Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

281. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State¹

3469.

Copenhagen, May 23, 1980, 1218Z

SUBJECT

• Alliance Relations and Allied Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

Ref:

• State 134861.²

1. Denmark consciously and consistently links its foreign and security policy to the United States, but seeks to maintain a cautious distance from the American lead. Denmark’s caution derives in part from such “constant” factors as geographic exposure and anti-militarism stemming from Denmark’s history of military defeats. Obviously, these factors can hardly be addressed by U.S. policy. Of greater consequence, therefore, are Denmark’s “current” fears that contribute heavily to its caution: (1) fear that the U.S. may overreact to Soviet adventurism; (2) fear that U.S. actions in Middle East could draw Europe into confrontation with USSR at home; (3) fear that U.S. will not show consistency and that violent gyrations of U.S. policy such as on initial economic measures against Iran (which we abruptly abandoned) could throw Europe off-course and actually ahead of the U.S. on risky initiatives; (4) fear that new U.S. toughness derives from electoral considerations what could be reversed next year. All of these fears reflect basic Danish pre-occupation with domestic solidarity and comfort and their desire to avoid international tension, especially international tension arising outside of Europe which might affect their own immediate welfare.

2. Denmark retains a deep attachment to the concept of detente and is fearful that new U.S. policies could break the communications link with the USSR. In essence, this means that the Danes believe it possible that a restraining influence could be exercised on the Russians through rational persuasion.

3. The perception of the Soviet threat is not uniform among shapers of Danish policy. Those most aware are the military, including all of those in the highest ranks. The Foreign Ministry has similar perceptions. Ministers in the Danish Government, all Social Democrats, have varying views, with few seeming to perceive the immediacy of the threat. Other parties in the Parliament, in a general sense, split between those on the right and those on the left, and only the former support increased defense spending as a response to the Soviet threat.

4. When one thinks in terms of geography, all Danes are aware of Soviet and East European activities in the Baltic area. When they think of a Soviet threat, their thoughts turn first to the Northern European area. Few Danes think in terms of the indivisibility of the Soviet threat. The great majority are probably little troubled by events in Afghanistan, at least to the extent of seeing aggression there as a direct threat to Denmark’s security.

5. The above thinking does condition Danish response in a negative way; i.e., the remoteness of events in Afghanistan means that they do not exert great pressure on the Danes to increase their defense preparedness. Moreover, regardless of their view of the threat, roughly half of all Danes probably feel that Denmark is impotent to respond to it and, more concerned about their present economic difficulties, prefer to concentrate on “at home” issues.

6. (II–A) Denmark’s response to the Olympic boycott has been most disappointing. Danish Government, never loath to pass legislation affecting Danes’ right of free choice in the interest of social welfare, was unwilling even to give an indication of preference concerning the response of Danish athletes. The result is that Denmark will attend.³

7. (II–B) On grain embargo, export credits and strategic trade controls, the Danes have been far more accommodating to U.S. policies. The cost to them, of such cooperation, has been extremely small, however.

8. (III) Danish foreign policy seems to derive from the belief that there is security in numbers, and in general Danes prefer to work through and sometimes hide behind EC and NATO. As Secretary Muskie pointed out in his briefing to Allied Ambassadors, “it seems easier for our NATO allies to agree to decisions en masse than it is for them to do things individually.”⁴ This is amply true of the Danes.

9. The mix of measures is not too rich: The focus of our efforts is misplaced. U.S. policies requiring Allied support would seem from here to have the greatest chance of succeeding if they were first launched without publicity in the major NATO capitals.

10. Given the fact that Denmark has little economically or diplomatically at stake in Afghanistan, Danes are likely to go along with measures that other NATO allies are willing to adopt re Afghanistan itself. As for measures affecting the Soviet Union directly, the Danes will be more reticent with the word “detente” used as a code for a go-slow policy.

Manshel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800006–0542 and P870058–0357. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 134861 to all NATO capitals, May 23, Muskie requested Embassy views and perceptions of Allied responses to the Afghanistan invasion which he would use in preparing for an upcoming PRC meeting on the Alliance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029–0094) For a record of the PRC meeting, see Document 54. Telegrams 69 and 2340 from Copenhagen, January 3 and April 9, reported on Danish responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001–0329, P900073–1965, and D800178–0192)
3. Telegram 128775 to Copenhagen, May 16, transmitted a letter from Carter to Jørgensen asking him to “speak out clearly” in favor of a boycott of the 1980 Olympics. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800242–0531) In a June 9 letter to Carter, Jørgensen rejected the President’s appeal. In a June 30 memorandum to Brzezinski, Rentschler described the reply as “a typical piece of Nordic waffling.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Denmark: Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen, 3/77–6/80)
4. Reference is apparently to Muskie’s May 19 briefing for Allied Foreign Ministers on his May 16 meeting with Gromyko in Vienna. (Telegram 132449 to London and Bonn, May 20, 1980; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029–1260)