(S) At the August 4, 1977 meeting of the Policy Review Committee on
PRM–23,2 it was decided that
a separate paper on antisatellite activities and arms control should be
forwarded for your review and decision. That Decision Paper is enclosed
along with an Issues Paper3 which contains a more detailed discussion of the
issue.
(S) Because of the importance of this issue and the widely differing
views on the approach we should take in our proposal to the Soviet
Union, you may wish further discussion of this subject at the NSC level prior to your decision.
Attachment
Decision Paper4
ASAT ARMS CONTROL5
THE ISSUE
What should be the U.S. policy on antisatellite (ASAT) activity and ASAT arms control?
BACKGROUND
The U.S. has offered to propose ASAT arms limitations to the Soviet Union. In
developing approaches for the discussions, a fundamental
consideration is the need for a U.S. ASAT capability.
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MAJOR FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
Both the U.S. and the USSR have and
are further developing satellite capabilities in space for a range
of activities spanning peacetime, crisis and wartime. These include
treaty verification, national and military intelligence, weather,
navigation, communications and attack warning. Both sides are
increasing the use of satellites as sources of tactical intelligence
to provide near-real-time photography, electronic ferreting, and
radar targeting of military assets.
The Soviet Union currently has an advantage over the U.S. in
antisatellite capabilities. They have an orbital interceptor which
has been judged to be operational [8½ lines not
declassified]
The U.S. has no ASAT capability. A
nuclear interceptor system was operational until 1975 at Johnston
Island. Currently, the U.S. is developing a new interceptor which is
planned for testing by 1981. [3½ lines not
declassified]
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES
On the one hand:
Limitations on Soviet capabilities to attack U.S. satellites would be
desirable since the U.S. is becoming increasingly dependent on its
space assets, and relies on a smaller number of more sophisticated
satellites than the USSR.
There has never been a confrontation in space and treaties have
tended to give space a special status as a peaceful arena where both
sides can work cooperatively.
ASAT limitations might preclude a
potential arms race in space with its attendant action-reaction
cycles, public concerns, increased defense costs and potential
instabilities.
On the other hand:
The U.S. must assess the need, independent of Soviet ASAT capabilities, for a U.S. ASAT system to counter threatening
Soviet satellites.
There are difficult treaty verification problems in this area.
Incentives to cheat may be greater than under previous agreements.
Because each side has a small number (6–15) of critical satellites,
small numbers of ASATs could be decisive. This is in contrast with
current treaties limiting ICBMs and ABMs, where stability is not affected by small numbers
of weapons.
APPROACHES
Under all of the approaches discussed below, U.S. ASAT research and development
activities will continue, and be modified to con
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form with any agreements reached during
negotiations. The four approaches are:
1. No Agreement: Do not seek an agreement
limiting ASAT systems. This does
not preclude initiatives to further limit the likelihood of
peacetime interference. For example, the U.S. could propose under
the existing Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of
Nuclear War, to show restraint in ASAT testing during crises.
2. Emphasis on Peacetime Problems: Do not
attempt to limit the capabilities of ASAT system but focus on peacetime problems and on
establishment of thresholds for use. We would propose a peacetime
sanctuary for all satellites.
3. Selected Limits: Seek bans on types of
systems which do not yet exist, such as high-altitude interceptors
and laser weapons in space, but permit each side to test and deploy
low-altitude ASAT interceptors,
electronic warfare, and ground-based laser ASAT systems.
4. Relatively Comprehensive Agreement: Seek a
relatively comprehensive agreement which would ban all ASAT capabilities except electronic
warfare. Electronic warfare is excluded because of verification
difficulties. The ban would prohibit testing, deployment or use of
any ASAT for physical attack on
satellites. The current Soviet orbital interceptor would be
dismantled.
—A variant (4A) would be a fully comprehensive
ban on all forms of ASAT
including electronic warfare.
AGENCY POSITIONS
[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
State and ACDA favor a
comprehensive ban on ASAT systems
in order to avoid cycles of action-reaction competition. Such an
agreement would enhance the survivability of U.S. satellites, on
which we increasingly depend for intelligence collection,
verification, early warning, and communications. A ban on testing,
deployment, and use of ASAT
systems would contribute to stability by easing concerns about
pre-emptive attack on critical satellites. The present Soviet
interceptor is relatively unsophisticated; future Soviet ASAT systems would be much more
difficult to counter. Measures short of a comprehensive approach
would permit an expansion of Soviet ASAT capabilities, which would make maintaining the
survivability of U.S. satellites more difficult. Verification would
be difficult, but testing and in some cases construction of an
ASAT system would be subject
to observation. State and ACDA
favor Approach 4.
In the OSD view, antisatellite
negotiations should be directed toward a ban on peacetime
interference. Such a ban would reinforce the principle of
noninterference in peacetime and establish a threshold beyond which
specific actions will be considered hostile. This approach
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recognizes that we must
assume the Soviet Union could retain its existing capability even in
the presence of a comprehensive ban. Elimination of these
capabilities could not be reliably verified and confidence in the
system in the absence of testing could be quickly regained. This
system would be effective against such critical low altitude systems
as the current near-real-time imaging system. In such a situation it
would not be prudent to assume an ASAT agreement would be a suitable substitute for
survivability measures. Furthermore, U.S. counteractions in
survivability and ASAT development
could take several years. Therefore, the OSD feels the U.S. should develop an ASAT capability. Toward these ends,
OSD favors Approach Two.
In the JCS view, a ban on ASAT activities would concede
existing Soviet capabilities, since their elimination cannot be
verified. Conversely, such a ban would deny the U.S. the capability
to develop a counter to military-related USSR space systems, particularly those which may
constitute a direct threat to U.S. forces. Arms Control agreements
cannot be used as a substitute for survivability of U.S. space
systems; to do so would be to invite denial of U.S. use of space
systems for a critically long period during a war given the
likelihood of unilateral treaty abrogation at the outset of
conflict. An agreement to prevent testing of an orbital ASAT has two drawbacks. First, Soviet
confidence in their current system would not be appreciably reduced.
Second, the U.S. would be unable to overcome the current Soviet
advantage. Therefore, the JCS
believe the U.S. should develop an ASAT capability and further that the U.S. should not
enter into any agreement that would ban ASAT research, development, testing, and
deployment.
