363. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
1680. Pass to DOE. Brussels for EC. Subject: Soviet Non-Paper on IAEA Matters February 3.
1. At Soviet request, Ambassador Warnke met with Soviet CTB Rep Morokhov on Feb 3 for a follow-up discussion of the IAEA and non-proliferation issues which had been raised during similar Morokhov-Warnke conversations in December.2 Non-Paper read by Morokhov on instructions urged following actions:
A. Appropriate steps by U.S. to ensure a favorable decision by Feb 7 EC–9 Council of Ministers on issue of inspections of light-water power reactors in EURATOM countries, in light of efforts by certain EURATOM countries, particularly the FRG, to revise present compromise proposal.
B. Coordinated action by U.S. and Soviet missions in Vienna to ensure implementation of effective IAEA safeguards, in particular continuous inspection, of reprocessing and enrichment facilities in [Page 924] EURATOM countries, and to bring about a radical increase in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.
C. U.S. support for candidacy of Jeniken (Canada) to replace retiring Deputy Director General for safeguards Romech. (Text of Non-Paper is given para 4 below.)
2. Turning to separate issue, Morokhov urged that U.S. and USSR exchange views and act jointly to ensure the adoption as a guideline by the next meeting of nuclear exporters of the principle of full-scope safeguards in recipient States. (Text of Morokhov’s remarks on full-scope safeguards to be supplied).
3. Action requested: Instructions regarding reply, if any, that should be given to Soviets here.
4. Following is text of Soviet Non-Paper given Feb 3:
Begin text: We should like, first of all, to note with satisfaction that the meeting we held last December at which we discussed a wide range of questions related to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of non-proliferation safeguards was most useful. That meeting showed that our countries act essentially in an agreed manner on questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weap-ons, including issues pertaining to practical implementation of IAEA safeguards. The time elapsed since that meeting has shown that our Missions in Vienna have begun to cooperate more, and they have been able to influence the leadership of the Secretariat of IAEA in the proper direction. As a result of joint efforts, it has become possible to ensure that the leadership of the IAEA at present is taking what is, on the whole, a correct position.
At the same time, despite the work which has been done, we have not succeeded in solving one of the principal issues of IAEA safeguard activities, namely, the issue of application of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear activities of the Non-Nuclear Member States of EURATOM. As you recall, one of the questions that we discussed was the question of application of IAEA safeguards to light water power reactors in the EURATOM countries. At that time we agreed on joint measures to properly influence resolution of this question. The Soviet Union in particular supported the US compromise proposal for carrying out inspections of this type of facility four times a year. The Delegation of EURATOM which recently held talks with the IAEA secretariat on this subject has, in principle, accepted this compromise proposal. However, according to the information available to the IAEA secretariat, some EURATOM countries, above all the FRG, are attempting to revise that agreement. It is expected that the council of ministers of the European Community will make a final decision on this question at its meeting February 7. Under these circumstances it is urgently necessary, in our [Page 925] view, to exert appropriate influence in order to ensure the adoption of the needed decision by the Council of Ministers of the European Community. We hope that the U.S. side will take the necessary steps in this matter.
We believe it necessary to call to the attention of the U.S. side the fact that, along with resolution of matters pertaining to ensuring adequate safeguards for light water reactors in the EURATOM countries, it is necessary to seek the earliest resolution of the question of implementation of effective IAEA safeguards for other nuclear facilities, above all for nuclear fuel processing plants. At present, the main principle concerning implementation of safeguards on these facilities, that is, the principle of continuous inspection, has been preliminarily agreed. Representatives of EURATOM, while formally supporting this principle, are in effect working toward undermining it in developing the practical provisions. Resolution of this question calls for adoption of effective agreed measures. In this connection we would deem it advisable for our Missions in Vienna to give highest priority to the solution of this matter.
As before, the question of a radical increase in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards remains unresolved. The measures taken by the Secretariat upon the recommendations of the USSR and U.S. have not brought the necessary results.3 As yet, work on evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards has not been properly organized. This task also requires agreed action by our Missions in Vienna.
In this connection we should again like to call the attention of the U.S. side to the need to replace Deputy Director General for Safeguards Romech. As a result of our consultations, a decision was made to the effect that Romech would leave his post in May of this year. The question of choosing a candidate for this post now arises. As you know, we supported the nomination of Jenikens, a Canadian, who, as we understand it, is also supported by the U.S. our Missions in Vienna would now be well advised to work without delay in support of this candidate. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780052–0795. Secret; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Vienna and Moscow. Sent for information to Brussels and Bonn.↩
- See Document 360.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 360. Telegram 10676 from Vienna, December 14, also reported that “responding to U.S. initiatives, IAEA Secretariat is trying to implement more stringent non-proliferation safeguards measures” but noted that the Secretariat “anticipates considerable difficulty in achieving this upgrading in view of opposition by EURATOM and certain important governments and need for Board of Governors to provide necessary manpower and other resource approvals.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465–1102)↩