262. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Robert Hunter, Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)
  • Prime Minister Odvar Nordli
  • Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund
  • A Notetaker

(The meeting began between Secretary Vance and the Prime Minister. They talked about the Prime Minister’s returning to Oslo for a party convention the next day; and the Secretary indicated that the talks in London had been very good.)2

The President said he had heard great things about the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said it was an honor and pleasure to see the President; he had heard about the President, too. There was no need to talk about the strong ties between Norway and the United States, since there were hundreds of thousands of Norwegians in the United States; there had been U.S. support for Norway during the war; and cooperation between the two countries ever since. Feelings are strong in Norway towards the United States.

The President said he wanted to keep it that way. He hoped the Vice President could visit Norway.

The Prime Minister said that they hoped so.

The President said (jokingly) that the Vice President brings up the subject of visiting Norway every week.

The Prime Minister said he was glad to hear it. When they look at the Vice President, they see a bit of Norway in the administration.

The President said he was genuinely proud of the Vice President. He doubted that two political leaders had ever been as close together personally. The United States has close ties to the nations of Europe, including Norway. He wants to provide assistance to Norway, and to consult with the Prime Minister at any time. Looking to the visit of the Vice President, we should decide how best to use the visit.

The Prime Minister said he was looking forward to the visit. Experience from the war and afterwards, through the situation of recent years, tells us that Norway needs strong friends.

The President said “you’ve got it.”

The Prime Minister said the situation at the moment with regard to relations with the Soviet Union was not critical. Relations were “correct;” they would call them good, too. This reflected the situation of a little nation that is allied to one superpower, and a neighbor of the other. Therefore in their foreign policy, they try to take care to preserve low tensions, and the right balance.

There is a military buildup at the Soviet base at Murmansk. This is not done because of Norway, but as part of Soviet global strategy. It reminds Norway that it is still part of a strategically important place. They have found oil—closer to the Soviet border. One must understand that an important question for Norway is the Spitzbergen situation.

The President said he knew.

The Prime Minister said that for years, for generations, two nations had been there: Norway and the Soviet Union. They are the only nations there now. There were some small problems, like wives at the airport.

Dr. Brzezinski said that they had deported one.

The Prime Minister said yes. But relations with the Soviet Union there were correct.

The President said that the U.S. will be aloof and reticent. But if Norway needs some expression of support, he would defer to the Prime Minister’s judgment.

The Prime Minister said that the opportunity to have consultations with allies and friends was most important.

The President said “good.”

The Prime Minister mentioned the continental shelf talks.3 He was afraid of a Klondike situation, that could give possibilities for conflict. Norwegian sovereignty over the area could perhaps avoid that. Spitzbergen was never a place for Norway of gaining money. Vacations were about all. They were paying 30 crowns per ton (?); and were putting in a billion crowns for coal—they were going in this way because they have to be there. He was afraid that if the Spitzbergen (formula?) should apply on the continental shelf, then some conflict could arise. They need to be very careful; the area is very sensitive, not only for Norway but also for the world.

The President said this was true. He hoped the Prime Minister would keep him informed. We have intelligence on this area, but direct information provided to himself or Secretary Vance would be helpful in explaining the situation directly.

The Prime Minister said it would be useful to have this opportunity. But there is no critical situation now.

The President said he knew.

The Prime Minister said, however, that it is important to discuss this sensitive area, to understand what is going on, and what the position of Norway’s allies is. Norway can’t accept Spitzbergen as just a bilateral issue with the Soviet Union. They have been negotiating with the Soviet Union for four years on delimitation of the continental shelf. There had not been much progress.

The President said he thought that the Prime Minister could teach him how to make progress with the Soviet Union; he needed the Prime Minister’s advice as an insider (on negotiating with the Russians). The Russian approach was to have us put forward an idea, then wait for another.

The Prime Minister said the Russians mostly say nothing.

The President said (jokingly) “that’s progress!”

The Prime Minister said that they hoped to find temporary arrangements with the Russians on fishing. How long they would last, he didn’t know. But they have an opportunity for that. The areas are important for fishermen of both Norway and the Soviet Union.

The President said he wanted again to encourage the Prime Minister never to be reluctant to let him know directly where the United States can be of help. Or if the U.S. Government takes actions that inadvertently damage Norway, he wanted the Prime Minister to let him know. Norway is of great value to the United States. We want to do nothing to disturb it. The Prime Minister should not be timid.

The Prime Minister said that cooperation in NATO is important. This cooperation would not be the same unless it were with the U.S., too. And NATO would not be the same without the U.S.

The President said he understood. He said that our support and commitment to NATO were stronger than they had been for many years. The time of doubt about U.S. allegiance was gone.

He thanked the Prime Minister again.

The Prime Minister asked if he could raise one question, on the oil cargo bill.4 Norway was interested in what happens with it, since 25% of its tankers work for the United States.

The President said he understood.

The Prime Minister said that for Norway, if the bill passed, losses would be $1 billion. That was a lot for Norway, and for its tankers in the future. He hoped it would not be a problem.

The President said he hoped not. He had no inclination to support the bill, though he had not gone into it yet. He would consider carefully what the Prime Minister had said. He would consult with the Vice President closely before making a decision.

He repeated that it was a great honor to see the Prime Minister.

(The meeting adjourned at 2:44 p.m.)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Presidential MemCons, 5/77. Secret. Prepared by Hunter. The meeting was held at Lancaster House. Carter was in London for a State visit to the United Kingdom (May 5 and 6), to participate in the G–7 Summit (May 7–8), and to attend the first day of the NAC meeting (May 10).
  2. No further record of Vance’s talk with Nordli has been found.
  3. Reference is to negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union regarding conflicting claims to the continental shelf in the Barents Sea. See Document 276.
  4. Reference is to proposed legislation that would require a certain percentage of imported oil to be carried in U.S. ships. (Memorandum from Deal and Hunter to Brzezinski, May 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Norway: 1/77–6/70)