Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

282. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State¹

Secto 10021.

London, December 13, 1980, 1001Z

SUBJECT

• NATOMIN: Muskie–Frydenlund Bilateral—12/11/80.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: Frydenlund sought advice and understanding regarding his impending visit to Moscow.² The Secretary urged him to not let the Soviets put him on the defensive regarding pre-positioning and other NATO reactions to the Soviet build-up. We also noted it is important that Europeans send firm signals to the Soviets about the potential costs of intervening in Poland.

3. Frydenlund sought the Secretary’s views regarding his planned trip to Moscow. He noted in recent days the Soviet Embassy in Oslo had grown more reticent in planning details, and wondered if the trip would materialize. He thought the timing, given Poland, might be awkward for both sides. If the Soviets intervened, the Foreign Minister said he would depart immediately.

4. The Secretary said it was hard to know whether the Soviets had already made their decision—and were just waiting for the right time or circumstances. Therefore, it was difficult to know if anything the West did or said could deter them. In any event, the situation required that Frydenlund try to discourage the Soviets, especially by passing along the strong sense of resolve felt by all members of the Alliance.

5. Frydenlund said he hoped the Soviets realized that the reaction in Europe after an intervention in Poland would be much different than following Afghanistan. The Secretary emphasized the importance of the Soviets hearing this from Frydenlund.

6. Frydenlund said Norway was interested in a high level meeting with the Soviets because of bilateral issues, such as the boundary question. He expected Brezhnev to be very critical of Norway’s role in NATO—especially Norway’s increasing military commitments, and acceptance of stockpiling.

7. Secretary Muskie said Frydendlund should not let the Soviets put him on the defensive. Instead the Norwegians obviously have no aggressive intent; their taxpayers have no interest in spending excess amount on weapons. NATO has reacted to Soviet actions. The Secretary recalled that even before recent troop movements to the Polish border, the Soviets had some 26 divisions in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Surely this is a threat rather than prepositioned materiel to be used in the event Norway were attacked. Therefore there was no need to be defensive about Western efforts in the defense field, be it defense spending in general or modernization programs like TNF. In this regard the Secretary noted the Soviets had already deployed 200 SS–20s against Europe and planned to deploy 100 more. Therefore the Western TNF decision was a reaction, not an aggressive threat against the Soviets.

8. The Secretary said whenever he meets with Gromyko or Dobrynin he stresses that the American people and government do not want confrontation, but prefer normal relations with the Soviet Union. This, however, requires a serious effort by the latter to offer material assurances, such as removing Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and by living up to the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act. In such a case they would find the American people ready to improve relations with the Soviet Union in all fields, including enhanced trade and the movement of people and ideas.

9. Frydenlund asked if recent trends in the United States indicated that these long term goals of increased contact and non-confrontational, evolutionary change were being abandoned. Were events in Poland already leading to a decisive change against detente even though the positive changes which occurred in the labor movement in Poland, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, could not have occurred without the detente process of the past decade?

10. The Secretary agreed that the progress we have seen in Eastern Europe was a benefit of the CSCE process, and that in this period the United States had been able to improve markedly its relations with governments in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless a brutal suppression of Poland would not be just a temporary side effect of progress brought about by CSCE. Mr. Bartholomew then added that it would be doubtful that anyone could argue after an intervention that a benefit of this thing called detente was that it enlarged the freedom of action of Eastern European governments.

11. Frydenlund agreed that such an action would be the end of detente and that he would say so in Moscow. The Secretary noted the Soviets appeared unwilling to listen or even to discuss the merits of the Polish situation. He hoped a strong, unified signal from the Ministers would help. In response to Bartholmew’s statement that an intervention would signal Soviet disregard for detente,³ Frydenlund noted that if they did not intervene such restraint—in the face of Polish politico-social experiments—would need to be seen as proof of the benefits of detente. Therefore the next several weeks would be fateful.

12. State Secretary Holst noted that one of the key problems was that the Soviets had been unable to develop anything but inorganic power links with Eastern Europe. Secretary Muskie added that they resisted change in all aspects of society. Frydenlund said one hopeful exception could be seen in Hungary, but that developments in Poland could be too much too fast.

13. SALT: Frydenlund then asked the Secretary if he thought SALT would go down the drain. Muskie responded that both sides have vital national interests in preserving the SALT process. Nonetheless, the ratification of SALT II required broad support in the Senate which was made impossible by the invasion of Afghanistan. If the Soviets suppressed Poland the Secretary did not see how SALT could make progress and he felt the Soviets understood this.

14. Frydenlund noted that the Soviets will be facing great internal and external problems in coming years, and that unfortunately they may well choose to rely on the only area where they have had success—the massing of modern military power. Holst noted that this was the one Soviet economic sector where growth was possible without social or systemic change.

15. Afghanistan: In response to a question from Frydenlund, the Secretary explained the stalemated situation in Afghanistan despite the continuing efforts of 85,000 Soviet troops. He noted that the disjointed resistance movement manages to fight on with minimal outside assistance. Muskie also noted that there are now over one million refugees in Pakistan who need food aid. The Secretary concluded that the Soviets seem committed to sticking it out and are building permanent infrastructure for their military. Bartholomew noted that whatever their problems they do have the geo-strategical benefit of occupying Afghanistan at an acceptable cost. The Secretary noted that the Soviets must also know that the resistance is not getting substantial help from outside, and that Pakistan is growing discouraged. He noted that the erosion of European interest and sanctions has an effect on prospects in Afghanistan. The Secretary concluded that the Soviets would probably stay unless they found a real face-saving solution. In the meantime they can afford to wait and they can even launch peace-feelers like their recent one re the Persian Gulf, which the Secretary characterized as a “fox in the chicken coop” effort.

16. Nordic nuclear weapons free zone: Deputy Assistant Secretary Holmes recalled that the Soviets often launch purposefully distracting political ideas during such aggressive periods, and he asked if Frydenlund expected them to push the Nordic nuclear weapon zone idea.⁴ Frydenlund said he did not think they would push it, especially since it was a Finnish proposal, though they might vaguely support it. Should they push he said Norway could always refer to its national position that any limits on nuclear weapons would logically need to include those already in place in the areas—i.e. on the Kola Peninsula—which should discourage the Soviets. He concluded that he would not raise the NNW free zone idea in any event.

17. Pre-positioning: Frydenlund then expressed his thanks for US efforts to accommodate Norwegian concerns in working out the Memorandum of Understanding.⁵ He said it had now been submitted to the Parliament and that it should be approved in January.⁶ The Secretary said that the United States equally appreciated Norway’s courage in taking on this enterprise. Frydenlund replied that in isolation it should not have been sensitive but that when added to the 3 percent, TNF, and the Olympic boycott it crested in a heated defense debate, similar to those previously encountered in Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. While the prepositioning issue would probably pass successfully, Frydenlund was afraid that nuclear sensitivities would continue to be a problem in Norway.

22. Muskie concluded the meeting by noting that he hoped Frydenlund’s trip to Moscow would take place since that would mean that other events in Poland had not occurred.

23. PARTICIPANTS

US Participants

• Secretary Muskie
• Ambassador Bennett
• Mr. Vest
• Mr. Holmes
• Mr. Hopper (Notetaker)

Norwegian Participants

• Foreign Minister Frydenlund
• Ambassador Vibe
• State Secretary Holst
• L. Mevik – Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Notetaker

Muskie

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800593–0851. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Oslo. Sent for information Priority to Moscow and all NATO capitals. Sent for information to Stockholm and Helsinki. Muskie and Frydenlund were in Brussels to attend the NAC meetings. Muskie traveled to London on December 12.
2. On December 22, Frydenlund visited Moscow for talks with Gromyko. On December 23, Holst briefed NATO Ambassadors in Oslo on the talks. (Telegram 7365 from Oslo, December 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800609–1129)
3. No other record of Bartholomew’s statement has been found.
4. See footnote 5, Document 274.
5. Reference is to the January 16, 1981, Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of Norway. (TIAS 9966)
6. On January 13, 1981, the Norwegian Parliament approved the MOU by a vote of 95 to 13. (Telegram 199 from Oslo; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810020–0026) On January 16, the MOU was signed in Oslo. (Telegram 444 from Oslo; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810041–0360)