Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State¹

282.

Helsinki, January 25, 1980, 1216Z

SUBJECT

• Meeting With President Kekkonen: Afghanistan, Detente, Disarmament and Finnish Foreign Policy.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: I met with President Kekkonen on January 22 to share with him our views on Afghanistan and its meaning for U.S. policy posture and objectives and to engage him in a discussion on the meaning of events for Finland. The President said that the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were so unusual that it was not possible to find any one clear motive for them. Increasing the tensions in Northern Europe should be avoided by all means and an effort should be made to calm the general atmosphere. Finland will continue along its official foreign policy line, which it believes has succeeded well, and as a country in a remote part of the world, will try to keep its position strong in the face of influences from events elsewhere. End summary.

3. Background: One of Finland’s most respected foreign affairs analysts and commentators said in a private conversation on January 12 that these are “difficult and dangerous times for Finland.” The challenge to Finland’s position and foreign policy posed by the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is clear. Finns are uncertain, but there is no firm leadership. President Kekkonen is “old and isolated”, “the politicians are young and ambitious”, and the public comment on events is not helpful. Two days later, a senior MFA official, describing the Finns as alarmed by the situation and unhappy with the government’s response or lack of response to it, said it was difficult to find any “logic” in what the Soviets had done in Afghanistan. Successive governments there had undertaken to assure the Soviet Union of their desire to have a peaceful relationship. Afghanistan was, in his words, “in the bag as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.” Yet it had been invaded. As the whole of Finnish policy assumed the Soviets would be “logical” with respect to Finland . . . it was difficult to know how Finland should respond.

4. By the time I met with President Kekkonen on January 22, the mood abroad in the Finnish public had been somewhat calmed by the Finnish UNGA statement explaining its abstention on the Afghanistan resolution² and by a rather substantial public affairs effort arguing that the positions of Finland and Afghanistan are not analogous. There remains, however, a perceptible nervousness.

5. President Kekkonen did not share the apprehensions. I called on him at Tamminiemi, the Presidential Residence rather than at the palace. Also present, unexpectedly, were Keijo Korhonen, MFA Under Secretary, acting as interpreter, and Pertti Torstila, MFA American Desk officer, as notetaker. The President looked in good health, somewhat thinner and far shorter than the advertised 6′4″. We spoke for forty minutes, after which he went out for his afternoon ski tour.

6. After the courtesies, somewhat extended in view of my impending departure, I told the President I was not calling pursuant to instructions but rather as a result of my own desire, based on a review of the Finnish media treatment of the U.S. response to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, to present the U.S. view to him. I wanted in particular to refer to two topics I knew were of interest and importance to Finland, that is, arms control and CSCE.

7. President Kekkonen said that the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan were so unusual that it was not easy to find one clear motive for them. What has happened either has been considered as a local conflict or viewed as strategic in nature, part of a broader plan. Afghanistan and Pakistan are “inflammable” areas. Understanding the motivation will take some time and policies should not be made too quickly. I shared with the President the range of views as to motivation which were being offered by American analysts and said we ourselves would not at this time say what single motive, if any one could be identified, had led to the invasion. However, the fact of the aggression required a response.

8. The President noted that “certain concerns” had been aroused also in remote Northern Europe. Increasing tension in this area should be avoided by all means and an effort should be found to calm the general atmosphere. He had not observed anything special or alarming in this regard in Finland. He was amazed at the small amount of criticism in the (Finnish) press about Finland’s policy, but tensions and pressures seem to have appeared in Norway and Denmark. It was his hope that the balance could be preserved and that a stable situation in the Nordic area would have a quieting effect on other parts of Europe.

9. I told the President that even as the United States was taking steps to make clear to the Soviet Union that its invasion of Afghanistan was not cost free, and that such action could never be, we had not lost sight of our determination to proceed with the arms control agenda, with some exceptions, or our commitment to CSCE as an essential process in the development of European security and cooperation. One could not say at what pace we could proceed, but we had not abandoned, as some have suggested, our long-term objectives, objectives which I was convinced also were shared by Finland.

10. President Kekkonen observed that detente is a process of long duration. It will require a long construction phase before its objectives are achieved but they offer the only lasting foundation for peace, and for the future.

11. Turning to another subject, I asked the President for his view on how it was possible for the Soviet Union to have thought, as apparently it had, that it could proceed in Afghanistan without damage to its other interests, including its interest in the benefits of cooperation, and its interests in the non-aligned movement. He answered that some of the decisions (of the United States) surely must have come as a great surprise to some of the leaders of the Soviet Union as well as its people. The Soviet Union is known to have great economic difficulties. Targets in agriculture and, particularly, industrial production have not been achieved.

12. Just before our meeting, Kekkonen said, he had heard that Deputy Prime Minister Kirillin had been relieved of his duties in Moscow. He found that news, arriving in these times, surprising. It raises questions. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin are old and now that Kirillin has been pushed aside, a situation could arise in which there begins to be a scarcity of experienced men in the leadership.

13. In approaching the end of the conversation, I asked the President if he would comment on the significance to Finland of world events as they were now unfolding.

14. He replied that, as he had said at the outset, Finland had not seen anything which would change its policy position, nor did he consider great change possible. Finland will continue its official foreign policy line which it believes has succeeded well. As a country in a remote part of the world it will try to keep its position strong in the face of influences from events elsewhere. Finland does not try to proselytize with its foreign policy, but offers its experiences and the results of that policy—“what we have been able to achieve amidst our difficulties”—for inspection to all.

15. In bringing the conversation to an end, I took the occasion to tell the President that I was confident the cooperation and dialogue between the United States and Finland would continue. Leaving Finland,³ I could not help but ask myself where we will be in the relationship some several years ahead. My view was that there may well be occasions when we hold different views of what is required to reach objectives we share, for example in the area of arms control.⁴ However, I see this as something to be expected and was sure that when those instances arose Finland would not draw the wrong conclusions about the positive nature of our relationship. For my part, I looked forward to continuing my interest in Finland and was sure I would see many of its representatives in Washington. The President said perhaps even he and I will meet again, in New York.

16. In fact, we will meet again on Feb 8 for my formal leavetaking.⁵

Ridgway

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800043–0412. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. On January 14, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/ES–6/2 that “strongly deplored” Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called for the “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.” (Bernard D. Nossiter, “U.N. Votes 104–18 to ‘Deplore’ Soviet Moves in Afghanistan; Demands Troop Withdrawal,” New York Times, January 15, 1980, pp. A1, A8)
3. Ridgway left Helsinki on February 20 and began service as Counselor of the Department of State on March 20.
4. On January 22, Kekkonen responded to January 20 call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics in a letter to Carter that read, in part: “In Finland, the question of participation in the Olympic Games has been discussed as a matter of principle by the Finnish National Olympic Committee in 1978. It was decided then to support the view that all countries represented in the International Olympic Committee should abstain from boycotts or other politically motivated actions with regard to the Olympic Games. In accordance with this position, the Finnish National Olympic Committee continues to support the holding of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow as planned.” (Telegram 15459 to All Diplomatic Posts, January 20 and telegram 251 from Helsinki, January 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–1334 and D800060–0452)
5. No record of this meeting has been found.