Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

133. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 5, 1980, 2:10–4:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
• Ambassador Berndt von Staden
• Zbigniew Brzezinski

Schmidt: (reports on good talks with Vance, Strauss, Brown, and Brzezinski—exchanges of pleasantries.)²

The President: Assume many issues have already been covered in the above conversations, but it would be good to review whole range of them again. The greatest reassurance to me is our common friendship and shared purposes. Difference of approaches and even occasional inadequate coordination still does not overcome our common ties.

Our current relations with the ANZUS countries are good, they are getting better with the PRC (though there could be problems), and they are better with NATO. We now have a better relationship with Africa, and we have worked closely with the British in Rhodesia.

In the Middle East, we are committed to the resolution of the autonomy talks. They are due to end by the end of May. I will be prepared then to apply stronger pressure. We may have a confrontation then with Israel. We are more compatible with Egypt than with Israel on some of these issues.

In the Persian Gulf, we look on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an unacceptable development. Within bounds of what we have done, we want to continue with arms limitations, CSCE, etc. We will honor existing agreements, but bilateral relations have deteriorated.

The Soviets are building up in Afghanistan, and they give no indication of withdrawing.

We must have the closest cooperation among our friends. After inadequate consultations in the beginning, we all now understand the need for more consultations and have spelled out the ways by which that can be done. (This was done with you by Brzezinski and Vance.)

Schmidt: I would like to deal first with the question of alliance solidarity.

The Soviets would like to sow discord among us. This is also the case in the mass media. In the event of a serious crisis, we can count on the French. Giscard has two-front domestic problem but he will stick with us. (Schmidt shows the President a chart of Western forces in Germany and how the French would participate in active defense in the event of war.)

The President: My assessment of the French military buildup is that they build up a long-distance capability as well as their nuclear capability, at the cost of their conventional European capability.

Schmidt: I disagree, but will check this with Giscard.

The President: There is a general doubt in this country about the French commitment to NATO and about their opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even after the Franco–German statement, Giscard later moved it towards a more neutral position. Our newspapers are more and more concerned about the French.

Schmidt: Put these stories in the fireplace.

The President: What can we do about them? How can we reassure our public?

Schmidt: I see 20 or so leading editors privately from time to time. That helps, and they know where we stand, on America and on France. I will do more on our relations with America and on the French role in my briefings. Our press talks about a choice between America and France. That’s ridiculous. There will not be and never has been such a choice. There also has never been a more alliance-oriented leader than Giscard. (Speaks again of French readiness to fight jointly with us.)

Brzezinski: I have less concern about how the French might behave in the event of hostilities than how the French posture now might be exploited politically by the Soviets. This is what opens opportunities up to the Soviets.

Schmidt: Let’s take the Olympic issue . . .

The President: That is the most important symbolic issue for American public opinion.

Schmidt: That is due in part to its public presentation, and how late we learned of it. I want to carry France with us, and I am confident I will by May 24, but not now.

The President: Our attitude towards the Soviet Union and Afghanistan is not going to change. We will not go to the Olympics, and will not resume normal trade as long as Soviet forces are in Afghanistan.³ Secondly, it is increasingly difficult for us to understand why you cannot express your support publicly and let France decide for itself later. As long as the other countries are doubtful about FRG position, they will be equivocal about themselves. My hope is that you will reconsider and join us on the Olympics. Your people are strongly in favor of our position. At least two-thirds of them support us. (Schmidt interjects “no, three-quarters actually support you.)⁴ It is becoming hard for us to stand alone. And I know you have a problem with alternate games.

Schmidt: That is not the heart of the problem.

The President: We hope to have alternative games in three or four sites in the second half of August. I would not be averse to a one-year postponement of the Olympic Games.

Schmidt: The Soviets have made no serious proposal like that to any responsible person.

The President: We are willing to move, cancel, or delay the Olympics for a year. I hope you will join with us early. That would still leave an option for the French to join later without any embarrassment.

Schmidt: No, it would embarrass the French. Our position is clear. It is up to the Soviets to create the proper conditions for the Olympics. It is evident we will join you. On alternative games, you will have to bring about the participation of some 60-odd associations. On Olympics, it will cut off all West–East German sports relations. That would be very destructive to us. (Develops more detail on German East–West sports arrangements.) We want to preserve the the notion of the German nation. I am ready to take the needed decision, but I need the backing of the French also for domestic reasons.

The President: I will rely on your early statement.

Schmidt: You can rely on me.

Brzezinski: Is your confidence about the French coming through based on your personal knowledge of them or on specific commitments from the French?

Schmidt: It is based on a personal and binding commitment from Giscard. They will be with us—but speak to no one of it.

The President: Would your opponents take a different line? Is it likely to be a campaign issue?

Schmidt: They will certainly oppose going to Moscow. Strauss is trying to get away from his image as a hothead.⁵ But he will certainly blame us for whatever goes wrong.⁶

The President: What do you propose we should do to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan?⁷

Schmidt: I asked Zbig if he thought they would get out and if it is your policy to get them out. Zbig answered yes to the latter question, but that we should build up pressure on them after the Olympics. But some of the pressures are bouncing back already. We have intentionally enhanced German–Soviet trade over the years, hoping for less conflict. Our trade now is six-seven times bigger than U.S. trade, relative to GNP. We deliver mostly industrial machinery. We are both now somewhat dependent on our trade.

The President: Have you restricted either trade or credits?

Schmidt: We never give credits.

The President: What about the pipeline?⁸

Schmidt: It’s a false report. Hermes issues insurance against political risk.⁹

Brzezinski: That is a terminological difference—Hermes in effect facilitates credits.

Schmidt: Trade is essential now to both the FRG and the Soviet Union.

The President: Since the invasion there has been no restraint on German–Soviet trade that would have a cautionary impact on the Soviet Union.

Schmidt: We will support you in COCOM, but you haven’t gone ahead with anything. We will go along, but we are more of a trading nation than you.

The President: Let me pursue this further. What can you do to pressure the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan?

Schmidt: We will participate in all collective actions, and not just in what America does alone. We don’t want to stick out our necks. We’re on the front line. We are now getting some of our people back, approximately 250,000 per annum. There are approximately 20 million Germans under communist rule. We cannot overlook that. As regards Afghanistan, it is principally a matter of the carrot and the stick. They will not be moved out by force. Zbig said earlier that Western unity and Islamic outrage are needed preconditions for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but that won’t exist as long as the Palestinian issue is open. He also mentioned the importance of Afghanistani resistance. That one I cannot judge. But you also need tacit Indian cooperation. You have to hold something out to the Soviets. First threaten them somewhere, like in Libya or Angola or Yemen, then offer them something. I would not favor neutralization because the Third World won’t like it. We should stress nonalignment and independence.

The President: Has Brezhnev ever indicated to you a plan to withdraw?

Schmidt: He wrote me the day before yesterday and I don’t have the impression that he is planning to withdraw.

The President: He wrote me he would withdraw when the causes of entry of Soviet forces had been removed, but now he talks only about “commencing” to withdraw. He won’t withdraw without some pressure and without some carrots. I don’t want to provide all of the force and others to provide all of the carrots.

Schmidt: I don’t expect that. We aren’t only extending carrots. We live by trade. We can’t cap exports to the Soviet Union. Besides they pay for them. We have an equal trade balance with the Soviets.

The President: I am trying to understand what we can do together to get them to withdraw.

Schmidt: One, be united and have a common strategy. Secondly, strengthen Western defenses, including Turkey, where we are doing more than you. You are not willing now to offer even an extra $100 million. (Germany is the size of Oregon and yet we accept new nuclear weapons even though our population is as congested as between here and New York.) We are doing more for Pakistan than you are, and we will now double our aid to Pakistan. We will have a supplementary budget.

The President: I have to cut our current budget by some $4–5 billion.¹⁰

Schmidt: I have an agreement with Brezhnev on economic cooperation and that includes credit insurance like Hermes. I have no reason to break that agreement or contracts. Part of that agreement is a joint commission. It has not met on Soviet initiative, but now they are proposing that it meet. There is also the question of my visit. Should I disinvite them? I am inclined to have the meeting later this year. The American media will be up in arms again against us. (Discussion now shifts to Iran embargo—the President explains the U.S. position—discussion then shifts back to Soviet Union.) As long as there are no COCOM rules, we will go ahead with trade with the Soviet Union. There has to be a collective decision on this.

Brzezinski: The above amounts in effect to business as usual. COCOM rules are very difficult to change, especially if the French don’t agree. If we wait for unanimity, no one will ever do anything. It is important for large countries like Japan and Germany to set the example for others.

Schmidt: The Venice Summit¹¹ could be divided in half, with half of it devoted to political discussions designed to define collective Western policy.¹²

The President: By May we will have been waiting six months for collective action. The U.S. is the only one doing something, and that hurts us. Everybody else is conducting business as usual.

Brzezinski: Every country should do at least one thing of its own, even though we recognize that not all countries can emulate the United States.

Schmidt: We will not take advantage of what you have been doing.

The President: In Iran, Beheshti has been out main problem in the Rev. Council.¹³ Given his German connections, can you exercise some influence on him?

Schmidt: We will look into that. (Some exchanges on the character of Bani Sadr, Khomeini, Beheshti.) Have you ever approached the Soviets on Iran?

The President: Yes, during the early UN votes but subsequently we haven’t.¹⁴ Not since Afghanistan. Vance talks to Dobrynin occasionally and Watson to Gromyko.

Schmidt: The Palestine question is the main obstacle to the concerted Arab–Islamic opposition to the Soviets. What will we do if there is a North–South Yemen unification?

The President: We are trying to prevent it, working closely with the Saudis and the North Yemenis. You could help us with the Iraqis, and what can you do about Yemen?

Schmidt: I would not exclude substantial financial aid to North Yemen. But we cannot send arms. Can we help Somalia? We would be in a good position to help. Oman also needs help.

Brzezinski: It would be very helpful if Germany offered economic assistance to Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, countries where we are now seeking facilities, and to whom we could say that German aid is part of a collective Western effort to shore up the region and should be seen by them as related to our effort to obtain facilities.

The President: (Reviews likely reductions in U.S. oil consumption, legislative progress on energy, etc.)

Schmidt: Prefer mutual reductions on consumption rather than imports.¹⁵

Schmidt: (Very positive in his comments on the above.) We will see the German press tonight. There should be an agreed statement. We will not stress differences but the areas of agreement. People who insist on rumors cause us difficulty and I detest that. On Venice, you do accept the Thatcher proposal that it be divided into two halves—one on politics and one on economics?

The President: That suits me fine.

Schmidt: Karamanlis wants to be President. We have to help Greece move back into NATO. We will exert some pressure on Demirel, and we already did so on Aegean air traffic. We should now do something on NATO command structure.

The President: Please be in touch with General Rogers—we have talked to him about this.

Schmidt: We will do so. There is anxiety in Berlin. When the Mayor of Berlin is here, would you see him please?

The President: I will try to see him.¹⁶

Schmidt: Do you still favor the European Security Conference, CSCE and its energy conference? The EC objected to it.

The President: I will check this with Vance.

Schmidt: What about the European arms limitation conference along the lines of the Polish proposal? (Clarifies, that this is really now the French proposal.)

The President: You mean as a substitute for TNF?

Brzezinski: (explains our skepticism about the conference but willingness to go along with it formally so as not to have a problem with the French. However, we do not wish TNF in it.)

(Finally, some discussion between the President and the Chancellor about the utility of having an exchange exhibit of German expressionists in this country and American landscape paintings exhibition in Germany.)¹⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 1, Germany, Federal Republic of, 9/77–11/80. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “Susan, my file. J.” The press statement issued by Carter and Schmidt after their meeting is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980, pp. 438–441.
2. A memorandum of conversation for Vance’s breakfast meeting with Schmidt is in the Department of State, Vance Papers, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Jan/Feb/Mar 1980 Memcons. No memorandum of conversation for Robert Strauss’s meeting with Schmidt has been found. Memoranda of conversation for Brown’s meeting with Schmidt are in the Department of State, Stoessel Papers, Lot 82D307, Box 3, Ambassador Memos for the Record, 1980 and in Department of Defense, Accession 330–81–0447, Box 2, No Folder. For Brzezinski’s meeting with Schmidt, see Document 199. Following Carter’s meeting with Schmidt, Miller, Owen, and other officials met with Schmidt to discuss energy, aid to Turkey, and plans for the G–7 economic summit held June 22–23 in Venice. (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, March 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 14, Germany F R, 3–4/80)
3. In this sentence, Carter inserted the word “normal” by hand.
4. In the margin next to this sentence and the one before it, Carter wrote an illegible notation.
5. Strauss visited the United States from March 11 to 14 for talks with Brzezinski (March 11), Carter, and Vance (both on March 13). During Carter’s talk with Strauss, Strauss said that the FRG should boycott the Olympics, back tighter COCOM rules, provide ships to support the U.S. in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and lead the effort to give economic aid to Turkey. In response, Carter stated: “I like every word you say.” Strauss replied: “Keep up your policy. Stick with it.” (Memorandum of conversation, March 13; Carter Library, President’s Files, Plains File, Box 1, Bavaria, 3/80) No memorandum of conversation for Brzezinski’s meeting with Strauss has been found. Telegram 67224 to Bonn and Munich, March 14, reported on Vance’s talk with Strauss. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800129–1006)
6. In a March 27 telephone call to Brzezinski, Strauss said: “I don’t want to waste your time; I know how busy you are. I have one confidential question. I get different information about political events in France and Germany. Some of them might be of value to you. I would like to send them to you without any request except one: that my name be kept out.” In response, Brzezinski said, “All right,” and asked Strauss to send the information to his secretary. Strauss added: “I don’t want to denounce anybody but I do have a special network of information. I don’t want to worry you, but some things worry me.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 80, Brzezinski Memcons: 1980)
7. In this sentence, Carter inserted the words “do you propose we” by hand.
8. Reference is a proposed pipeline to supply Siberian natural gas to Western Europe.
9. Reference is to export credit guarantees issued by Hermes following guidance issued by the FRG Government.
10. In this sentence, Carter added the word “current” by hand.
11. Reference is to the G–7 summit held from June 22 to 23 in Venice.
12. At the end of this sentence, Carter wrote “—PM Thatcher has proposed this.”
13. In this sentence, Carter added the words “in the Rev Council” by hand.
14. In this sentence, Carter added the words “during the early UN votes” by hand.
15. Carter added this paragraph by hand, underlining “consumption” and “imports.”
16. On April 11, Carter met with Stobbe in the Oval Office from 9 to 9:30 a.m. During their conversation, Carter mentioned “the growing sense of discouragement, even bitterness that Americans felt about the Europeans’ reaction to the Iranian and Afghanistan crises.” Regarding the hostages in Iran, Carter stated: “we had only a few days in which we could continue to act in moderation. After that, more forceful action would be required which would disturb the calm which was important to Europeans.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 3–4/80)
17. Below this sentence, Carter wrote: “Later I briefed S. re Iran situation, including our agreement with Bani Sadr and Waldheim. Helmut said he hoped Americans could understand restraints on FRG re Soviets. I replied we could understand everything else better than the Olympics issue. He restated his commitment (and Giscard’s) to be with U.S. on Olympics.”