. You should stress the importance of close cooperation between ourselves and the Germans in addressing the range of economic issues that confront us: providing adequate international financing, achieving progress in trade negotiations, assuring economic growth, and moving forward on North–South issues.

3. Non-Proliferation. The meeting will provide an opportunity to raise a new approach to the FRG–Brazil agreement.⁹ You may also want to indicate your concern with the recent announcement of a European cooperative program to develop and export breeder reactors.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Box 21, 7/13–14/77 Schmidt (Germany) Visit: 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the page.
2. Tab A was not found attached.
3. Tab B was not found attached.
4. Tab C was not found attached.
5. Tab D was not found attached.
6. Tabs E and F were not found attached.
7. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words: “Left wins in France” and “virtually sealing Schmidt’s doom.”
8. For Schmidt’s remarks to Reston, see Document 163. Telegram 519 from Luxembourg reported Thorn’s account of critical comments made by Schmidt at the June 29–30 European Council meeting in London: “Thorn said that he ‘couldn’t believe his ears’ when he heard Schmidt; the Chancellor had said that President Carter appeared to be accommodating and flexible but was really determined on getting his way and that American policy was as domineering as it had ever been in the past. Thorn said that he thought that the nuclear non-proliferation question was the root cause of Schmidt’s bitterness.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770004–0148 and P840003–0234)
9. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 417, footnote 1.