Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany¹

156897.

Washington, June 13, 1980, 2331Z

USBerlin for Ambassador Stoessel. Subject: Report of Senator Biden’s Meeting with Chancellor Schmidt.

1. (C)—Entire text.

2. Following in para. 3 below is text of report prepared by SFRC Staff Director William Bader on Senator Biden’s June 11 meeting with Chancellor Schmidt. Senator Biden met briefly with the Secretary June 13 to pass on copy of report, and Bader had somewhat longer discussion with Vest and EUR/CE Director Niles to review highlights of meeting. Bader advised that Senator Biden planned press conference at 4:00 P.M. June 13 during which he planned to express full confidence and assurance in steadfastness of FRG position in support of United States without getting into substance of his conversation with Schmidt. Biden also used a June 13 closed hearing of SFRC, at which the Deputy Secretary discussed outlook for Venice Summit, to inform his colleagues on highlights of his Bonn visit. Bader said he planned to do separate report on meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher.²

3. Begin text of report:

Senator Biden, accompanied by William Bader, met at the Chancellery with Helmut Schmidt at 3:00 P.M. on June 11. The Chancellor had with him Ambassador Berndt von Staden and the new German Ambassador to the United States, Peter Hermes. The meeting was scheduled to last a little less than an hour but ran on for approximately one hour and 45 minutes.

The first impression of the Chancellor was that he was tired, distracted and irritable. For the first fifteen minutes he lectured rather than discussed, and throughout the meeting both smoked heavily and took snuff five or six times. After the first few minutes he moved from lecturing and complaining to solid discourse with Senator Biden; and in the final moments said that this had been a good and productive meeting.

Schmidt began by commenting—in abrasive terms—on the contrast between the reports of the American Ambassador, whom he trusted, and the reports of the American press, particularly the New York Times. He complained that the U.S. Government should listen to its Ambassador and not to the likes of John Vinocur of the Times. He said he was absolutely fed up with the distortions and mistrust of the American authorities as fed by an irresponsible press. He said he was about to say “to hell with it” and go it alone.

Senator Biden interjected that he felt that part of the problem was the twin concerns felt in the U.S. over Afghanistan and Schmidt’s election campaign. Americans wanted to know—particularly some of the German’s staunchest friends in the Senate—what he was going to do in Moscow and what price he was prepared to pay for Moscow—because there would be a price. Schmidt replied that his anger over how he has been treated over the handling of the Euro-strategic systems was total. It was he who made the speech in 1977 raising the issue of the discrepancy in medium range systems. It was he who pursued it at Guadeloupe. It was he who pressed the TNF decision through NATO, including putting great direct and indirect pressure on the Italians (including the Communists), Belgians and Dutch. He believed he understood the issue and indeed had formulated it. The mistrust of the U.S. Government was as unwarranted as it was unacceptable. He wanted Senator Biden to know that he considered it unacceptable to settle for 572 new nuclear strategic systems in Europe. It must be less—whether it be 400 or 300 or 250. These levels are—and must be—negotiable. What has to be done is to negotiate in the context of SALT III. He stressed that the nonratification of SALT remained the greatest of dangers to the U.S. leadership in the West. This danger was heightened by the fact that American leadership had already abdicated in the international economic and political spheres, and with the loss of SALT II, the bankruptcy of American leadership would be total.

Schmidt then went to the subject of TNF and his mission to Moscow. He said that he had first presented the idea of a freeze on deployments to the Russians in a form and forum that he believed made the idea seem attractive to them—because the freeze concept as initially presented had a strong element of equality. He regretted that disclosure of his proposal, plus the necessity to defend it publicly for the “benefit” of allies had seriously undermined—perhaps destroyed—the possibility that the Soviets would accept such a freeze. With great intensity, including hammering the table, Schmidt argued that the 1983 deployment date for NATO medium-range systems gave us some 36 months for negotiations—closer to 35 for the clock is running and the Russians are deploying medium range systems at the rate of 45 per year. Schmidt argued that he was not going to Moscow to negotiate but to help “establish a trend” for negotiations. The issue is one of convincing and cajoling the Russians to enter into discussions and negotiations in a preliminary way. The Chancellor stated again that SALT II must be ratified, and with that ratification SALT II would be an acceptable basis for negotiations on Europe’s Euro-strategic problem. Senator Biden asked whether the Russians were aware that the ratification of SALT was at a standstill because of Afghanistan, and unless there was movement on Afghanistan, we would not be able to move SALT through the Senate. Are the Russians aware of this? Are you aware of it? Schmidt replied that he was sure that the Russians were not aware of it; and for himself he was not entirely sure that this was the case. As for Afghanistan, he did not believe that it had fundamentally changed the situation with regard to SALT. He compared Afghanistan and Iran and argued that Iran had become an outlet for American frustration and that the two issues, Afghanistan and Iran, had become inseparable. Biden countered that this was not the case at all, that the issues were in fact separable—that the American people do not connect the two in an important fashion—and understood the implications and dangers involved in this major new departure of Soviet policy—the invasion of Afghanistan.

The mention of Afghanistan got the Chancellor to a long discourse on the U.S. response to Afghanistan. Schmidt argued vigorously that the Soviets “cannot be allowed to get away with it” and it must be made extremely painful for them to remain there. The problem was, that the West was seriously and fundamentally challenged in Afghanistan and rather than coming up with a coherent strategy of resistance, the President produced the Olympic boycott. The Chancellor said that he had agreed to the boycott at a great cost to himself and his party. He said, “I have delivered, others have not.” All this in spite of the fact that 70–80 percent of the German population does not agree with the government’s decision. Nevertheless, only Norway and Monaco have followed the U.S. lead. Margaret Thatcher bristles and postures but delivers nothing.

The Chancellor went on to say that August 3 will arrive, the Games will be over and the Russians will still be in Afghanistan. He said that in his effort to push the West to a more coherent and broader strategy of response, he had delivered papers to Washington but had received absolutely no response. What he did receive was “a shopping list” of possible actions but no strategy.

Senator Biden then returned to the subject of Moscow and asked what the Chancellor hoped to accomplish and particularly what would be the relationship of that effort to SALT II.

Speaking with heat and great intensity, Schmidt stated as a start SALT should not have seen put in a “ratifiable” form. In his view, it was just impossible to move such a complicated agreement through the necessary two-thirds barrier of acceptance. But what has been done has been done. He does think that the Russians will in fact honor the terms of SALT II with the exception of the requirement for dismantlement of some of the older missiles. He said he did not expect them to go forward with that dismantlement. As for his trip to Moscow, “why are you so mistrustful” Schmidt said. On the basis of what record, what indiscretion are you concerned about? Are you concerned that this government and this Chancellor will sell out the Alliance? If you are so concerned, let me give you my agenda for Moscow with regard to TNF and strategic issues.

(1) First, I will tell the Russians that any negotiations must be in the context of SALT III but we must try to make use of the three years we have before the 1983 deployment date for NATO medium range systems.

(2) Secondly, any discussion or negotiations in the next three years must be conducted by the U.S. in close concert with the Europeans.

(3) Thirdly, I will return to the theme of preliminary talks stressing that there are almost 450 Soviet medium range systems at stake in the next three years and that I have a responsibility as Chancellor of Germany to try to make use of those three years.

(4) Fourthly, and most importantly, I intend to tell the Russians that any negotiations between now and 1983—in whatever form or forum—will not interfere with the implementation of the TNF decision. The siting will be done, the production will go forward, the plans will be made. Nothing could be clearer.

The Chancellor told Senator Biden that he must appreciate “that it is my soil that is at stake.” He said Germany is the size of the state of Oregon and we must understand that there are some six to seven thousand nuclear warheads in that small area. Imagine the concern and reaction in the U.S. if there were a similar area of landbased missiles between Boston and New York or New York and Washington. Senator Biden raised the question of what the reaction of our other European allies to the Moscow initiative would be. Would Belgium or the Netherlands or even Italy be tempted to weaken their resolve over the December TNF decision if they saw Germany seemingly tamper with that decision in Moscow.

Schmidt then went down the list of TNF countries. He began by saying that what happens in Belgium simply does not matter. Belgium was on the brink of dissolving the unification of 1830 and tumbling into linguistic division. As for the Netherlands it was difficult to gage. In many ways the Christian Democrats have pulled themselves together as well as easing out some of the TNF “softies.” He thought things were looking up in the Netherlands. When Senator Biden interjected to say that he had spoken the day before with the Italian Foreign Minister Colombo and Colombo had said with all Italy’s problems with respect to TNF, it would be extremely difficult if we looked to the North and thought Germany was weakening.

Schmidt’s response was heated. He said the Italians as well as Americans should be looking at what I am doing and they should trust me.

Senator Biden said there was no question that the Chancellor had the “right to go to Moscow” but that he should understand the concerns and hesitations of his partners. Biden said that the Chancellor might recall that during their last meeting, Schmidt had said that when the U.S. sneezed, Europe tended to get a cold.³ The Chancellor should appreciate that we have reached a situation now that when Germany even nods the rest of us tend to stir. We must try to understand what the Germans are up to. Schmidt responded by asking why must we always try to be understood. We can’t be the psychiatrist of the United States. Biden replied that America had been Europe’s psychiatrist for many years, perhaps it was time for a role reversal. Schmidt conceded the point; but said that Europeans do not have the strength to be psychiatrists. Over the years the U.S. has been both strong and naive—naive enough to be self-confident. On the other hand, Europeans have an inferiority complex. We do not feel confident enough to pat you on the back and hold your hand.

Schmidt again returned to the theme of trust. Look at Germany, we have not only delivered on the Olympics but we have also delivered on Turkey. Again, the British are all talk and no action. Why are you so worried about Germany. Why do you doubt? Biden replied that it was not out of fear of a strong and powerful Germany. In fact, the U.S. welcomed a strong Germany. Schmidt countered by saying that many in the U.S. do in fact fear a strong Germany and he would prefer that Germany avoid the appearance of strength, although it might have the reality. Schmidt said that a largely Eastern dominated American press heightens fears within the U.S. as to what a strong Germany would do. He understood this reaction. He had recently told his 34-year old daughter, who said she bore no responsibility for the crimes of Hitler, that all Germans at least to the end of this century will bear a deep responsibility not only for the “gasification” of millions of Jews as well as being the reason for a war that killed almost 200 million. It is a reality and we have to live with it.

Schmidt then turned to the theme of Southwest Asia, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. He accepted Biden’s point that the “sharing of responsibility” could include U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf and German aid to Turkey and to Pakistan. He said the German aid to Turkey, which has gone up dramatically—twice the U.S. aid—was not particularly appreciated in Washington. Moreover, the U.S. through its embargo had seriously weakened Turkey leaving it without spare parts and depriving its military forces of the ways and means of meeting their NATO commitments. Senator Biden countered sharply, stating that he had recently been to Turkey and had been told by the Turkish General Staff that Turkey needed at least $15 billion in military assistance in order to return to an acceptable NATO combat readiness. The embargo, which involved a few hundred million dollars in military equipment, was certainly not the cause for Turkey’s military demise.⁴ Somewhat grudgingly, Schmidt conceded this point. But he went on to say that the West needs the support of Pakistan, even the support of such unsavory states as Iraq and the Emirates, as well as Turkey. Pakistan and Turkey are the cornerstone of any Western strategy in Southwest Asia. But what have we done? The United States took a military package of 200 million to Pakistan when it had to have much more in order to make a commitment and now the U.S. seems to be resisting the rescheduling of Pakistani debt—this, in the Chancellor’s view, would be an absolute disaster. He also said that we must appreciate that we will need the Arabs and that solution of the Palestinian issue is imperative to gaining that support. When Senator Biden asked what was next for Turkey, the Chancellor said that one of the reasons the Alliance must pull together is that Germany has done all that it can financially for Turkey: “We have done much but we have come as far as we can.”

Toward the end of the meeting Schmidt seemed both relaxed and very engaged. He obviously feels that communications between the U.S. and Germany now seemed to be through distorted press releases and not through proper and serious channels. He said he welcomed this opportunity to speak frankly and fully to someone in the Senate who cared about Europe and European relations. He wanted Senator Biden to know as a final thought that you can depend “on the bloody Germans.” End text.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–1141. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to USBerlin for information. Drafted by Niles; approved by Vest; cleared by D, H, and S/S. Telegram 153085 to Bonn, June 10, which reported on Biden’s June 10 meeting with Vance to discuss Biden’s planned trip to Germany, noted that “Senator Biden concluded the meeting by remarking that he felt he could be most effective by expressing his strong feelings directly to the Chancellor. The Secretary agreed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800085–1735)
2. Not found.
3. Apparent reference to Biden’s meeting in Bonn with Schmidt on May 31, 1979, no record of which has been found. (Telegram 9505 from Bonn, May 25, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790238–0262)
4. Reference is to an embargo on U.S. arms sales to Turkey, which lasted from 1975 to 1978. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 121.