Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 15, 1980, 12:15–12:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of President Carter’s Telephone Conversation with Helmut Schmidt (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

President: How are you this afternoon?

Schmidt: Fine. How is spring in Washington?

President: It is absolutely beautiful. The whole White House grounds are covered with wonderful flowers, and I am sure it is the same where you live.

Schmidt: Ja, it is the same in Bonn, not as yet in Hamburg. Bonn is a benevolent place for the eyes and for the human soul.

President: Well, this is too. It’s one of the bright spots about my life these days.

Schmidt: Are the cherry blossoms already on?

President: They have already come and almost gone. But now we have the flowering crab apples which in my opinion are even more beautiful; and the dogwoods are just coming on, and the tulips are in blossom; the azaleas are on the way. It is really a lovely time.

Schmidt: Jimmy, I guess this is my call, or is it yours?

President: It’s yours I think.

Schmidt: Let me please, in the first instance reiterate a point which I would like to deal with so that you can interrupt me or say that you have some other points as well and then get back to them one by one.

President: O.K.

Schmidt: Number one, I would say a few words about our actual communications; the next point would be oncoming decisions, which I will take next week as regards Iran, as regards the Olympic Games. I would like also to have an exchange on Afghanistan and on medium-range weaponry. This is about the number of subjects I would like to touch upon shortly, if you have the time for that.

President: Yes, I have the time, go ahead.

Schmidt: Number One. I would like to thank you for your talk with Berlin Mayor Stobbe.² I have seen his report; I have not seen him in person so far and would also especially thank you for the very clear statements about the United States and its support for Berlin.³ I would connect this with my repeated expressions of thanks for our ongoing talks a month ago at your place in Washington.⁴ I have not seen your television talk with the European editors, but there has been some confusion in the West European press about a deadline or a specific date.⁵ I am not aware of any such deadline and it makes me ask you what is it you mean by that?

President: Well there was no deadline to Allies. I did ask you all to help us with action either two weeks after the Majlis is convened or the middle part of May, and we would hope that all of our concerted efforts would have success by then.

Schmidt: Well, I fully understand it. This was my belief that this was what you had in mind.

President: Yes, that is exactly what I had in mind.

Schmidt: It was my speculation. Let me please say that some people of course, in the French, British, German press, I don’t know what the other Europeans have said, are speculating whether the Heads of State or Heads of Governments in Europe and in America are communicating over the media with the other leaders. This is certainly not the case and I think we shall take the opportunity within the next couple of days to make it clear that we are in necessary and close personal contact. I just talked to Valery, and he told me that you had been in contact with him, a couple of days ago.

President: Yes, that’s true.⁶ And that’s the only reference I made, and it was completely distorted in some of the European press as an ultimatum or a demand for action and so forth. What I said was in the interview that there was an expectation of success and that we did have a target date, but what I was referring to is the one I have just described to you.

Schmidt: Let me tell you that on Sunday,⁷ the day before yesterday, I had a couple of hours with the leading members of the Cabinet, including the parliamentary and political leaders, Brandt, Wehner and others, so we were nine or ten people altogether talking about Iran, and all the other subjects I have mentioned; and I am glad to tell you that we were very united in the opinion which we at the end articulated and I would just like to mention them now to you one after the other. I have also the opportunity tonight, within the next quarter of an hour, to go over to Parliament to talk to the Foreign Relations Committee in a private session to tell them what is in the making.

First, Iran. As you know from early January, we are still not really convinced that extending economic sanctions will help to liberate the hostages, but we will certainly follow through. We are determined to take that decision next week in our Cabinet.

President: Yes, I am not sure either. There is no way to be sure.

Schmidt: I think it opens up two dangerous possibilities: one danger is that they fall back on the Soviet Union which they will not like, but they may feel they may be forced to and secondly, if sanctions don’t work, then in a couple of weeks, we have to come to the point where we have to ask for other measures.

President: Yes.

Schmidt: Anyway, we will participate. Valery will participate. I guess we’ll get a consensus with the EC Foreign Secretaries on Monday or Tuesday⁸ next week. They are sitting together Monday or Tuesday; we will try to form a so-called European umbrella for the Nine governments to act on a national basis. Possibly, we might also act by a joint decision. The Rome Treaty has some clause, the famous article 113 which may be useful as an end. Anyway, I guess you will see in the course of next week some European Cabinets, at least, anyway my Cabinet to publicly decide that we take economic sanctions. They would be declared next Wednesday,⁹ but probably becoming effective a fortnight after the election of the Parliament, if within that fortnight the hostages are not freed. This would mean about the date which you mentioned five minutes ago.

President: Well, you know, we have indications that it is very doubtful that the Parliament is going to be elected at all. And the date that I mentioned was really either mid-May or two weeks after the Majlis . . .

Schmidt: Good. I will make sure that we say either a fortnight after the election or mid-May.

President: That sounds good.

Schmidt: I will tell Valery as well.

President: Good.

Schmidt: Second point is that I would like once again to tell you privately that I am deeply worried about many rumors which one hears here about military measures being in preparation. I understand that one has to prepare oneself for any contingency, but I hear from the Iraqis, from the United Emirates, from the Saudis that they are rather afraid of the possible outcome of all this, and I would very much like you to be careful and think about it a second time before you take any such decision. The Soviets are only waiting for a pretext under which they could intervene.

President: I understand what you’re saying.

Schmidt: As regards the Olympic Games, we will next Wednesday, in Cabinet, decide as follows: in January I have told my Parliament that under present circumstances, one could not participate in the Olympic Games and that it was absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union to change the circumstances. I will then repeat what you and I have said jointly in our press statements on the 5th of March when I was in Washington.¹⁰ Thirdly, I will say that unfortunately the circumstances have not improved, which they really haven’t, and that therefore the German Cabinet is advising the National Olympic Committee not to go to Moscow.

President: That’s good news.

Schmidt: I will tell this to the leading members of the National Olympics Committee tomorrow afternoon, but the official decision of the Cabinet will only be taken Wednesday next week because I cannot take it behind the backs of our Cabinet. I have just told Valery and he accepts this and will in fact later on follow suit, but will not make a declaration at the same time, which I deplore really but I have the feeling that regarding your situation, I have now to deviate from my former plans. So we will make our decision public next Wednesday; and I am rather confident that our National Olympics Committee will follow the advice.

President: Yes, I am too.

Schmidt: Regarding Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, I would like your collaborators to again look to the transcripts of the talks between you and me on March 5, because I have the feeling that some of the American officials may not have read it. Here there are some rumors that make me feel that this is not really understood that I have decided to obey the obligations which I have made under treaty and agreement with the Soviet Union. This means that we will agree in the OECD or whatever in the COCOM is being reached or also changed, but they should not tell us to break off our economic relations with the Soviet Union. The reasons I gave you at the time I was in the White House haven’t changed in the meantime, and I might tell you that the Olympic thing will deteriorate the relationship between the two Germanies very severely. They will cut off the sports traffic between the Germans of either side and this will be the measure they take immediately—they will take other measures afterwards—which they have not specified to me, but altogether it will hit the East Germans more than the West Germans. It will hit the family relationships. It might hit Berlin; I don’t know. I think one should be aware that this will lead to great human hardship. I would like in this context to thank you. You made clear not only in your talks with Stobbe, but also in your television talks with the European journalists, that you understand our special position clearly—that a divided nation is another situation than, let us say France or Canada or America or Britain, or whoever. I am really grateful for this.

President: Well, that’s good. I don’t think anyone in our government feels that you are promising any major change in your economic relationships with the Soviet Union; as a matter of fact, when I got through my discussions with you I was quite discouraged with that.

Schmidt: I hope that everyone understands that I have national interests to consider as well.

President: Well, I’ll make that clear to Secretary Vance and others so there will not be any misunderstanding about it. I wish that you had agreed to do more; but it was very clear to me that you were going to maintain basically your existing relationships with them on economics.

Schmidt: There is one point that I am particularly touchy about. Being a German, I mean a German that grew up in the Hitler war. Germany, after having broken so many treaties in the Hitler period, has to honor its existing treaties. It is a moral feeling in myself, apart from all the political considerations.

President: Yes, and as you probably know, Helmut, we are honoring all of our government-to-government agreements with the Soviet Union as well. We have not broken any of those agreements.

Schmidt: That is a very necessary point. Otherwise one endangers the agreements which run in our favor.

President: Yes. We have not done that. In fact the agreement for us to sell 8 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union was a government agreement, and we honored it. So we have not violated any of the agreements with the Soviet Union.

Schmidt: I have heard that Cy Vance is going to Vienna to see Gromyko, which I really welcome, and that on the way to Vienna he will stop over, which I welcome even more.

President: That has not been decided. That is not an accurate report yet.

Schmidt: The Vienna meeting has not been decided?

President: That’s correct.

Schmidt: I see. I hope it will be. Because you know Gromyko is coming to Paris for the normal consultations which they have agreed among themselves every year, and I think it is necessary that the two powers keep in touch and that they do not let Paris serve as proxy.

President: I understand. We have not decided that that meeting will take place yet.

Schmidt: I might have been a little hasty.

President: No, it was in the press, but it has not been decided at all.

Schmidt: I have welcomed it publicly because I thought it was so.

President: The American press makes a mistake every now and then. I’m sure this is not the case in Germany. (laughter)

Schmidt: It was printed in the German press as well. (laughter) Let me say a last word about these medium-range weaponry. I would like to thank you that Cy has renewed a former offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union, by his talks with the Soviet Chargé or whoever it was.¹¹ In that context, I would like to make to you a remark which I have made in two campaign speeches which I have made over the last weekend, namely that perhaps one could bring the preliminary talks or negotiations about medium-range weapons and get them underway by an interim agreement between the two governments not to station weapons in the next two and three-quarter years until the beginning of 1982 which we would not be able to do anyway. This could in a way give the Soviets a face-saving device not to deploy additional SS–20s until then. This would stop the Russians from deploying a rocket every week with three warheads.¹² I would like to mention this to you, and I will see to it that Ambassador Stoessel is given the text of that speech. It is a rather short message, and in a rather vague way, because it was made in a public meeting, but I hope that this thought might impress the American experts.

President: Helmut, I believe that when we study the text our concerns might be alleviated, but as you know we have a very shaky commitment on the part of the Italians and the Belgians, and if we start equivocating about the December Agreement at all on a unilateral basis, I am afraid that that might cause us very serious concerns.

Schmidt: No, this would be very dangerous. It is quite clear that such a proposal is within the framework of the decisions of NATO which must be honored. I took enormous risks to put them through my party. I would never endanger them, nor would I allow anyone else to.¹³

President: That’s good. Well, we will study your remarks very carefully, but I think that it must be made very clear to the Italians and Belgians in particular, that this is no deviation.

Schmidt: No, it is a way to convince them of our logic and our strategic imagination.

President: I understand that there is no deviation, but I wonder if you would mind sending to the Belgians and Italians an explanation, if you think it is necessary, that this is indeed no deviation at all from the December commitment, because the press distortions have indicated that it was a new proposal.

Schmidt: Yes. I will get in great rage of anyone undertaking to deviate or to change the decisions of December of last year.

President: Do you think it is advisable to send to those two countries at least that sort of explanation from you?

Schmidt: Yes, I will, and I will send it to the others.

President: That would be very helpful, I think.

Schmidt: I will do it this week. I will have to have it translated into other languages, but I will do it in the course of the week.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 3/80. Secret. Carter spoke to Schmidt from the White House. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “ok. J.”
2. See footnote 16, Document 200.
3. On April 11, the White House issued a statement on Carter’s talk with Stobbe that noted the “United States’ firm commitment to Berlin’s freedom and prosperity;” see “White House Statement,” Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 644–645.
4. See Documents 199 and 200.
5. Reference is to Carter’s April 12 interview with European editors; see “Question-and-Answer Session With Foreign Correspondents,” Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 668–682.
6. On April 9, Carter spoke with Giscard about European responses to the Iranian hostage crisis. (Memorandum of Conversation, April 9; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 56, Chron: 4/8–14/80)
7. April 13.
8. April 21 or 22.
9. April 23.
10. See “Visit of Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany: Joint Press Statement,” Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 438–441.
11. Reference is to Vance’s reaffirmation of NATO’s offer to negotiate about TNF. (Telegram 89453 to Moscow and the White House, April 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005–0235 and P880025–0556)
12. Telegram 7199 from Bonn, April 15, reported that in speeches given in Hamburg and Essen over the April 11–12 weekend, Schmidt had called on both the Soviet Union and NATO to freeze TNF deployments during “a certain number of years” and use this period to negotiate arms limitations. The telegram also reported that Schmidt “made it clear though his press spokesman that he was not suggesting any change in NATO’s December 12, 1979 decision on TNF.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800189–0220)
13. In telegram 7557 from Bonn, April 18, Stoessel reported that on April 17, “Von Staden told the Ambassador that Schmidt made his remarks on TNF last weekend on his own and only because of his deep concern over the world situation and over what Schmidt saw as an impasse in East/West arms control negotiations. This concern was undoubtedly one of Schmidt’s motives, but we believe that additional likely motives were Schmidt’s desire to keep the FRG relationship with the USSR from deteriorating excessively and his desire to pacify certain elements of the left wing of his own party.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800193–0099)