137. Message From President Carter to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Schmidt)1
Conflicting press reports about your remarks on TNF at the June 9 Essen meeting of the SPD delegates have again caused confusion about the position of your government both here and in Europe.2 Some stories incorrectly have claimed that you have proposed an East–West freeze on TNF deployments, and others imply you have called on the Soviets to cease further TNF deployments for a fixed period of time.3 In view of your upcoming trip to Moscow, I thought it would be appropriate if I took the immediate opportunity to state once more our views on this matter.4
The U.S. will not agree to any proposal for a freeze, moratorium, or renunciation of new or additional missile deployments, even for a fixed period of time. Such a proposal would be unequal and inconsistent with the Alliance’s December 12 decision, which I know you continue strongly to support. It would not be in the security interests of the Alliance to make or to accept any proposal that would perpetuate and legitimate the vast Soviet superiority in the field of long-range theater nuclear missiles. It was this superiority that led NATO to decide to deploy long-range TNF. A Soviet agreement to halt their deployments at their current levels would not remove that need. Agreement to a freeze would threaten to perpetuate the very gap we hope to close through our own deployments and genuine arms limitations.
Continuing confusion will only undermine Allied solidarity on this central security issue, and have hard consequences for the future of the Alliance.
When questioned by the press this week, I have stated that you were one of the originators of the common commitment to meet the formidable SS–20 threat with allied action on TNF, and that your position has not changed.5
If asked, we will state publicly that we would not support a temporary freeze proposal.6 Our position is that we should begin immediately to explore LRTNF limitations without preconditions. We are prepared to urge that the Soviets halt their SS–20 deployments but will not accept a freeze till 1983 even if only aimed at the USSR, and we will continue to go forward with the Alliance LRTNF deployments expeditiously.7
Sincerely,8
- Source: Carter Library, Presidential Files, Plains File, Box 36, Schmidt, (Helmut) Communications 4–6/80. Secret. A handwritten note at the top reads: “Annex Charlie.” Brzezinski forwarded a draft of this message under cover of a June 11 memorandum that reads: “Muskie, Brown and I concur that it would be most desirable if the enclosed message were sent directly from you to Schmidt. His comments have caused confusion and are potentially damaging to our effort. (Henri Simonet told me this afternoon that his comments are likely to encourage the Belgians to further weaken their already inadequate position on TNF.)” Carter approved the transmission of the message after it was revised to incorporate his handwritten amendments. (Ibid.) According to Document 208, the message was dated June 12.↩
- In this sentence, Carter amended the earlier draft, which read “confusion about your position,” to read: “confusion about the position of your government.”↩
- In this sentence, Carter amended the earlier draft, which read “Some stories claim that you have proposed,” to read: “Some stories incorrectly have claimed that you have proposed.”↩
- In this sentence, Carter amended the earlier draft, which read “I am sure this confusion will be clarified in the coming days when we see the full text of your remarks, but in view of your upcoming trip to Moscow,” to read: “In view of your upcoming trip to Moscow.”↩
- Carter added this sentence, which was not in the earlier draft.↩
- In this sentence, Carter amended the earlier draft, which read “If we are asked publicly whether we would support a temporary freeze proposal we will say no,” to read: “If asked, we will state publicly that we would not support a temporary freeze proposal.”↩
- In this sentence, Carter added the words “till 1983” after the word “freeze.”↩
- Carter did not sign the message. Telegram 156412 to Bonn, June 13, provided Stoessel with the text of Carter’s message; telegram 158147 to Bonn, June 14, conveyed corrections to the text sent in telegram 156412. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800007–0353 and P900086–2316, N800007–0376 and P900086–2319)↩