138. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Your Bilateral Meeting in Venice with Schmidt (S)
Since your March 5 discussion with Schmidt, the direction of his policies and public statements have proceeded in an ever more worrying direction. He repeatedly stresses to the German people that the principal danger today is not Soviet aggression but an accidental superpower confrontation reminiscent of 1914. Western Europe is thus trapped between the United States and the Soviet Union, equally immature and equally dangerous. This sort of talk has frightened the German voter and now even Genscher, who began these crises with unstinting support for the U.S., is following Schmidt’s bridge-building line lest the FDP be decimated in the October elections. (S)
We can do nothing about this problem of German drift in the short term although we should go on making clear that their hope for an island of detente in Europe is a self-destructing fantasy. The American people will not long support the U.S. defense of Europe if this idea is predominant on the other side of the Atlantic and the Soviet Union will eventually increase its blackmail to a level which the Western Europeans will be unwilling to pay. But that battle with Schmidt will principally be fought by your next administration. (S)
During this meeting, you should concentrate on Schmidt’s June 30–July 1 visit to the Soviet Union. While it remains true that Schmidt can have neither too much success nor too much failure in Moscow without damaging his electoral prospects, the present mood of appeasement among German voters gives him more latitude than we would like. There are two issues in particular on which you should concentrate. (S)
Schmidt continues to play around in his public speeches with the idea of a mutual freeze on U.S. and Soviet TNF deployments until 1983. You should make unmistakably clear to the Chancellor that we will not accept such a proposal which would legitimate the extraordinary Soviet superiority in these long-range systems and would foster the likelihood it would be politically impossible in Western Europe to end the freeze in 1983 when the time came to deploy our LRTNF weapons there. Even a call for the Soviets to halt deployments until 1983 would have that effect. Schmidt should go away from his meeting with you convinced that we will make this matter a public issue between us in the months before the German election if he takes this route in Moscow. (S)
The Germans are also giving every sign that they would accept something less than total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to resume unqualified detente. They have told us that they believe the Islamic negotiating group should meet with Babrak Karmal in order to stimulate negotiations concerning the future of Afghanistan. This of course would meet an important Soviet objective since their occupation of Afghanistan, the beginning of recognition of their puppet Babrak by the international community. Another Schmidt idea is to persuade the Soviets to withdraw their “offensive” capability such as the two airborne divisions and the fighter bombers from Afghanistan which would demonstrate Moscow’s benign intentions toward Pakistan and Iran. Any such concept would of course implicitly recognize that the Soviets could indefinitely occupy Afghanistan with their remaining 60,000 troops there. Schmidt should understand that if while in Moscow he takes any steps which authenticate the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he is in for a major public row with us. He will seek to convince you that he will be an utterly trustworthy emissary of the West during his discussions in the Soviet Union. Most evidence of these past several months argues to the contrary. (S)
Finally, Schmidt may mention his reaction to your recent letter suggesting we intensify U.S.–German consultations at the policy level.2 One way to approach the problem would be to establish a bilateral panel with about five on a side which would meet every two months or so to work through the current strains in our relationship. (S)