Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Norway to the Department of State¹

40.

Oslo, January 3, 1980, 1700Z

SUBJECT

• (S) Consultations With Allies on Reaction to Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

REF:

• A. State 001310;²
• B. Oslo 0015.³

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: Chargé consulted with Norwegian State Secretary Holst on January 3 concerning possible responses to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Holst indicated that the GON was still considering appropriate and effective responses. He felt it important that the USG not back away from commitment to SALT ratification and generally seemed to favor carefully conceived responses, ones which hopefully would “hurt” the Soviets without imperiling basic Western interests. Despite an expressed aversion to linkage, Holst personally thought that playing the China card might prove necessary. The only other specific he touched on was the possible boycott of the Moscow Olympics which, he said could be “counterproductive.” End summary.

3. On January 3 Chargé and Pol/Mil officer met with MFA State Secretary Holst and made points contained in reftel.

4. Holst responded initially by saying that, in attempting to deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we must first attempt to understand Soviet intentions. Clearly, he said, the Soviet action constituted a flagrant violation of the rules of the game as the West sees them (or would want them to be). However, these were not necessarily rules which the Soviets accepted. This of course did not justify Soviet actions, but being aware of a possible difference in perception was important in dealing with the Soviet action.

5. Obviously, Holst said, Norway, as a small country bordering the Soviet Union, was particularly concerned about the course of events in Afghanistan. The Norwegians, he said, were asking themselves if the Russians were now contending the right to freely intervene in the affairs of smaller neighbors outside of “their immediate sphere of interest in Eastern Europe.” Whatever the answers to these questions, in Holst’s view, it was necessary that the US (and the West) take steps designed to “hurt” the Soviet Union; these steps must not, however, hurt us. As an example, he said that it would be inappropriate to encourage American business to cut off relations with the Russians if only to be replaced by French or German business interests.

6. Another question very much on Holst’s mind was the nature of USG goals. Specifically, he asked whether the US hoped to limit the geographic focus of possible action to the Afghanistan area or was Washington likely to attempt to resurrect a policy of linkage which would place Afghanistan in the broader and general context of East/West relations. Holst said that he himself was of two minds on this subject and had not yet reached a conclusion. He added, however, that he believed it would be much more difficult to gain public support for and understanding of a more generalized reaction in the wider East/West context.

7. The Chargé asked Holst if in fact he was assuming that there was little to be done outside of oral protestations. He emphasized to Holst that the Russians most certainly did know the rules of the game and had clearly known that Afghanistan, like Finland, was a state where well-established and mutually-accepted restraint governed activity on both sides. We understood this, said the Chargé, and so did they. Holst responded by arguing that perhaps the Russians had made different calculations based on recent developments in Afghanistan. He pointed out that previous Soviet activities in Afghanistan since Daud’s overthrow⁴ had not produced a strong response from the West. In effect, Holst said, the Soviets may have thought that we had acquiesced in such activities. If this was so, perhaps the Russians felt they were running an acceptable risk, one which would not necessarily imperil the process of detente or their relations with the West.

8. Although he had not yet considered the specific actions which the United States was considering, Holst did make some general observations. First, he said that it was clear the Soviets would best understand an action which revolved around power politics (although not necessarily an armed power display). Such an action, he personally thought, might very well be to “play the China card.” Clearly, he saw Secretary Brown’s pending visit to Beijing as an opportunity in this regard.⁵ He added parenthetically that when he discussed the China card, he realized that this might possibly involve arms sales to China. On the subject of a possible boycott of the Olympics, Holst’s initial reaction was negative. He pointed out that no similar actions had been taken in 1956 after the Hungarian invasion nor in 1968 after Czechoslovakia. Moreover, in Holst’s view, there were many (at least in Norway) who had a great interest in sports and only a modest interest in politics; taking away their show might prove to be counterproductive.

9. Finally, Holst emphasized that the Norwegian Government was greatly concerned about the possibility that the US Government, in reaction to Afghanistan, might shelve its current efforts to obtain ratification of SALT II. He understood, he said, that the environment in which the treaty would now be considered would be substantially altered by the Russian incursion, but felt that it would be a great mistake if the government itself backed away from active support of the treaty. The Chargé assured Holst that the USG remained committed to moving the SALT treaty forward but that obviously it would be more difficult under the circumstances.

10. The Chargé emphasized the need for prompt reaction from our allies in order that we might make judicious and carefully thought out responses to the recent Soviet moves. Holst said that he understood, but he felt that Norway might not have a great deal to offer in terms of specifics. Nevertheless, he promised to get back to us with any reactions his government might have as quickly as possible.⁶

11. On departure the Chargé commended the strong position taken by Prime Minister Nordli in his New Year’s Day television message to the nation (ref B). Holst noted that the Prime Minister already had pre-recorded his speech but felt that developments in Afghanistan warranted comment. Therefore he had arisen at 6:30 in the morning New Year’s Day to come in to the studio and tape a new portion on Afghanistan.

12. Comment: Holst, who is generally recognized as one of the more bold, articulate and incisive thinkers in the GON, struck us as unusually cautious in his discussion of Afghanistan development. Clearly he was concerned about the serious implications of the situation for the Nordic area generally and Norway specifically. At the same time, the GON has, in recent years, found that any confrontation with the Soviet Union could be extremely demanding. This background, coupled with the heavy stake the Labor government has placed on detente/disarmament measures, may explain Holst’s uncharacteristically cautious approach to Afghan developments. It was our clear impression that Holst hoped that the Afghanistan situation could be confined to that geographic area. While we expect the Norwegians to follow any Alliance consensus, they would prefer to see the Afghan crisis addressed with the least possible amount of East-West confrontation in Europe.⁷

Barkley

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007–1104 and P900077–1592. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis Cherokee.
2. Telegram 1310 to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, Canberra, and Wellington, January 3, instructed Embassies to continue consultations with allied governments on appropriate responses to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and report allied reactions on January 3 by COB Washington time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001–0331 and P910096–1951) Telegrams 69 from Copenhagen and 15 from Reykjavik, January 3, provided reports on Danish and Icelandic responses. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001–0329 and P900073–1965, N800001–0322 and P890003–0626)
3. Telegram 15 from Oslo, January 3, reported that in a televised New Year’s speech Nordli said: “I have already pointed out to the Soviet authorities that Norway opposes any form of involvement in the internal affairs of another nation. I will again urgently appeal to the Soviet authorities to show restraint.” It also reported that in an interview published on January 2, Frydenlund said that he feared “for the effects on the process of detente in Europe at a time when we looked to great possibilities of negotiation in a number of areas.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800007–0491)
4. Reference to the April 27, 1978, coup that overthrew Afghan President Mohammed Daud. (William Borders, “Coup Is Reported in Afghanistan After Heavy Fighting in Capital,” New York Times, April 28, 1978, pp. A1, A6)
5. From January 5 to 13, Brown visited China. (Fox Butterfield, “Brown Impressed by China Military Tour,” New York Times, January 14, 1980, p. A2)
6. Telegram 60 from Oslo, January 4, reported that on January 4 Holst gave the Embassy a statement on Norway’s position regarding the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The statement read, in part: “We would consider it particularly important that the responses be focused as directly as possible on the context of power relations in the area most immediately affected by the invasion of Afghanistan. Hence we could emphasize the role of regional powers of the Indian subcontinent, the Gulf region and Asia. The political costs will, in our view, be maximized if the countries of the Third World play a front line role in the matter.” The statement further read: “In these circumstances Norway attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of Western solidarity and security. At the same time, we have to examine carefully how the continued pursuit of arms control may enhance (and promote) overall security and stability.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800009–0794)
7. Telegram 3502 from Oslo, May 26, reported: “The Norwegians entertain few illusions as to either the expansive nature or exploitative purpose of Soviet policy.” It further noted: “At the same time, the prospect of protracted military confrontation with the Soviets in Europe is difficult for the exposed Norwegians to accept as a permanent condition of their national existence,” and “as elsewhere, the government must assess carefully the degree of public domestic support it can expect for any particular action. In view of the government’s tenuous political hold (it needs the support of a small, truculent, left party to rule) it must move cautiously.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870111–0308)