136. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Telephone Conversation between Berndt Von Staden and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 10, 1980, 2:49–2:57 p.m.
Dr. Brzezinski: I have seen press reports today of Chancellor Schmidt renewing his call for a moratorium on theater nuclear weapons in Europe.
Ambassador Von Staden: That is utter nonsense.
Dr. Brzezinski: What did he say to the Party Conference?2
Ambassador Von Staden: It is a strong confirmation of the NATO decision and this is an intentional or unintentional misrepresentation.
Dr. Brzezinski: Schmidt is quoted as saying that he stands by a three year freeze in installation of middle range missiles in East and West.
Ambassador Von Staden: I can’t find the statement at the moment. I could send you the text through the channel that we have.
Dr. Brzezinski: I will quote from the New York Times: “I stand by what I said. It would serve peace if both sides did not deploy for the next three years and instead negotiate soon on mutual reductions.”3
Ambassador Von Staden: That sounds correct. As far as I can remember he said deployment can not take place before the second half of 1983 and that one should use that time to negotiate. What’s missing is his statement that it is a technical reason which gives us the time.
Dr. Brzezinski: Unless I misunderstand, I can’t help wondering how consistent this is with our December 12 position that we should go ahead on TNF. Our joint security analysis is that an imbalance exists now. A three year freeze would make it very difficult to go ahead with our current plans and this could be misunderstood, and I take it is a misunderstanding as recommending a freeze.
Ambassador Von Staden: It is unfortunate that I cannot get hold of this.
Dr. Brzezinski: Maybe tomorrow you could give me the wording or Peter Hermes could give me the wording.
Ambassador Von Staden: I think I can get it in a minute. I have it now. He says that the first deployments can take place at the earliest at the second half of 1983. Until the first weapons are actually in place, it will take three years and NATO, the U.S., has at the same time the proposed immediate negotiations on the mutual limitations.
Dr. Brzezinski: While going ahead with TNF.
Ambassador Von Staden: This time element leaves the theory open to the Soviet Union to further enlarge its present advantage in an extraordinary way. I already pointed out to the Secretary General in May 1978 that there is a great danger in this advantage which the Soviet Union has. My suggestion to use this time gap for negotiations until deployment can take place has been rejected by the Soviet side and some in the West have misrepresented these proposals (he does not say directly)—misrepresented this as a softening of positions. I stick to what I said. It would be useful for peace if within this time both sides would not deploy but immediately start talks about mutual limitations. I assume that anyway in the context of SALT III negotiations will take place. We will contribute to these negotiations even if as a non-nuclear power we cannot negotiate ourselves.
Dr. Brzezinski: Our concern is about the impact of this on the Belgians and Western public opinion where it could be misunderstood as suggesting that we do not go ahead with implementing the TNF decision. We know deployment will take place two or three years from now, but a tremendous number of preparatory steps are needed in the meantime. During which time we negotiate.
Ambassador Von Staden: He says, “Until the first putting into position (of the weapons), it takes more than three years.”
Dr. Brzezinski: But in the meantime, everyone goes ahead with what they are doing.
Ambassador Von Staden: Right.
Dr. Brzezinski: You might want to check how the press is playing this to make sure the Chancellor’s intentions are not distorted. I look forward to seeing you in Venice.
Ambassador Von Staden: We will act on this and I’m going to send you the verbatim tomorrow morning.4 You may be sure the formulation is very careful not to lend itself to any misunderstanding.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski, 1–6/80. Secret.↩
- Reference is to Schmidt’s June 9 speech at the SPD convention in Essen.↩
- Brzezinski read from “Schmidt Urges Missile Freeze,” New York Times, June 10, 1980, p. A3.↩
- On June 11, the White House received a translation of the relevant portion of Schmidt’s June 9 speech with a covering note from Von Staden to Brzezinski that read: “Following is the translation of the text of the chancellor’s speech to which our conversation of yesterday referred. Warm regards, Berndt.” Brzezinski wrote “Schmidt wording,” on Von Staden’s message; Carter initialed it. (Message from Schmidt to Carter, June 11; Carter Library, Presidential Files, Plains File, Box 36, Schmidt, (Helmut) Communications 4–6/80)↩