79. Memorandum for the Record by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Canadian Officials on Exfiltrating Six Hiding Americans from Tehran
On January 2, 1980, I met with Deputy Foreign Secretary Alan Gotlieb for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes starting at 3 p.m. in his office in Ottawa. Accompanying me were Ambassador Curtis [name not declassified]. Accompanying Gotlieb were Undersecretary Pat Black, Executive Assistant to the Minister Hugh Hanson and Bureau Chief Michael Shenstone.
I told Gotlieb that we very much appreciated their agreement to meet with us on short notice. The President and the Secretary were extremely grateful for the cooperation that the Canadian Government had provided to us in dealing with the Iranian situation, notably in sheltering the six official Americans. We are fully aware of the risks and dangers to Canadian personnel, property and interests stemming from their assistance to us. Although we had not previously wanted to press the Canadians on finding ways to exfiltrate the six, we were becoming increasingly concerned that their continued safety in Canadian Embassy premises could now become jeopardized: (1) an increasing number of journalists know that some official Americans are hiding in a friendly mission; (2) the application of Chapter VII sanctions by Western countries2 could lead both to greater surveillance and harassment of embassies, and the drawdown of Western embassy personnel, thereby increasing the risks that the presence of the six will be exposed; and (3) the staging of trials of U.S. personnel could intensify a hunt for missing U.S. officials and make it impossible for us to negotiate their departure from Tehran.
I explained that the urgency of the present situation convinced us of the need to accelerate our contingency planning for removing the six from Tehran. We hoped to have a plan agreed to by the American and Canadian Governments that could be rapidly executed when officials of our governments agreed that we had to act. Even though we could not now predict exactly when the six should leave, we need an agreed scenario given the complications of the preparations involved.
Finally, I indicated that after thorough study of the options, we had concluded that the six had the best chance of leaving by the Tehran airport if they had Canadian documentation. The details of the plan would have to be worked out by experts in both governments, and the six would have to be fully briefed and express a willingness to leave by this risky route. Nonetheless, we wanted to have Canadian Government agreement in principle to our request that the six might be given Canadian passports. Were there unsurmountable legal or constitutional problems to this request?
Gotlieb responded that his government very much appreciated the words of gratitude which I had brought from the President and the Secretary. He would pass them on immediately to the Prime Minister and Minister MacDonald. If Minister MacDonald had not been in Kingston campaigning,3 she would have received us personally. The Canadian Government was glad to have the opportunity to cooperate with us in this sensitive operation since it wanted to share our burdens at this time of national trial. Gotlieb found our assessment of the increasing dangers to the six extremely timely and he agreed completely with our conclusions. Canada would become an increasing target of Iran’s attention in coming weeks for reasons beyond the valid ones that we had presented because it is: (1) the protecting power for Israel; (2) an active participant in Western financial and economic pressures on Iran; (3) the initiator of the Commonwealth appeal that Iran free the hostages; and (4) because harsh public condemnation of Iran will increase as the Canadian political campaign develops in coming weeks. Gotlieb added that there is a strong public and political current in Canada favoring much stronger actions against Iran if the hostages are not released. Until now, the Iranian authorities have not appeared to notice Canada’s growing role in the measures being carried out to pressure the Tehran regime to free the hostages, but the time would come when Iran could be expected to retaliate against Canada, which could also expose the six to greater dangers.
Gotlieb went on to say that his government had been concerned that the U.S. was not paying sufficient high-level attention to the plight of the six, but that this impression had been completely dispelled as a result of Secretary Vance’s conversation with Minister MacDonald4 and my trip to Ottawa. Until now, the Canadian Government had concluded that it was safer for everyone involved for the six to remain in place. However, conditions were changing and a plan for exfiltrating them should be decided promptly. Gotlieb said that he personally would feel much more comfortable if Canada could close down its Embassy in Tehran and make arrangements for the six to leave as part of a general exodus of Canadians from Iran. If no Canadian officials were left in Tehran, Ottawa would be less concerned about possible reprisals if the six were caught trying to leave the country with false Canadian passports. Canada might also consider drawing down its personnel in the Embassy (now 18 persons) in Tehran to a skeleton staff of volunteers so that fewer Canadians would be in danger in Tehran if the six were discovered or the Embassy was invaded for other reasons.
On the question of providing Canadian documentation, Gotlieb said that he would study the matter but that he foresaw no great juridical hurdles. The decision to provide Canadian passports could probably be made in the context of an agreed exfiltration plan that would subject the six and Canadian personnel in Tehran to the minimum number of risks.
At this point, Gotlieb asked that we consider some other aspects of the problem. How valuable was it for the U.S. to keep the Canadian Embassy open for other reasons, [1½ lines not declassified]. He suggested that both governments reflect on the three dimensions of the problem (removing the six, closing the Embassy [less than 1 line not declassified]) together, since there might have to be trade-offs when a final plan for exfiltrating the six was agreed upon.
We then discussed the possibility of moving the six to other friendly embassies in Tehran, but Gotlieb seemed persuaded by the argument that it likely would be much more difficult for us to exfiltrate them from another mission than it is under present circumstances.
It was also agreed that we would pass a message through Ambassador Taylor to the six from the Department explaining the reasons why we had begun contingency planning for exfiltrating them from Tehran and soliciting their views.5
Gotlieb said that he would review our presentation and conversation with Minister MacDonald on January 3, that she would want to discuss it with the Prime Minister on January 4, and that we could expect an initial Canadian response6 to our proposals by this weekend.7
Executive Secretary
- Source: Department of State, Peter Tarnoff Files, Lot 88D100, Box 3, Tehran Six Files. Secret; Nodis.↩
- On December 31, 1979, the United Nations Security Council voted to impose sanctions against Iran under articles 39 and 41 in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if Iran did not release the hostages by January 7. (Bernard D. Nossiter, “U.N. Council, 11 to 0, Gives Iran One Week to Let Hostages Go Before Deciding on Sanctions,” New York Times, January 1, 1980, pp. 1, 6; “Text of U.N. Council Resolution,” New York Times, January 1, 1980, p. 6)↩
- On December 13, 1979, Clark’s government lost a vote of confidence by 139 to 133; the next day, elections were called for February 18, 1980. (Henry Giniger, “Canadian Government is Defeated on No-Confidence Budget Motion,” New York Times, December 14, 1979, pp. A1, A11; Henry Giniger, “House of Commons is Dissolved and Election Date Set in Canada,” New York Times, December 15, 1979, p. 8)↩
- On December 13, 1979, Vance was scheduled to meet with MacDonald in Brussels, which both of them visited to attend a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers on December 11–12 and the NAC on December 13–14, 1979. No memorandum of conversation for their meeting has been found. (Telegram 321018 to the Secretary’s Delegation, Tosec 120054, December 13, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790573–0365)↩
- Telegrams 3207 and 3933 to Ottawa, January 5 and 6, conveyed Vance’s message regarding the contingency plans for exfiltration of the six U.S. diplomats (which was to be transmitted through Gotlieb and Taylor). Telegram 4105 to Ottawa, January 7, approved a final version of the message that took into account revisions suggested by Gotlieb contained in telegram 72 from Ottawa, January 7. Telegram 118 from Ottawa, January 9, reported that Taylor had delivered Vance’s message to the six but had omitted the sentences with details about exfiltration planning. Telegram 7360 to Ottawa, January 10, sent another message for Taylor, asking him to brief the six more fully on the exfiltration plan and ascertain their views. (Department of State, Peter Tarnoff Files, Lot 88D100, Box 3, Tehran Six Files)↩
- On January 5, Vance, who had received word of the Canadian response concerning exfiltration, sent a message to MacDonald: “I want to express to Prime Minister Clark and yourself how much President Carter and I appreciate the steps that you are taking.” Vance continued: “We understand fully your preference for having Ambassador Taylor provided with both American and Canadian passports for the six. The choice of nationality can then be made at the last minute depending on circumstances. [less than 1 line not declassified] If, however, that need changes or the danger to the remaining Canadian personnel in Tehran increases, we will of course understand if you decide to close down the embassy.” (Telegram 4003 to Ottawa, January 5; Department of State, Peter Tarnoff Files, Lot 88D100, Box 3, Tehran Six Files)↩
- In telegram 14916 to Ottawa, January 19, Tarnoff wrote to Curtis: “We have decided we would like to implement the plan for the exfiltration of the six from Tehran as soon as possible.” Tarnoff continued: “As agreed when I was in Ottawa, we appreciate fully that the decision to exfiltrate the six must be taken after full consultations and the concurrence of the Canadians.” Telegram 353 from Ottawa, January 22, reported that Gotlieb had informed Curtis that the Canadians, having heard from Taylor, had decided to exfiltrate the six as soon as possible, that Canada would close its embassy in Tehran shortly after the exfiltration, and that the United States should keep the six “under wraps” until all Canadian officials had left Iran. In telegram 18504 to Ottawa, January 22, Tarnoff informed Curtis that Vance approved the scenario proposed by Gotlieb. (Ibid.)↩