129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany1
SUBJECT
- Letter From President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt.
1. Entire text Secret.
2. You should deliver following letter from the President to Chancellor Schmidt at earliest opportunity. There will be no signed original.
3. Begin text.
Dear Helmut:
I want to tell you again how gratified I was by our phone conversation2 and by the communique you and Valery issued earlier this week.3 This letter is also a result of our conversation.
I know you agree with me that our actions should make it clear to Soviet leaders that they must pay a price for invading Afghanistan and encourage them to withdraw their forces. We can do much to help deter them from further aggression, to contribute to the security and stability of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, and to improve Western relations with the crucial states in that area. It is also very important to remove from Soviet expectations any hope that they can drive a wedge between the Western Allies with a so-called “peace offensive” aimed at any of us.
Our response to the Afghan crisis can also serve as a catalyst for making progress on some of the West’s most pressing problems. One such problem is our defensive capability, which should be enhanced both inside and outside Europe. Another lesson of the current crisis is the need to reduce the industrial world’s dependence on Mideast oil. I know that our two countries will work closely with others at the planned meeting next month to reduce oil consumption and, through the International Energy Technology Group, to devise means for increasing alternative energy sources.
Each of us in the West has different assets—economic, military and political—as well as different constraints on our ability to act. We need a thorough exploration of how we can ensure that our policies are complementary and of how we can share the necessary tasks. In this message, I want to give you my thoughts on what steps should be taken next. I am also writing to the leaders of the other countries that participate in the economic summits.4
I agree with you that we need a “division of labor” among the Allies to ensure that each of us makes a maximum contribution to our common effort. You are aware of the punitive bilateral steps the United States has taken, or will take, with respect to the USSR. You are also familiar with our efforts in NATO, and with our initiatives in Southwest Asia itself to respond to the Soviet invasion. My decision to seek a five percent real growth in our 1981 defense budget, despite the economic problems and conflicting pressures we face in the United States, is an example of the type of action I hope our allies also will be prepared to take.5
I understand that you and your colleagues are giving renewed consideration to the possibility of a supplemental appropriation that would bring the real growth in the Federal Republic’s 1980 defense budget above the three percent commitment adopted at the 1978 NATO summit. This increase in spending on the Federal Republic’s defenses, in addition to the military assistance you will provide Turkey, will be a clear demonstration of Allied solidarity.
I was very pleased to learn that the Federal Republic plans a substantial increase in its 1980 assistance to Turkey and that you are already taking steps to coordinate Western assistance to Turkey this year. You may be sure that the United States will again make a major contribution, both in economic and military assistance. In our judgment, the other donors should be encouraged to disburse their 1979 pledges as soon as possible.
Pakistan also needs a large increase in the economic aid being provided through the consortium. The United States is willing to contribute generously. General Zia has told Dr. Brzezinski and Warren Christopher that he wants to know what increased aid others will provide before making important decisions.6 In reviewing possible responses to the present crisis, this effort seems to us a matter of the highest priority. I hope that the Federal Republic will be in a position at least to triple its economic assistance to Pakistan this year.
Given Pakistan’s enormous needs and the dangerous situation in the area, and given the fact that the Federal Republic will not be providing Pakistan with arms, we believe that you could make another important contribution to Pakistan’s security by helping to improve its communication and transportation systems.
In the case of both Turkey and Pakistan, it is important that the aid be untied, in order to increase its usefulness.
As you know, the United States (at some substantial cost to our nation) has already taken significant steps in the economic area designed to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that “business as usual” is impossible in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I hope that the Federal Republic will be able to take some action in its extensive economic relationship with the USSR which would complement United States measures.
We continue to believe that a severe restriction of official export guarantees by the Federal Republic and of official export credits by the other major lenders would send a powerful signal of Allied solidarity to the Soviets. As you know, Japan has recently taken action to restrict credits to the Soviet Union.
With respect to exports of high-technology items to the Soviet Union, I ask that your authorities not request exceptions in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) to the embargo on strategic goods and technology destined for the USSR, except in hardship cases or where Western security interests dictate. This “no exceptions” policy to the COCOM list as negotiated in 1979 will mark an important and prudent shift in the Allied approach. As to computers—where I understand the 1976 standards are still in effect—I urge that no exceptions be made to those standards until new standards are negotiated.
In addition, I believe the list of items covered by the COCOM embargo should be expanded to include technology critical to the modernization and expansion of the Soviet industrial base. Submissions to COCOM for approval of these items would be reviewed case by case, with a presumption against approval. What I have in mind is limited in scope but in my judgment important. We believe that the introduction of Western technology to the Soviet industrial modernization program will lead to a significant improvement in the productivity of those industries, which would directly affect both the quantity and quality of military equipment produced in the Soviet Union.
In the industrial area, neither Alcoa nor Armco will go forward with major projects in the Soviet Union. To preserve the impact of this withdrawal, it is essential that the place of the American companies not be taken by industrial firms elsewhere. I hope we can count on German cooperation in this regard. We are looking into the possible existence of similar situations where we should discourage Western and Japanese companies from bidding on large-scale projects in the Soviet Union for the time being. We will keep you informed. We hope that restraint will be evidenced until we mutually agree that circumstances have changed.
You know the importance which is attached to denying the Soviet Union the privilege of hosting the Olympic Games—unless their military forces are immediately withdrawn from Afghanistan. This issue is a difficult and emotional one, and I appreciate the thoughtfulness with which it is being discussed in the Federal Republic. I am gratified by the assurances you gave me on the telephone and repeated to me by Malcolm Fraser.7 To the Soviets, this may be the most significant item of all.
Finally, I believe it is important that we move quickly to reach firm agreement on a coordinated plan of action. As you and I discussed, I would welcome any thoughts of yours on these subjects.
Sincerely,
/S/ Jimmy
His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn
End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003–0211. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Niles; cleared by H. Allen Holmes in EUR, Blackwill, and Bremer; approved by Vance. Repeated for information Immediate to USNATO on February 16.↩
- On February 5, Carter spoke with Schmidt from 4 to 4:10 p.m. (Memorandum of Conversation, February 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 2/80)↩
- Reference is to the February 5 Franco-German communiqué, which called for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan “without delay.” (Frank J. Prial, “Paris and Bonn Ask for Soviet Pullout From Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 6, 1980, pp. A1, A10)↩
- Telegrams 36318 to London, February 9; 38080 to Paris, February 12 (see Document 136); 41187 to Rome, February 15; and 43005 to Tokyo, February 16, transmitted Carter’s letters to Thatcher, Giscard, Cossiga, and Ohira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003–0212 and P910096–1923, N800003–0274 and P910096–1917, N800003–0405 and P890003–0632, N800004–0018 and P890005–1007)↩
- Reference is to Carter’s Fiscal year 1981 budget request, which included a 5% increase in defense spending. (Richard Halloran, “Military: Carter Wants Increase in 1981 and Steady Rises Over Next Five Years,” New York Times, January 29, 1980, p. B10)↩
- Telegram 33236 to Tokyo, Paris, Bonn, Oslo, Stockholm, Brussels, London, Ottawa, Rome, The Hague, Beijing, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Cairo, Dacca, Canberra, Wellington, Ankara, Doha, Manam, Muscat, Mogadishu, February 7, summarized the February 2–3 talks in Islamabad among Brzezinski, Christopher, and Zia, including Zia’s comments regarding aid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800065–0491)↩
- For Carter’s meeting with Fraser, see Document 41.↩