Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

78. Memorandum of Conversation¹

November 30, 1979, 2:05–2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Telephone Call From Canadian Prime Minister Clark

After initial pleasantries, Prime Minister Clark told the President that he admired his calm and restraint during the present Iranian crisis.² He praised the President for his personal performance during the present emergency and also stated his admiration for the general restraint of the American public. He asked the President if there was anything more he could do to help. The President replied that there might be some things Prime Minister Clark could do after Saturday’s United Nations Security Council meeting is over.³ President Carter said that he did not want to discuss these matters over the telephone.

Prime Minister Clark asked President Carter to have Ambassador Peter Towe kept informed about the Iranian situation, particularly if there are any policy changes. Prime Minister Clark indicated that better liaison between U.S. government officials and Ambassador Towe might be appropriate.

Prime Minister Clark volunteered to offer any liaison assistance with leaders of other countries. President Carter responded that both the Canadians and the Egyptians had been extremely helpful. He indicated that the U.K., France, Japan, and the FRG were helpful, but they could do more. President Carter made it clear that he was not being critical of the leaders of these four countries, but was simply pointing out that they did only what they were asked to do, nothing more. Prime Minister Clark said he understood and volunteered to follow-up with Thatcher, Giscard, Ohira, and Schmidt on a strictly personal basis, not involving the U.S. in any way.

President Carter and Prime Minister Clark then engaged in brief discussion of Canadian and U.S. domestic politics. Prime Minister Clark indicated that “my hunch is that the Canadian people want a government,” and he intends to give them one. President Carter remarked about his recent favorable performance relative to that of Senator Kennedy.

Prime Minister Clark then turned the conversation to the West-to-East oil pipeline.⁴ President Carter said that the Foothills approach was unacceptable. Foothills had been considered and rejected in the findings of the Department of the Interior.⁵ Prime Minister Clark pressed the President on this issue: “Is it the position of your government that Foothills is out?” President Carter said “yes.” President Carter said that the choice was now reduced to the northern tier vs. the transmountain approach. Prime Minister Clark indicated that the Canadian Government was concerned about symmetrical treatment of these two competing proposals. He expressed concern that the northern tier approach, an all-U.S. pipeline system, might receive more favorable treatment. President Carter said that treatment of the proposals would be evenhanded.⁶ He suggested to Prime Minister Clark that financing is the key issue. If the Canadian authorities hear anything about how the finance committee⁷ feels about these two proposals, this information should be shared with their U.S. counterparts.

President Carter informed Prime Minister Clark that he had requested a 60-day extension on this decision, an extension which is permissible under the appropriate statute.⁸

Prime Minister Clark asked if there would be any public announcement by the U.S.G. concerning the reduction of three pipeline options to two options. President Carter said that there was no appropriate forum⁹ to make such an announcement but that Prime Minister Clark should feel free to quote him as a result of this conversation.

Prime Minister Clark then turned to the subject of cancellation of the November 9–10 trip to Ottawa.¹⁰ He told the President that he didn’t want to press the President, but that he would very much like the President to come to Canada when the circumstances are appropriate. President Carter expressed his deep regret at having to cancel his trip and said he very much wanted to visit Canada. He indicated that appropriate officials on both sides should be able to produce satisfactory time for the visit, when the present uncertainty is over.

President Carter then turned to the security issues and the use of weapons by special agents. Prime Minister Clark indicated that the morale of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was quite low and that unfortunately the security issue has become tangled with a morale issue. Prime Minister Clark indicated that if he appeared to give in, it would be bad for the Mounties’ morale. Prime Minister Clark did indicate, however, that “in light of extraordinary present circumstances,” i.e., the Iranian situation, the Canadians might be able to make some special accommodation for a Presidential visit. President Carter indicated that he would be willing to invite officials of the RCMP down to Washington to talk with him about the problem.¹¹ He was concerned that part of the difficulty was an inherited problem from the Nixon administration, during which President Nixon or USSS personnel apparently criticized security arrangements by the RCMP after President Nixon’s trip to Canada. President Carter indicated that the U.S. had an unfortunate history of security problems for national leaders and that one result of this history was the development of special expertise; e.g., the USSS has developed special techniques in crowd monitoring.¹² Prime Minister Clark accepted the point and suggested that the appropriate way to make progress on this matter was to have Ambassador Towe continue discussions with appropriate U.S. officials. President Carter indicated that since the USSS came under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury, it might be sensible to take advantage of Ambassador Towe’s friendship with Secretary Miller and have these two men discuss this matter. Prime Minister Clark agreed.

The President closed the conversation by thanking the Prime Minister again for his courageous and invaluable help during the present crisis in Iran.¹³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10–12/79. Secret; Sensitive. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “ok as amended. J.” Carter spoke to Clark from Camp David. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Reference is to the November 4 occupation of the Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages.
3. Reference is to the UN Security Council’s discussion of the Iran hostage crisis on December 1. (“U.N. Council to Sit Without Iran,” New York Times, December 1, 1979, p. 6)
4. Reference is to a proposed pipeline that would bring Alaskan crude oil from the West Coast to refineries in the middle of the United States. Three routes were under consideration: a) the “Foothills” pipeline, which would bring the oil to the United States directly overland through Canada; b) the “Northern Tier” pipeline, which would transport oil across U.S. territory from Port Angeles, Washington to Chicago, Illinois; and c) the “Trans-Mountain” pipeline which would move oil from Port Angeles through both Canada and the United States. (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, November 29; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 7, Canada: 1/78–9/79)
5. On October 15, Secretary of the Interior Andrus rejected the “Foothills” pipeline, endorsed the “Northern Tier” pipeline, and specified that the “Trans-Mountain” pipeline should be considered if the “Northern Tier” pipeline failed to secure financing within a year. (“Northern Tier Oil Line is Endorsed by Andrus,” New York Times, October 16, 1979, p. D1)
6. Carter underlined the phrase “would be evenhanded,” and wrote in the margin: “No. I said both proposals would still be considered. Sec Int has reccom. N Tier.”
7. Carter drew a line through the word “committee.” In the margin he wrote the word “community,” which he circled, and from which he drew an arrow pointing at the word “committee.”
8. Reference is to Title V of Public Law 95–617, which required the President to decide which pipeline system should receive expedited permitting procedures. (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, November 29; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 7, Canada: 1/78–9/79)
9. In this sentence, Carter wrote the letter “u” above the word “form,” changing it to read “forum.”
10. Carter cancelled his visit to Canada as a result of the November 4 occupation of the Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages. (Telegram 6004 from Ottawa, November 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790009–0424 and P840128–1756) In a November 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, which bears a stamp that reads “ZB has seen,” Blackwill wrote: “If our people have not been released in Tehran, I believe the President should stay home. I say that fully recognizing that there is pitifully little he can do to hasten the release of hostages. But I am certain that if the students begin to shoot our people, the last place the President should be is at the French-Canadian Ballet or lifting a glass of champagne at the black-tie dinner.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 7, Canada: 1/78–9/79)
11. In this sentence, Carter drew a line through the words “would be” and wrote “had been” above them.
12. At the end of this sentence, Carter wrote an asterisk. At the bottom of the page, he wrote another asterisk and the following sentence: “Including esp. the knowledge of appearance & habits of potential attackers who might be known only to guardians of the President.”
13. In a November 30 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski suggested the following talking points on Iran for Carter’s telephone conversation with Clark: “We are deeply grateful for Canada’s courageous and invaluable help, both public and otherwise.” Brzezinski underlined the phrase “and otherwise” and wrote: “A hint would be sufficient.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 6, Country Chron: Canada, 7–12/79) The Canadian Embassy sheltered six U.S. diplomats not taken hostage during the November 4 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran; see Document 79.