Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

280. Telegram From the Embassy in Iceland to the Department of State¹

622.

Reykjavik, April 4, 1980, 1655Z

SUBJECT

• Icelandic Attitudes Toward US Policy and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

Ref:

• State 088475.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Following responses are keyed to questions contained in lettered sub-paragraphs of para 1 Reftel:

(A) Govt in power in Iceland at time of Afghan invasion was a caretaker govt comprised solely of representatives of strongly anti-Communist Social Democratic Party.³ Because of its caretaker status, its leaders did not feel it was possible for them to speak publicly on behalf of the nation and they did not. Nonetheless, leaders did take several steps to show displeasure with Soviet action and solidarity with actions USG was then announcing. They postponed indefinitely a scheduled visit to Iceland by Soviet Vice FonMin Zemskov, as senior a Soviet official as Iceland ever receives, and unofficially arranged to have workers at Keflavik airport who service transitting aircraft refuse to handle an Aeroflot IL–76 en route to and from Cuba, thereby permitting the GOI to deny the Soviet request for landing clearance.

(B) Despite broad and continuing public and media condemnation of Soviet invasion, new coalition govt which assumed office in early February⁴ has taken no public stand on Soviet actions or US measures in response, except to subscribe to communiqué issued by recent Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting at Helsinki. Shortly after govt was installed, in fact, new FonMin Olafur Johannesson told me pointedly that he did not believe his govt would be in a position to take actions similar to those initiated by its caretaker predecessor. Its ability to do so is, of course, conditioned by presence in coalition Cabinet of representatives of Communist-led Peoples Alliance (PA). Individual members of PA have themselves publicly and severely criticised Soviet actions, but party as a whole would probably not be disposed to permit GOI officially to do so and other members of coalition are neither so united or fervent on this issue as to be willing to take on PA.

(C) As to countermeasures which US has adopted and asked other nations to support, both caretaker and current govts view Afghanistan as aspect of superpower confrontation in which Iceland can and should play only minimal role consistent with its limited obligations as NATO ally. This, plus fact that Iceland is not really involved in any of the measures we have taken in military, technology transfer or trade fields and relies heavily on Soviet Union for petroleum supplies, has restrained govt from either endorsing or criticizing US actions. Privately, the majority of the political leaders in Iceland, like the majority of the public, hopes that US measures will be effective, but does not feel sufficiently involved, qualified or experienced in such matters to be willing to comment publicly or privately. On the one issue which does directly affect Iceland, Olympic participation, both the present and the caretaker govts have been unwilling to intervene to persuade the Icelandic Olympic Committee from deciding to send a team to Moscow. Their attitude has been based on the premises that the IOC is independent of the govt, including financially, and that govt intervention would simply introduce the issue of its right to do so and cause the IOC to dig in its heels. As of now, the IOC has not made a final decision but has announced that it is continuing preparations to go.

(D) Foregoing attitudes have not changed significantly. That is, GOI does not see Iceland as directly involved, but in general supports US efforts. Icelanders do absorb word from abroad, however, and if US measures were to become perceived as failures by other allies, either because latter concluded they were ill-conceived or failed to support them, such tacit support as our efforts do have could erode rather quickly.⁵

Ericson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800169–0716. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. See footnote 2, Document 279.
3. On October 15, 1979, following the collapse of a coalition between the Progressive Party, the People’s Alliance, and the Social Democrats, Gröndal, leader of Iceland’s Social Democratic Party, formed a caretaker government. (Telegrams 1532 and 1571 from Reykjavik, October 9 and 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790462–0957 and D790472–0716) In parliamentary elections held on December 2 and 3, 1979, the Independence Party won 22 seats, the Progressive Party 17 seats, the People’s Alliance 11 seats, and the Social Democrats 10 seats. (William Borders, “Icelandic Voting Leaves Fight on Inflation Unsolved,” New York Times, December 5, 1979, p. A3)
4. On February 8, Thoroddsen formed a new government backed by a coalition that included part of the Independence Party, the Progressive Party, and the People’s Alliance. (“Rebel Rightist’s Cabinet Takes Office in Iceland,” New York Times, February 9, 1980, p. 2)
5. Telegram 920 from Reykjavik, May 24, reported that Iceland’s attitudes toward U.S. policy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had not changed significantly since April. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–0945)