Office of the Historian

135. Memorandum From Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, May 7, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Consultations with the Germans (C)

The present level of suspicion running both ways in the U.S.–German relationship is the highest since the war. There are fundamental reasons for this—nearly twenty years of American trauma which have produced a large ensemble of uncertain trumpets; the growth of Soviet military power and Moscow’s demonstrated willingness to use it; the FRG’s reliance on the Soviets for good relations with East Germany which are critical to eventual German reunification; increased FRG economic dependence on Moscow; and the emergence of a more confident and assertive Germany less willing to follow the U.S. lead automatically. Added to these long-term trends are more passing phenomena which also breed distrust—Schmidt’s close relationship with Giscard and his persistent public complaints about the President;2 an election year in both countries; and our own difficulty in projecting a consistent and coherent policy toward the Soviet Union. (S)

All these factors explain why we have had problems with Bonn over Afghanistan. The Germans tell us they agree with our strategic assessment of that crisis. Not true. In fact, the FRG believes we have overreacted to Afghanistan and that especially with respect to Iran, it is we and not the Soviets who pose the immediate threat to international peace and stability. The Germans want an island of detente in Europe but are afraid to tell us so. (S)

We need to address these different perspectives in a systematic way. Occasional high-level conversations are too brief to get to the heart of the matter. One shot discussions like that in Washington with Van Well on the awful German paper do more harm than good.3 (S)

I recommend that the President propose to the Chancellor the formation of a small bilateral working group to begin to talk these differences through. This group with perhaps five or so on a side would meet every two months until it had illuminated all the corners of the problem. In creating such a body, we would be duplicating Franco–German consultations which have existed for more than a decade. We have to reverse years of drift in the U.S.–German relationship and we have to do so in a sustained way. It is time to begin.4 (S)

Bill Griffith concurs. (U)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Box 9, Chron: 5/9–31/80. Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote: “good. develop memo for the P—in consult. with State. ZB,” below which an unknown hand wrote: “5/12/80.” Above Brzezinski’s notation, a stamp reads: “ZB has seen.” At the bottom of the page, Aaron wrote: “ZB—I agree with this.”↩
  2. In a March 29 letter to Stoessel, Vest reported that Aaron said “that there had been extensive conversations between the President and Schmidt which they hoped would clear things up and asserted that Schmidt had no sooner taken off on the plane headed for Germany when he was briefing the press and referred to the President as a ‘fool.’ I don’t know what the value it is to tell you about it but thought, in any case, that you should know that this story came out of the White House and is obviously believed from the top down there.” (Department of State, Stoessel Papers, Lot 82D307, Box 3, Ambassador: Memos for the Record, 1980) In an April 14 letter to Vest, Stoessel referred to a press report that on the airplane back from Washington, Schmidt referred to American attitudes about inflation as “naïve.” (Ibid.) See John Vinocur, “Schmidt’s Personal Victory: Tacit White House Concessions on Soviet Policy Will Disarm Hard-Line Critics in Bonn and U.S.,” New York Times, March 10, 1980, p. A3.↩
  3. On March 5, Christopher held a working lunch for Van Well; see footnote 9, Document 198.↩
  4. In a May 27 memorandum to Brzezinski, Blackwill reported that State agreed in principle to a bilateral working group but “there seems to be no inclination over there to move ahead rapidly.” (Department of State Stoessel Papers, Lot 82D307, Box 3, Ambassador: Memos for the Record, 1980) Telegram 146484 to Bonn, June 4, transmitted a letter from Carter to Schmidt that proposed bilateral consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–1127) On July 14, Christopher, Vest, Bartholomew, Blackwill, and Stoessel met Van Well, von Staden, Blech, and others for a first round of talks. (Telegram 13243 from Bonn, July 15, telegrams 13419 to 13429 from Bonn, July 17, and telegrams 13503 from Bonn, July 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870101–1100, D800343–0894, D800343–0917, D800343–0924, D800343–0927, D800343–0963, D800343–0968, D800343–0977, D800343–0965, D800343–0979, D800343–0976, D800343–0981, D800345–0487)↩