Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

131. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Two Key Issues in the Schmidt Visit²
• 1. Alliance Management;
• 2. The German View of Detente and the Afghan Crisis

The two issues are interrelated, but each requires special attention from you.

With reference to alliance management, the Vance visit³ was designed to generate more unity in action in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Presently, it looks as if it is being followed by a “competitive” detente, in which the Europeans appear to be outdoing one another in trying to engage the Soviets in negotiations about Afghanistan neutrality. The British are doing it, the French are doing it, the Italians want to do it, and the paper given by Chancellor Schmidt to Cy Vance on the Afghan situation,⁴ which stresses that the West must compensate the Soviets for withdrawing their troops, underscores the possibility of fundamental substantive divisions between us and the Europeans. (S)

All this is to stress that it is imperative that we have control of the process and more effectively manage the Western diplomatic response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (S)

There are three institutions that we can use:

— NATO: It can talk but it can’t act outside of its own geographic region. It is useful for consultations but nothing more, at least on the diplomatic front.

— The Economic Summit group: This is a way of pulling the Japanese into the consultations, but it will take significant work to broaden the agenda from economic concerns. A good way to start the process is to use the group to pursue economic assistance to Pakistan and Turkey. Cy has begun to meet with these countries informally for a drink Friday evenings. This is a good step and ought to be encouraged, but his meeting last Friday was in the New York Times Saturday morning.⁵

— The Four-Power groups: This is potentially the most effective means, but only if the meetings remain secret; otherwise, the French can’t play, and the rest of the allies become resentful. In the past there have been quadripartite meetings among Foreign Ministry officials, and separate meetings among Cabinet Office officials (i.e. myself or David with von Staden, Wahl, etc.). I believe we should continue this division since there will undoubtedly be occasions in the future when myself or David may wish to meet on particularly sensitive matters with our European counterparts. (S)

I would recommend that toward the conclusion of your conversations with Schmidt you stress the importance of following up in the Four-Power framework. The agenda for discussion should be:

— A common assessment of Soviet objectives: We and our allies are already developing “solutions” to the Afghan crisis without having a common appreciation of the problem.

— Development of the neutrality concept: There are several very important aspects of reestablishing Afghan neutrality which have yet to be explored, including whether or not the Soviets would recognize the Durand Line⁶ as Afghanistan’s border (and without which there can be no guarantees of these borders).

— Our diplomatic tactics and strategy: At the moment it is a case of every man for himself. There will be a Four-Power meeting at the Political Directors (Assistant Secretary) level March 10–11 in Paris.⁷ I believe we should upgrade the level of attendance to at least the Permanent Under Secretary level. (I believe that State would agree to this approach.) (S)

The German Paper (Tab A)⁸

Although we have had conflicting signals from the Germans, it is possible that Schmidt may want to discuss this paper with you. In any event, Warren Christopher will raise with the Germans next Wednesday in a meeting at State our serious problems with the German analysis.⁹ (S)

In general, the FRG paper has several severe weaknesses:

— There is no mention of the need for the Europeans to take any steps in their relationship with the Soviets (credits, COCOM).

— The paper indicates that the Soviet Union would have to be adequately compensated for withdrawing from Afghanistan.

— The Soviets must not be made to lose face in this crisis.

— The Soviet withdrawal could be phased over time. Moscow would first take out those forces which threaten neighboring countries. (The Germans probably have in mind the two airborne divisions, fighter bombers, and perhaps some of the Soviet armor.) The rest of the Soviet force would then be withdrawn in “a realistic timeframe determined by logistics.”

— Normalization and improvement of East–West economic relations would occur parallel to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

— The West would indicate its readiness to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games provided that the Soviet Union “took concrete measures to ensure conditions under which sportsmen from all countries can participate.” (Those measures are not defined, and may entail something considerably less than total withdrawal.) (S)

— In the area of the crisis, the Europeans would launch an initiative for a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement. (There is no mention of any military component of the Western effort to stabilize Southwest Asia and the Middle East.)

— The paper indicates that Western decisions on assistance to Third World countries should not be determined primarily by the domestic systems and foreign policies of those countries. (In other words, minimize human rights.) (S)

Throughout the paper there is a naive assumption that the Soviets are looking for ways to escape from Afghanistan and that Western political initiatives will be sufficient to convince them to do so. This idea could cause us real trouble if the EC continues to push its neutralization proposal for Afghanistan¹⁰ and if the Europeans settle for something less than total and immediate Soviet withdrawal in any deal they made with Moscow. The German paper is so bad that I do not think you should raise it with Schmidt and thus give it any more prominence than it already has. However, if he wishes to discuss it with you, I suggest you try to keep that part of your conversation short and general. I recommend that you make the following points: (S)

— We appreciate the German effort to try to lay out for us Bonn’s analysis of the crisis we face. We also are heartened by the indication in the paper that the Germans could assume additional defense tasks in Central Europe, want to push NATO’s long-term defense program forward, and are willing to give economic assistance in the immediate region of the crisis.

— However, we are troubled by certain elements in the German paper.

— There is almost no mention of Europe’s bilateral relations with the Soviets. This seems to suggest that the Afghanistan crisis is of indirect and not direct interest to the Europeans. We believe that is wrong. In the end detente and Western security must be indivisible.

— We do not believe the Soviets should be compensated for their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Nor is it our responsibility to see that Moscow does not lose face or suffer a political defeat in this crisis.

— Only total and immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would be acceptable to us. Any Soviet withdrawal phased over time would only weaken Western solidarity and resolve to respond to Soviet aggression. Please keep this in mind as the EC proceeds with its neutralization proposal. We will not accept the Europeans becoming intermediaries between Washington and Moscow.

— In our view, normalization of East–West economic relations must be after total Soviet withdrawal. We will not agree to legitimization of any Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

— A European initiative for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East would not be helpful this year. What we want instead is strong European support for Camp David.

— We will continue to make human rights a central plank in our foreign policy.

— In sum, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not solely an East–South problem. It is and must remain a major issue between East and West until the Soviets end their brutal occupation of Afghanistan. We do not believe this reality is sufficiently taken into account in the German paper. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East\West, Box 8, Chron: 3/1–10/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. This memorandum supplemented a February 29 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter on Carter’s March 5 meeting with Schmidt which transmitted February 28 memoranda on the meeting from Vance and Owen to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, Germany: Chancellor Schmidt, 3/4–6/80: Briefing Book [1])
2. Schmidt visited the United States from March 4 to 8; on March 5, he met for talks with Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Miller, and other officials. (AAPBD 1980, Documents 71, 72, and 73)
3. See Document 197.
4. See footnote 15, Document 197.
5. According to the report dated February 29, “Mr. Vance also met today with ambassadors from Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan and West Germany to discuss a response to the Afghanistan situation, reporting to them on his meetings in Europe last week with allied leaders.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Vance Confers with Moscow Envoy,” New York Times, March 1, 1980, p. 4)
6. The Durand Line marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 159 as well as Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume VIII, South Asia, Documents 103, 112, 114, 117, and 120.
7. No further record of this meeting has been found.
8. See footnote 15, Document 197. In a February 29 memorandum to Aaron, Blackwill noted with respect to the German paper: “Nothing could be clearer evidence that although we will probably get a satisfactory response from Schmidt next Wednesday, the Germans, while prepared to take useful political and economic steps in the Third World, have not faced up to the global implications of raw Soviet military power, and Moscow’s willingness to use it directly or through its surrogates.” Reference is to Wednesday, March 5. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 25, German Federal Republic: 2/80)
9. Telegram 4070 from Bonn, March 3, indicates that Christopher and Van Well planned to hold a working lunch on March 5 to discuss the German paper and the paper that Vance gave to Schmidt on February 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800110–0669) Christopher and Van Well met that day, but no record of their discussion of the German paper has been found. (Memorandum of Conversation, March 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800050–0782) For information on the U.S. paper, see footnote 14, Document 197.
10. On February 29, the United Kingdom formally presented to the Soviet Union a neutralization proposal for which it had secured backing from its EC partners. (R.W. Apple, “Britain Presents Afghan Neutralization Plan to Soviet,” New York Times, March 1, 1980, p. 1)