Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

132. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 5, 1980, 10:35–11:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany
• Ambassador Berndt von Staden
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

After an initial exchange of pleasantries, Chancellor Schmidt asked if Dr. Brzezinski had seen Wischnewski during Wischnewski’s recent visit to Washington. Brzezinski said that he had and that he knew Wischnewski quite well.² In response to Schmidt’s observation that Wischnewski was an efficient operator, Brzezinski agreed and said that Mr. Wischnewski had good common sense. Brzezinski liked him. (S)

Schmidt responded that Wischnewski was a “political friend” in Germany. He would be coming to the United States again around the time of the national political conventions. Schmidt said that anything Dr. Brzezinski told Wischnewski would get immediately back to the Chancellor. Brzezinski, Schmidt said, could be more open than with some German politicians. Brzezinski wryly noted that with some Germans, he had spoken too openly. (S)

Schmidt then said that he wanted to make a point concerning detente. He said Brzezinski and the Americans should not put a label on Schmidt and the Germans as mindlessly following detente. Schmidt much preferred stessing the importance of a military equilibrium on which detente must be based. Although it was now more important than ever because of the Afghanistan invasion to stress that prerequisite for detente, Schmidt noted that he had written a book called “The Strategy of Balance” ten years ago which developed this theme. Schmidt said it had been his strategy for 20 years. (S)

Schmidt continued that he was still in favor of detente and cooperation with the East, not least because of the effect on Eastern Europe. For the Poles, Hungarians, and East Germans, East–West confrontation would be deadly. They needed detente to maintain their limited amount of freedom from Soviet oppression. This was even true of the Bulgarians, but Schmidt repeated that detente could only be sustained if his prerequisite of military equilibrium was maintained. (S)

Brzezinski said that he agreed with the Chancellor’s comments and that Eastern Europe should be insulated against some of the current tension. Detente would have to be based on military equilibrium, but the Soviets not only had to show restraint in the acquisition of military means but also in their actions. At the moment, the Soviets were upsetting the equilibrium in means and their actions were also contributing to international disequilibrium. (s)

Schmidt agreed and said this trend had started with Angola when the first Cuban foot had been put on African shores. It had now expanded to other places, but was not prevalent in Europe except for the problems of the SS–20 and BACKFIRE—problems, incidentally, that the previous administration did not take seriously enough. Schmidt said that it was only with respect to these weapons that he detected any Soviet tendency to try to tilt the balance in Europe. (S)

Brzezinski replied that in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we must avoid a situation in which the Europeans practiced competitive detente, each approaching the Soviets with different solutions to the Afghan problem. Such European initiatives would be divisive in the West and ineffective because the Soviets had probably not reached the stage where they would consider such proposals seriously. They would only use them as propaganda devices and to drive wedges among us. (S)

Schmidt then stated that he wanted to ask two very frank questions: (1) Was it possible to maneuver the Soviets out of Afghanistan; and (2) was that the American objective? Schmidt said he thought the answer to the first question was possibly, but had doubts that such a result was really the U.S. aim. (S)

Brzezinski replied that we were leaving the door open to a solution through which the Soviets could withdraw from Afghanistan. But it was important for the West not to push too hard now with such ideas. If we did, this would make it easier for the Soviets to follow their present strategy of fighting and talking at the same time. The Soviet strategy seems to be to consolidate its position in Afghanistan while defusing external criticism through public discussion of neutrality. (S)

Brzezinski said that the Soviets might accept neutralization of Afghanistan if three preconditions were sustained: (1) Western unity in rhetoric and action which made Moscow feel that there was a cost for the invasion in East–West relations; (2) Islamic outrage which demonstrated to the Soviets that they were seriously damaging their relationship with the 700 million Moslems from Rabat to Djakarta who were reentering history; and (3) continued Afghan resistance through which (1) and (2) above remained possible. If these conditions were maintained for six months, the Soviet leaders might conclude that a neutrality solution was their most preferable option. But, Brzezinski continued, Moscow would not reach such a view until after it had launched its massive spring offensive against the Afghan resistance. Brzezinski stressed that the U.S. certainly wanted to give the Soviets the opportunity to leave Afghanistan if they decided to do so. But if the Afghan resistance died, we would have a repeat of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the West would forget very quickly. (S)

Schmidt then observed that imposing neutrality on countries was not an agreeable act in the Third World. The FRG would not have endorsed the EC neutralization proposal if it had not come from the British. But since Carrington had pushed the idea very hard, Schmidt had welcomed the opportunity to come to some joint EC agreement on the problem. But he far preferred that Afghanistan’s neighbors give guarantees of that country’s territorial integrity, self-determination and sovereignty. (S)

In response to Brzezinski’s question concerning who would govern Afghanistan in such a situation, Schmidt said that he was not sure but it would have to be without Soviet presence. Brzezinski replied that if the Soviets withdrew, there was a real probability that the resulting Afghan government would be strongly anti-Soviet. The problem was to try to create a situation in which the government the Soviets left behind would not be rabidly against them, but that result would be very difficult to obtain. Brzezinski said that he had raised with the Pakistanis and Saudis the possibility of an Islamic military force (Algerians/Syrians/Iraqis/Indonesians/perhaps Pakistanis) who would maintain the balance in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal under the green flag. This force might be able to ensure that there would not be a strong anti-Soviet reaction but the depth of feeling on the part of the Afghans would make this difficult too. (S)

In any event the West was making a mistake in creating the impression that neutrality was possible soon. There was too much premature speculation about neutrality when the Soviets were massacring Moslems in Afghanistan, perhaps in some cases through the use of chemical weapons. Hundreds of Afghans had been killed in the last few days and that would grow into the thousands. (S)

Schmidt responded that the idea of creating an Islamic military force or maintaining concerted Islamic political pressure on the Soviets would, as regards the Arabs, necessitate a solution to the Palestinian problem. Schmidt had mentioned to Vance the desirability of getting together Western experts to analyze the domestic situations in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, Oman, Somalia, and perhaps Algeria. The idea would be to analyze what kinds of Western presence these countries could absorb. Schmidt believed that none of these governments would dare accept foreign military bases on their soil; only Israel and Egypt would agree to that, and it would be counterproductive. Brzezinski agreed to the last point. (S)

Schmidt continued that many Arabs believed that the U.S. was a greater enemy than the USSR because of the Palestinian problem. For this reason Schmidt had welcomed the McHenry Security Council speech and vote which had been taken back 24 hours later.³ Even the Saudis gave the impression of more preoccupation with the Palestinian problem than Afghanistan. So Schmidt was not just talking about people like the madman in Libya. For the Arabs, the danger of Israeli expansion and settlement and the specter of Zionism were a more clear and present danger than the Soviets. It was therefore doubtful that a sustained Islamic effort against the Soviets could be maintained without progress on the Palestinian problem. (S)

Brzezinski said he basically agreed with the Chancellor’s analysis and had talked about this problem with the Algerians, Saudis and Paks during his visits to those countries. But what solution could one think of this year? We could not now promise the Palestinians a nation state, but we could promise a process that moved them toward their goal even if we could not endorse it. Autonomy would create a structure and history would judge how they used it to further their own ends. But, Brzezinski continued, as the Chancellor knew this was mainly a domestic problem for us. The Europeans could be helpful by always remaining a little ahead of the U.S. on the Palestinian question. In response to the Chancellor’s comment that the events surrounding last weekend’s Security Council vote hurt, Brzezinski noted they were extremely damaging. (S)

Schmidt next said he wanted to talk about India. There were 900 million Indians and their leader was a lady who was hostile to the United States, to the FRG and to the West. Brzezinski replied that we were trying to establish a serious dialogue with Mrs. Gandhi. Despite the press’s preoccupation with Clifford’s remark on war, his mission and the talks with Mrs. Gandhi had gone quite well.⁴ Brzezinski said he had seen Gonsalves the other day and it was Brzezinski’s impression that the Indians now realized that Mrs. Gandhi’s first comments after the Afghan invasion were a mistake—that she had given too much absolution to the Soviets. The Indians now seemed to realize that they had a stake in Pakistan not disintegrating. We wanted to convince Mrs. Gandhi that while we wished to stabilize Pakistan, we did not wish to strengthen it to a degree that would lead to conflict with India. We would not give the Paks military equipment they could use against India such as advanced aircraft. In response to Schmidt’s question of whether it would be possible to convince the Pakistanis to move some forces from the Eastern to the Western front, Brzezinski said that was difficult because after all Indian forces too were mobilized on Pakistan’s Eastern border. We were also encouraging the Chinese to be more moderate in their relations with India and they seemed to be moving in that direction. Schmidt observed that the Chinese had presumably concluded that a totally pro-Soviet India was certainly not in their interest. (S)

Schmidt then asked about the U.S. China policy as a whole. Brzezinski stressed that we were not designing our Chinese policy primarily as an anti-Soviet tactic. We were interested in good relations with the Chinese quite apart from the Soviet angle. There were several reasons for this: (1) trade; (2) our desire that China serve as a stable factor in the Far East which would help maintain the present equilibrium there; as well as China’s global opposition to Soviet and Cuban activities; and the 44 Soviet divisions that were tied down on the Chinese border. Nevertheless, we would not move rapidly to rapprochement with the Chinese. We recognized that China would like to use us against the Russians and that the Russians are extremely sensitive to our relationship with Beijing. We did not want to needlessly irritate Moscow. At the same time, the Soviets must recognize that if they were insensitive to our concerns it could have an effect on our relationship with China. (S)

Schmidt observed that this would mean that from the Soviet perception not only could they not be sure about U.S. policy toward Moscow; they would also interpret Washington’s pro-China policy as clearly anti-Soviet. Moscow no doubt tended to overemphasize the Chinese element in U.S. Soviet policy and it could bring a Soviet preemptive attack on China. Indeed, Schmidt stressed, he thought a great danger in 1981 was Soviet punitive military action against the People’s Republic. He thought this was a clear option for the Soviets. If it happened, Schmidt said, this would give the U.S. a horrible choice: either ignite World War III or let the Russians get away with an enormous gain in prestige. The same loss in prestige would occur if Moscow got away with invading Afghanistan as it had gotten away with Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya. (S)

Noting that what the Chancellor had said was terribly important, Brzezinski emphasized that this was why we had avoided some actions in our China policy such as selling arms to Beijing. But we were not prepared to abnormally limit our relations with China because of irrational Soviet sensitivities. On the question of a preemptive strike, perhaps the Chancellor was right. But Soviet leadership would have to be very cautious because it could mean the end of the Soviet Union. There were several scenarios: a limited attack which the Chinese could absorb; a large-scale attack which would lead to Chinese defense in depth and heavy Soviet casualties; or a nuclear strike. If the Soviets took the latter action, they could inflict horrendous losses on the Chinese but it would be a historically calamitous decision. Moscow could not be certain what we would do. But even if we did not react in such a scenario, the Soviets would lose every single major Soviet Far East city to a Chinese second-strike nuclear attack which might even reach Moscow. (S)

Schmidt said he believed the first of Dr. Brzezinski’s three alternatives was the more likely and Brzezinski replied that it would also be the least effective. Schmidt was not convinced and thought that if the Soviets indicated they were attacking for limited aims and for a limited period, a situation on the model of China’s invasion of Vietnam was thinkable. This too would put the U.S. in an extremely difficult position. Schmidt summed up by saying his fear was that the U.S. China policy was adding to the Soviet obsession with China and with being encircled, without giving the security assurance to the Chinese that they are so longing for. In other words, the worst of both worlds. (S)

Brzezinski replied that we did not intend to go much further in the near future in our relations with Beijing. At the same time, however, the Soviets were in danger of repeating the tragic error of Imperial Germany after Bismarck. They too had tried to avoid encirclement but through their own actions—naval buildup/colonialism/railroad construction in the East—they had brought it about. The Soviets too may produce just such a self-fulfilling prophecy. (S)

Schmidt said that he was astonished to hear from Cy Vance in Bonn that it might be possible to ratify SALT II this spring. Brzezinski said we would do our best, that he himself was deeply and personally committed to SALT and that we genuinely wished to preserve the arms control element of detente. But the right wing in the U.S. would make that difficult; perhaps the same thing was true in the Federal Republic. In any event, Soviet policy in Afghanistan had been shortsighted, much like Stalin’s blockade in Berlin. It had created a strong Western reaction and a dynamism in our policies which would not otherwise have existed. (S)

Returning to Brzezinski’s three pre-conditions for Soviet withdrawal, Schmidt thought that no Soviet peace offensive would be effective, that the Soviets could not drive wedges among us. The danger, Schmidt stressed, was in the West itself; the Soviets could not create it. Schmidt noted that there simply was not sufficient cooperation or collaboration among the Allies. There were different reasons for this but they added up to this one simple fact; from December to February, there was not enough consultation. Brzezinski said the Chancellor was absolutely right. (S)

Schmidt continued that often the U.S. did not appear to have time enough to ask its Allies their opinion before it acted. This gave the Europeans the feeling that we did not care what Europe thought. Schmidt said that even if we did not wish to really consult, we had to create the impression of consultation. This face-saving was critical for the French and for the Germans. It was of enormous importance and it had not been understood in the U.S. (S)

Brzezinski repeated that the Chancellor was absolutely right, and that he had been thinking how we could improve consultations. The talks between the Chancellor and the President on the phone were useful as were the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Also, Vance would be meeting regularly with the ambassadors of the major European countries from now on. Another valuable tool was the quadripartite group made up of Brzezinski, von Staden and their counterparts in Paris and London. Schmidt thought all these forums were useful but observed that because of Genscher’s sensitivities, this last group must not be used too often. (S)

Returning to the question of consultation, Schmidt observed that the Olympics had not been the only problem. When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had begun, Schmidt had been in Spain for the Christmas holidays. He said he was hanging on the telephone each day hoping for word from Washington on the American reaction to the invasion. However, it took the U.S. a week to decide that this was the greatest threat to international peace since World War II, which by the way it was not. During that first week, Schmidt had had to make the Chancellor’s traditional New Year’s Eve speech to the nation. He had redone the text in Spain after the invasion but had he known what we were going to say a few days later, he would not have looked so hesitant in the speech. Then, Schmidt continued, he had gone to see Giscard on January 7. They had tried to evaluate the situation and the American reaction to it and they had failed. They simply did not know what the Americans were up to. Although this was now water over the dam, Schmidt noted it was not good that two of America’s closest Allies could not figure out the U.S. position a week after the crisis had begun. This must be avoided in the future. (S)

Brzezinski agreed and then went on to say that though we appreciated Germany’s rhetorical expressions of solidarity, it was now time for the FRG to act in a tangible way. We understood Germany’s vulnerability, but we also believed that the Federal Republic had to act. (S)

In response, Schmidt asked, “Do you really understand our vulnerability Zbig, do you really?” Schmidt stressed there were several elements to that vulnerability: Berlin, divided families, and the 16 million Germans in the GDR who would be victimized by an East–West confrontation. And, the Chancellor asserted, America’s reaction had not been all that tangible either. Moreover, Tehran had made it easier for the U.S. to change course dramatically in our relations with the Soviets. The Federal Republic had not had such a stimulus and it would take the Germans longer. Schmidt said it was necessary for his government to appear to German public opinion as stable and consistent. (S)

Brzezinski repeated that we were not indifferent to Germany’s vulnerability, but stressed that there was a feeling on this side of the Atlantic that the FRG’s reaction had been almost entirely rhetorical. That was simply not the case with the U.S.—witness the grain decision and the fact that we had suspended all our trade with Moscow. (S)

Still complaining, Schmidt said that nine weeks after we had first raised the suggestion of expanding the COCOM list, we still had not come through with a specific proposal. In any event, if the chips were down the U.S. should not doubt that Germany and France would be on its side. (S)

In closing the conversation, Schmidt said that Guenther Huonker, a politician in the Chancellor’s office would be visiting Washington in the next couple of months and asked that Dr. Brzezinski see him. Dr. Brzezinski agreed. Chancellor Schmidt remarked that not every German who arrived in Washington was his megaphone. Brzezinski responded that not every German who left Washington was his megaphone. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Box 80, Brzezinski Memcons: 1980. The meeting took place in Blair House. Secret. Carter initialed the first page, above which Brzezinski wrote: “ZB file.” Schmidt visited the United States from March 4 to 8; on March 5, he met for talks with Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Miller, and other officials.
2. No memorandum of conversation for Brzezinski’s February 26 meeting with Wischnewski has been found. In his February 26 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 1, Document 197), Brzezinski reported that, during their meeting, Wischnewski “assured me of FRG support on the Olympics but said that it would be impossible for the West Germans to announce it now. He could not indicate when it will be possible to do so. He stressed the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf area and the importance of working together in shoring it up. Finally, he agreed that we need to cooperate closely in developing help for Pakistan.”
3. Reference is to McHenry’s March 1 speech and the vote in the UN Security Council in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 465 on Israeli settlements, a vote that Carter subsequently disavowed. (Bernard D. Nossiter, “U.S. Votes at U.N. to Rebuke Israelis on Settlement Issue,” New York Times, March 2, 1980, pp. 1, 8; Terence Smith, “President Terms Anti-Israeli Vote in U.N. an Error,” New York Times, March 4, 1980, pp. A1, A6)
4. Reference is to Clark Clifford’s January 31 talks with Indira Gandhi, which were reported in telegram 2224 from New Delhi, February 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800056–0643 and D800077–1075)