Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

130. Memorandum by Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, February 25, 1980

Herewith is my report of my luncheon conversation with Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn, February 20.²

Summary: At luncheon in Chancellery February 20, Chancellor Schmidt was accompanied by Genscher and von Staden. I was accompanied by Ambassador Stoessel. Two and one-half hour conversation was wide-ranging and extremely frank; exchange was useful in elucidating Chancellor’s concerns about present situation and prospects in connection with Afghanistan situation and highlighted his emphasis on need to understand US conception of overall strategy and aims. He complained with some vigor about several instances where he felt there had been lack of prior consultation by US regarding actions it was taking and on which US expected support from allies; however, he emphasized his firm intention to be supportive of US and he made some suggestions regarding ways to improve consultative procedures. Chancellor strongly emphasized his belief that, however difficult France may seem to be, Giscard will stand with us when chips are down and he suggested continuing efforts to pursue dialogue with French. Chancellor welcomed most warmly my visit and effort to consult with European allies, especially France. Chancellor conveyed his best wishes to President Carter and stressed how much he is looking forward to his talks with him in Washington. End Summary.³

Schmidt dispensed with any small talk and at beginning of luncheon launched at once into lengthy exposition of his concerns and views. He said that, for him, the fundamental question related to the philosophy of the US in dealing with the Soviet Union now and in the next few years; he also said the same question applied to our views on Southwest Asia, China and East-West relations as a whole. As background to these questions, he said his impression was that, within a matter of months we could be in a phase of escalation of tension between East and West. Perhaps this was inevitable, but he wondered if we really intended to have such an escalation. The Chancellor said he had been puzzled by the phrase in the President’s most recent letter concerning ‘‘punishment” of the Soviet Union.⁴ Is it really our goal to punish the Soviet Union and, if so, what do we wish to achieve?

Continuing, the Chancellor acknowledged that he had certain domestic problems, as Giscard does and other governments in Europe. Just as President Carter, he also has a political campaign to conduct. He understood that much of what the President says and does has something to do with the domestic situation in the United States and with the political campaign. In an aside, he remarked that this was no doubt the reason that the President was not fulfilling the pledge he made at Tokyo to bring US oil prices up to the world market level in 1980.⁵ The Chancellor said that he and other members of his government have refrained from making statements concerning the present situation which would cater to the interests of the political campaign under way in the FRG. He wants to continue to put politics to one side, but this would be a difficult position to maintain if he does not understand the philosophy behind US policies. He said that he has a clear feeling that danger is building up. The Chancellor said he wanted to be frank in what he told the Germans about what is going on, but to do so he must know our overall concepts. For example, do we want to embark on a new arms race? Do we wish to punish a world power and for what reasons?

The Chancellor then spoke about French policy and Giscard. He urged that we should not let our attitude toward France be influenced by the public media. After reviewing briefly his last meeting with Giscard, the Chancellor said there was not the slightest doubt that, if the chips were down, the French would stand firmly with the US just as they had done during the Cuban missile crisis. However, this is not appreciated by the press, which tends to carry “disastrous” reports about French policies. The Chancellor recalled that, in his private meeting with Giscard, he had made a remark—partly intended to flatter Giscard—that for obvious reasons the US was the FRG’s most important ally and that France, for obvious reasons, was the FRG’s closest ally. Schmidt said he wanted the President to understand this and that he did not wish to hide the fact that he had made such a remark. He emphasized that any attempt to divide France and Germany would be most unwise—and this held also for the issue of the Olympic Games.⁶ Schmidt said that he wou1d not allow the Soviets to drive a wedge between the FRG and the US and he stated that Giscard feels exactly the same way about his relations with the US.

Schmidt said that we should not worry too much about the FRG–France tete-a-tetes, since this is the only way the French can be carried along with the main stream of European thought. Only the FRG can perform this role. The US cannot do this. As an afterthought, Schmidt remarked that he hoped the UK would not break up Europe because of disputes over the EC budget.

Recalling the events of the past five weeks, the Chancellor said that he had to state frankly that he had not understood some of the US actions. Moreover, on several occasions the US had taken decisions on its own and then had expected the allies to say “me too” within 24 hours. As an example, he mentioned the US position regarding a boycott or postponement of the Olympic Games. He had been assured by Warren Christopher (and von Staden had also been assured by Brzezinski) shortly before his policy statement to the Bundestag January 17 that the US would not make a decision in the near future regarding the Olympics.⁷ Thus he had said nothing about the subject in his statement. He subsequently was informed on Sunday morning that the President would announce that evening his decision concerning the boycott or postponement of the Olympics.⁸ The Chancellor said this was all in the past but he mentioned it only as an example of how a lack of prior information regarding US intentions could make matters difficult for others.

Referring to the US hostages in Iran, Schmidt said he deeply admired the manner in which the President had handled this extremely difficult situation. He could understand some of the pressures the President had been under because of the FRG’s own—and much briefer—experience with the taking of hostages. With all of his admiration for the President’s policy, he had to admit, however, that he had not liked everything we had suggested concerning Iran, especially the idea of mining Iranian ports.

The Chancellor inquired about the scenario leading, hopefully, to the release of the hostages in Iran and I outlined to him the various steps which are under way.

Turning to East-West relations, the Chancellor said that over the past ten years he felt the FRG had not done badly. His approach has always been that of maintaining a balance in Europe, by striving for a reciprocal limitation of arms or, failing achievement of this aim, having enough military strength in the West to deter the Soviets. Only by maintaining this policy can detente proceed. The Chancellor noted that much has been attained through detente, especially for Germany. Many persons of German origin have been able to leave the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and he did not want to see this process interrupted. Thanks to the help of the US and the other allies, a Berlin agreement was achieved which had brought great benefits; however, if tensions escalate, Berlin could suffer, as well as the 18 million “hostages” constituting the population of the GDR.

Schmidt felt that some people in Washington see the present FRG Government as “softies.” This was definitely not the case. After the experience with the neutron bomb issue, it had been hard to get agreement on TNF, but the FRG had rammed it through. In this connection, the Chancellor recalled that, when he had first raised the issue of grey area weapons in 1977, there had been critical statements out of Washington. However, this had changed and, following the Guadeloupe meeting, Germany had taken the lead in Europe in regard to grey area weapons. He thought it should be remembered that, so far as this subject was concerned, the FRG initially had taken a harder stance than the US; moreover, he would note that, on the neutron bomb, the FRG had been ready to go ahead, although the US finally decided not to do so. The Chancellor said the FRG would be as hard as anyone, but he wanted to be sure it was necessary before taking such a stance. One had to be certain that this would not just be to punish someone. As a divided country, the FRG felt particularly vulnerable. It could be that the Soviets would decide to punish the FRG in retaliation rather than the US. Against this background, the Chancellor said he had not been too happy with some of the remarks by Mrs. Thatcher and he preferred the more balanced views of Carrington.

As another example of the firm FRG attitude, Schmidt said that the FRG had never interrupted military aid to Turkey. They had not been wrong to do so, just as they had not been wrong to advocate consistently the need for supporting Pakistan, despite the nuclear problem in that country. Schmidt acknowledged that this problem existed, but the FRG had felt all along that it would be well to assist Pakistan.

Schmidt lamented that there were too few opportunities between allies to talk directly and confidentially about current problems. Also, he regretted there was not more talk between the US and France. Once again, he praised Giscard as a sound and reliable leader who is certainly far better than any personality in the opposition in France. He agreed that, as a Frenchman, Giscard has particular sensitivities. However, this is something which afflicts all leaders of democracies and he was sure that Giscard just as other allies wished to maintain a stable alliance.

Summing up, the Chancellor said that, as we already knew, we could count on the FRG as a partner without any reservations whatsoever. However, such a partner would be more effective if it knew and understood the goals and aims of the US.

In response, I said that the President greatly appreciates his conversations and exchanges with the Chancellor, particularly during the difficult period since the taking of the hostages and during the even more difficult period since the Afghanistan invasion. The President greatly values the Chancellor’s views and he understands, as Schmidt had said, that Giscard in a crunch would be with the US and the other allies. There have been irritations with the French and there will undoubtedly be more in the future, but the President knows that Giscard will stand with us when we are pressed. I said that I personally had been irritated by the French attitude toward the suggested multilateral Foreign Ministers’ meeting and the subsequent backgrounding they had given to the press which had been done without prior notice and which had been extremely distorted.⁹ I said I had made my irritation clear to the French, while at the same time emphasizing that this would not affect the basic relationship between our two countries.

On the matter of the Olympics, I said there had been a failure to communicate adequately in advance regarding our decision, although this had been foreshadowed by remarks I had made previously. The lack of sufficient prior consultation was regrettable and must be prevented in the future.¹⁰

As to our philosophy in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I said we saw this as an event of very serious proportions requiring a firm, strong response and one which we would be prepared to sustain. We felt the Soviets must be made to pay a price so long as their troops remain in Afghanistan; also we wished to convey the message that we intended to be firm in order to deter Soviet aggression elsewhere. The Soviet strength in Afghanistan represents a potential threat to Pakistan and Iran, especially if there is fragmentation in the latter country.¹¹

I said that, in our view, the steps we have taken are both firm and clear and no further major, new steps are required at this point. We believe that we should seek to achieve a return to the status quo ante in Afghanistan, along the general lines suggested by the recent statement of the EC–9 in their Rome meeting.¹² Before that is achieved, our philosophy on East–West relations is that the present sanctions should remain in effect but that we should not try to shut off all dialogue between the US and the Soviet Union or between the other allies and the Soviets. It is essential to maintain arms control discussions. I emphasized that we have not withdrawn the SALT II treaty for ratification but have deferred it. As soon as we feel there is some chance for ratification, we will bring it to the Senate. Hopefully, this could be before our elections, although it might come afterwards.¹³ Meanwhile, we will take no actions which would violate the SALT II treaty and we expect the Soviets to adopt the same position. I said I had put the question specifically to Gromyko regarding Soviet intentions to abide by SALT II but had received no answer. A Pravda editorial had indicated somewhat ambiguously that the Soviets would continue to observe the treaty provisions.

In conversations with Dobrynin, I said agreement had been reached that most of the other negotiations with the Soviets in the arms control field would continue, such as CTB, MBFR, a chemical warfare treaty and a radiological treaty. The Indian Ocean talks have been suspended in view of Afghanistan, which has made it essential for us to maintain a strong naval presence in the area. In general, I said we will continue arms negotiations, which are in our own interests as well as those of our allies. I believed the CSCE process should be kept alive and we planned to attend the Madrid meeting. We also will be prepared to follow up on the French CDE proposal following Madrid.

When Schmidt inquired if the Soviets know of these intentions, I responded affirmatively. In another aspect of our policy, about which the Soviets have not been informed, I said it is our intention to maintain and observe formal US–Soviet agreements, such as those covering grain shipments, maritime activities, and civil air. With regard to Eastern Europe, I said we believe it is in our interest and that of our allies to continue to seek good relations with Eastern Europe. I repeated that we feel it is important to maintain a dialogue between the US and the Soviets. Schmidt interjected that the last consideration was the most important.

I said I had met three times in recent weeks with Dobrynin and had emphasized our desire to keep alive the basic framework of our relations. We expect that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn.

Schmidt asked if the Soviets understand that no weapons from the West will be sent to the Afghanistan rebels if the Soviets withdraw. I said the Soviets have raised this question and I have responded by saying that I had heard the question but that if there is to be discussion about it, it would be a subject for a talk between Gromyko and myself. I said that, speaking very confidentially, I have written to Gromyko outlining all of our concerns about Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, and so on. I thought the time would come when it would be helpful for me to have a private talk with Gromyko and that, before doing so, I would wish to consult with the Chancellor.

Schmidt inquired whether I felt there was a real danger to Yugoslavia in present circumstances. I replied that I did not believe this was the case at this time, but might arise later, and Schmidt agreed.

Summing up, I said our philosophy was that the Soviet invasion could not go without a strong response but that we do wish to maintain the overall framework of East-West relations.

The Chancellor said he understood I had given Genscher a paper outlining US aims in the current situation.¹⁴ On its side, the FRG had also drawn up a paper which had been developed at least in part on the basis of the recent talks with the French. He thought we would find it of interest to study the German paper and, thereafter, on the occasion of the Chancellor’s visit to Washington, the two sides could compare views and reactions regarding the papers. (Genscher subsequently gave me a copy of the German paper.)¹⁵

After expressing appreciation for my remarks, the Chancellor said he would like to speak in a broad vein about some of his concerns. Quite frankly, he saw the danger of a third world war occurring in the not too distant future—not immediately but perhaps in 1981.¹⁶ Of course, an “explosion” regarding our hostages in Iran could lead to an escalation which could bring the danger of war even sooner. Outlining various possibilities in which he saw the danger of a war developing, Schmidt said this could come over an incident in the Persian Gulf, as he had already mentioned it could result from something to do with the hostages, or it could involve pressures in Berlin. He also thought that any hostilities might become nuclear, particularly given the lack of a strong US military potential in the Persian Gulf.

Schmidt continued that the obsession of the Soviets with China also is a threat. He thought the Soviets probably misread US policy toward China and that it was important for us to explain these policies to them. If the US tries to make the Soviets pay by stimulating their fears of China, this could induce the Soviets to take counter actions which would be dangerous. The Chancellor thought that the situation between China and the West is unclear and could be a cause of war. If China is threatened, this could compel the US to ask—and to answer—the question of whether we would help China or not.

Probably the most likely cause of war, the Chancellor thought, would evolve from an increased arms race. From statements made by some US representatives, the impression is given that we wish to see a sharp increase of allied forces in Europe as well as those of the US. How serious all of this is remains unclear to the FRG and it must be even more unclear to the Soviets. In the Chancellor’s view, if by 1981 the Soviets conclude that an arms race is beginning—and they would realize that this is a race they could not hope to win—there is a risk that they would decide to take early preemptive action to strike while they still had an advantage.

This line of thought, the Chancellor said, led him to underline the importance of my talking with Gromyko in order to make clear the true nature of US intentions. I said I agreed completely with the Chancellor concerning the dangers inherent in an arms race. This is why I felt it was imperative to obtain ratification of the SALT II treaty so as to prevent a new spiral in the arms competition.

Reverting to the Afghanistan situation, Schmidt said that, if the Soviets are to leave Afghanistan, they will do so only if a framework is established and if they know that the West will not replace them. A framework probably would have to involve a staged withdrawal. For example, removal of their strategic air capability would reduce the strategic threat to the surrounding area.

The Chancellor then raised the possibility that the Soviets, despite all of the sanctions taken against them by the West, may simply refuse to pull out of Afghanistan.¹⁷ If this transpires, the Soviets will appear to have won and the philosophy of containment will no longer be credible. What should the West do if the Soviets refuse to leave Afghanistan? In Schmidt’s view—and he emphasized he was “thinking out loud”—he thought it would make sense in such a situation to try to push the Soviets out of some other area where they have established a foothold—i.e., Angola, Libya, Ethiopia, or North Yemen.¹⁸ We might be able to find some areas where our capabilities are greater than they are in far-off Afghanistan and where more direct pressures could be brought to bear. The Chancellor acknowledged that all of this probably sounded very daring and adventuristic, but he urged that consideration be given to what moves might be taken if the Soviets refuse to budge on Afghanistan. If this happens, we must do something in order not to appear impotent.¹⁹

I expressed my own confidence that, in time, the Soviets could be induced to leave Afghanistan. On China, I reviewed the development of our relationship with China and the measured pace we were following in pursuing normalization. While in the past we have attempted to be evenhanded in dealing with the Soviets and the Chinese, the Soviets now perceive that there has been a clear tilt by the US toward China. In fact, they may see more than is really there, since there has been a large increase in contacts following a period where virtually no contacts existed. The Soviets are particularly concerned about the strategic relationship between the US and China and how this might translate into such matters as military sales. When it was decided before Secretary Brown’s visit to China that we would permit the sale of non-lethal military equipment to China, the Soviets probably saw this as a first step towards selling lethal weapons to the Chinese.

I continued that the Soviets have always been worried about encirclement and these fears are now exacerbated by our contacts with the Chinese. The situation is also being fed by the flux in the Soviet leadership, where we can say that the change is already under way. I agreed that the whole relationship with China presents an area of great danger—when I see Gromyko I will talk to him about this and assure him that we are not trying to encircle the Soviet Union and will not sell lethal weapons to the Chinese.

Schmidt picked up my remark about change in the leadership in the Soviet Union, and asked what our views were. I said that Kosygin seems to be totally out of the picture while Brezhnev apparently is experiencing more periods of down than up.

Schmidt inquired if it would cause problems for us if he were to stress in public the deisrability of contacts between the two super powers. I said I thought there would be no objection if this idea were stated in general terms.

Schmidt inquired if the US had proposed officially to the Soviets that negotiations begin on TNF. I said this had been done but that the Soviets had turned the suggestion down.²⁰ Schmidt thought it would be helpful if I could mention in a speech that we had made the suggestion for such negotiations. I said this would pose no difficulties. When Schmidt inquired if I felt the Soviets would stick to their negative stance on TNF negotiations, I said I thought they would do so for some time but eventually they would probably move from this position. Schmidt commented that the recent Gierek speech and proposal for a disarmament conference might indicate a certain erosion in the Soviet position.

Schmidt inquired if, in our contacts with the Soviets, we had evoked the 1973 US–Soviet agreements. I said that this had been done and that the 1972 agreement had also been recalled.

Schmidt reverted to his concerns about an arms race, saying that if this were to develop the position of the FRG would become extremely difficult, in particular, this would be the case if only the US and the FRG on the Western side were to contribute to the Western buildup. He would not permit the FRG to be singled out among European countries. The FRG, Schmidt said, must remain a NATO partner like the other partners, even if it was stronger economically and militarily than the other allies.

The Chancellor went on to speak of the capability of the FRG army, noting that it was based on a conscription system, that good reserves existed, and that mobilization would be expeditious. These were the important things in estimating military capabilities, and not percentage numbers which could be manipulated in various ways. Nevertheless, in order that no wedge could be driven between the FRG and the US, the Chancellor said that the FRG would fulfill the three percent pledge and that he would tell the President this when he saw him in Washington.

Schmidt then dwelt on the risks assumed by the FRG in regard to the stationing of a large number of nuclear weapons in a small and heavily populated area. He could only hope that the US public could understand this situation and the risks accepted by the FRG in this connection. At this point the Chancellor spoke with some vehemence about his dislike of criticisms from US officials (he mentioned Bob Komer by name in this context) regarding the FRG military contribution.²¹ He said he had had enough of such criticisms and was “fed up” with them.

The Chancellor was also irritated by allegations that he is somehow in the hands of the left wing of the SPD. He said in strong terms that the SPD was in his hands and would remain so long as he was the Chancellor. If Strauss were to win—which Schmidt did not anticipate—then the nature of the SPD might change. This was one reason why the Chancellor intended to stay in power. He reiterated that, so long as he was there, he would control the party.

In a discussion of sanctions against Iran, Schmidt said he had agreed to go along with them in the past even though he had not felt them to be correct.²² I explained why we felt the threat of sanctions had been useful in persuading the Iranians to adopt a more moderate stance on the hostage issue. The Chancellor said he would not argue with this in principle but that he also had some of the same reluctance about sanctions against the Soviet Union as he had felt about sanctions against Iran.²³ For political reasons, the FRG has built up its exchanges with the Soviet Union and he noted that FRG trade with the Soviet Union was five times more important to the FRG than US trade with the USSR.²⁴ Such trade also contributed to FRG employment, and the Chancellor said he would be reluctant to see unemployment rise in the FRG because of sanctions against the Soviet Union. He thought it was wrong to ask what the FRG and others should sacrifice in relation to the Soviet Union.²⁵ What the FRG wishes to do is contribute to a constructive policy. If it appears that sacrifices really are required by the situation, then they would be accepted, but this should not be done in response to pressure from the public media in the US and elsewhere.

I said I wished to refer to one more issue, that of the Middle Eastern negotiations and the Arab–Israeli dispute. The US fully recognizes the importance of resolving these issues if we were to have a stable situation in the Middle East. Progress is slow but there is hope for a favorable outcome. I noted the interest on the part of some of our Allies in coming forward with a new proposal in the UN relating to the Middle East problem. In our view, such an initiative at the present time would be premature and could hinder the ongoing discussions. It is possible that, after the target date for the Autonomy Agreement has passed, an initiative or a new statement might be useful, but I emphasized that for the moment this would not be desirable. Meanwhile, the statements by individual countries relating to the fundamental importance of settling the Middle East problem could be useful.

Schmidt said he assumed that we were putting all possible pressure on Begin to move forward and to meet the target date. I said this indeed was the case and that support from others would be helpful in this regard. Schmidt said that, because of German history, there were limits on what the FRG could do. He remarked that it is clear that many of the Arab countries seem to feel that a solution of the Palestinian problem is more important than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Regarding assistance to Turkey, the Chancellor said he hoped to see a modus vivendi achieved between Turkey and Greece concerning the Aegean. In the course of the FRG efforts to lead the assistance program for Turkey, it might be possible to sound out the possibilities for such a solution. Schmidt said that the FRG would wish to stay in close touch with SACEUR in this regard. I welcomed this suggestion, while noting that the prospects for success in connection with SACEUR’s efforts seem to have improved somewhat.

Speaking in reflective terms about the position of the President, Schmidt said that clearly the President is now seen as a strong leader. He thought that the President had the prospect of being perceived as well as a wise leader and, hopefully, as a successful leader in resolving the crisis situation with the Soviet Union. Schmidt said it is clear to him that strong emotions have now been built up in the US about the Soviet Union. This may be seen as a positive development, although it is something which needs guidance. Through US contacts and those of other countries, with the Soviet Union, there could be a process leading to a resolution of the present situation of tension. Schmidt hoped that in the period just prior to the US elections in the fall there would not be a competition between the rival candidates as to which one would be the toughest toward the Soviet Union. What is required is leadership in order to ensure the peace and not to lead into a world war.

On the question of the Olympics, Schmidt said that, as we knew, the FRG will be on our side in the end, but time is needed to bring the others along.²⁶

Referring to the question of failure of communication which has plagued us at times in the past, I wondered if a mechanism might be developed to improve the situation. For example, perhaps Assistant Secretary Vest might have weekly talks with Ambassador Hermes in Washington to review matters and Ambassador Stoessel might do the same in Bonn. Schmidt welcomed the idea of regularized consultations, but he thought it would be far preferable if I, myself, could arrange to meet on a regular basis with the UK, French, and FRG Ambassadors in Washington.²⁷ This could be done in the office or in my home. Perhaps the Italians could be brought in as well if we felt it advisable, although he cautioned that the Cossiga government might not be around very long. Such an arrangement would provide the opportunity for consultations at a high level and could be extremely useful, if I could find a way to make time in my schedule for such talks. I said I would undertake to do this.

Concluding the substantive discussion, I said I felt that all of the important questions had been discussed either with the Foreign Minister or with the Chancellor. For some of them, neither side had answers at the moment but there would be opportunity to study them and further consideration would be given to them when the Chancellor visited Washington.

The Chancellor expressed his great appreciation to me for my visit to Bonn as well as to the other capitals in Europe. He was particularly pleased that I would be going to Paris, since otherwise it would have made matters very difficult. He asked me to convey his very best regard to the President as well as the gist of the views he had presented. Schmidt said he looked forward with much pleasure to seeing the President in Washington and hoped he would have the opportunity for a good private talk with the President. Schmidt reviewed the membership of his delegation, noting that it would include several top industrialists and trade union members. These individuals did not have to be present in the political meetings but it would be useful if they could be included in the White House dinner. The Chancellor remarked that this was his way of helping to lead public opinion in the FRG.²⁸

Comment: While he appeared somewhat tired, the Chancellor was in good form. He was frank and even blunt in many of his comments, although generally constructive in his approach and his desire to look ahead. His remarks about the difficulties caused by perceived gaps in the consultative process underlined his sensitivities on this score. His emphasis on the need for a long-term strategy for the West, his disquisitions on France and the FRG-French relation, his worries about the possibility of war and his desire to defend the FRG record in the security area highlighted his concerns on these points. The talk was useful in permitting Schmidt to air his views and preoccupations on a wide variety of subjects. He repeatedly expressed his pleasure that he will be visiting Washington soon, and it is clear he looks forward with much anticipation to his consultations with the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Box 56, Chron: 2/16–25/80. Secret. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “Cy, Zbig—Overall, I see nothing encouraging here. FRG opposes any sanctions against Iran or Soviets, are continuing business as usual with SU, refuse to commit publicly to Olympic boycott & privately & in press are very critical of us. However, we need each other—Schmidt’s visit should help. J.” Sent to Carter under cover of a February 26 memorandum from Brzezinski. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—[1/80–3/80]) In telegram 3392 from Bonn, February 21, Stoessel provided his draft of this memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900086–1982)
2. In this sentence, Carter crossed out “my” and wrote “Vance.” Vance visited Bonn from February 19 to 20 as part of a trip that also took him to Rome (February 20–21), Paris (February 21), London (February 21–22), and Ottawa (February 22). (Telegram 44177 to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, and USNATO, February 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003–0498 and P870104–0081) Telegram 1023 from Vance, February 22, reported on his February 20 talk with Genscher. (National Archives, RG 59, Vance Papers, Lot 84D241, Jan/Feb/Mar 1980 Memcons)
3. In his February 26 memorandum (see footnote 1, above), Brzezinski wrote: “Schmidt’s comments are interesting because they reveal a curious schizophrenia: on the one hand, an exaggerated fear (induced by exaggerated anxiety over our reactions), and on the other hand the view that Soviet failure to withdraw from Afghanistan should be followed by some ‘more direct’ Western pressure, perhaps against Libya or Yemen.”
4. Reference is apparently to Document 196.
5. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words “he made at Tokyo” and wrote in the margin: “It was Bonn. I corrected our goal before Tokyo.”
6. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words “also for the issue of the Olympic games.”
7. Reference is apparently to Christopher’s January 16 talk with Schmidt in Bonn and Brzezinski’s January 15 meeting with Von Staden and their British and French colleagues in Paris. Telegram 915 from Bonn, January 16, reported on Christopher’s January 16 consultations in Bonn. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002–0022 and P900086–2017) For Brzezinski’s talks in Paris, see Document 38.
8. On January 20, Stoessel informed Von Staden that during that evening’s “Meet the Press” program Carter would call for a boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics if Soviet troops did not withdraw from Afghanistan in a month. In response, Von Staden said that he personally regretted the lack of consultation “in rather strong terms” and noted: “Based on his own contacts with US officials in Washington in the last few days, on Deputy Secretary Christopher’s consultations in Bonn and on Secretary’s statement last week on TV, von Staden said he—as well as the Chancellor—had felt that a US decision on the Olympics was not imminent and, in any event, would be taken only after prior consultation with Allies.” (Telegram 15459 to all diplomatic posts and telegram 1153 from Bonn, both January 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–1334 and P870104–0210)
9. See footnote 2, Document 43.
10. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Don’t apologize.”
11. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter drew an arrow.
12. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “‘Status quo ante?’ Ante when? not 12/23/79.”
13. At the bottom of the page below this line, Carter wrote and then crossed out the following list of words: “Eppy. El Sal. Is Nukes. Schmidt memcon. PR–SU buildup Af.”
14. Vance’s paper has not been found. Telegram Secto 1012 from Vance in Rome, February 21, reported that his February 20 presentation in Bonn “followed a five point outline of our goals and instruments in response to the Afghanistan/USSR problem”: “A) buttress Western defense forces and reduce energy dependence”; “B) for sake of deterrence, make Soviets pay a price for Afghanistan and prevent their driving wedges among the allies”; “C) maintain pressures to gain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan”; “D) manage East-West relations in ways that protect our collective interests in arms control and the possibility of improved relations with Moscow when Soviet policies allow”; and “E) strengthen the Western position in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800090–0566)
15. The paper, “The West’s Overall Strategy in the Present International Crisis Situation,” February 18, is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 25, German Federal Republic: 2/80. It is printed in AAPBD 1980, Document 58.
16. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words “third world” and “perhaps in 1981.”
17. Next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “most likely prospect.”
18. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line and wrote: “How about trade restraints, boycotting Olympics, stronger NATO, Allied unity, world condemnation.”
19. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter drew a vertical line and wrote: “(Just what we are trying to do with doubtful support).”
20. In the margin next to this and the preceding sentence, Carter wrote: “He knew this.”
21. Reference is apparently to Komer’s February 9 speech at a Munich conference on European security problems. (Richard Burt, “Pentagon Aide Says Allies Let US Carry Burden,” New York Times, February 10, 1980, p. 10)
22. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter drew an arrow.
23. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter drew an arrow.
24. In this sentence, Carter underlined the words “For political reasons,” and wrote in the margin: “for DMarks also?”
25. Carter underlined this sentence and wrote an exclamation point in the margin.
26. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “I have a queasy feeling still—.”
27. In this sentence, Carter underlined “UK,” “French,” and “FRG,” and wrote in the margin next to the paragraph: “Don’t let them decide whom to invite. Include Italy, Japan, Canada.”
28. In telegram 3393 from Bonn, February 21, Stoessel wrote: “At lunch February 21 with Von Staden, he told me that the Chancellor had been very pleased with his talk the previous day with the Secretary and with the frank and confidential nature of the exchange which had taken place. The Chancellor highly values such talks and wishes there could be more of them.” Stoessel also reported: “According to Von Staden, the Chancellor believes that, in the current circumstances, it would be useful to re-institute a kind of special allied consultative group in Washington and his suggestion was meant in this sense.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003–0651)