360. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
12375. USEEC USIAEA. Subject: Consultations With the Soviets on EURATOM/IAEA Agreement and Other Matters. Ref: Geneva 12348 (Notal).2
1. In view of Morokhov’s responsibilities in non-proliferation area, Amb Warnke took opportunity of Morokhov’s presence in Geneva for CTB negotiations to raise question of Soviet adherence to Protocol II of Treaty of Tlatelolco at a bilateral meeting Dec 15 (reported Reftel). After concluding discussion of Tlatelolco, Morokhov delivered a lengthy complaint about EURATOM resistance to IAEA safeguards,3 about the light water reactor safeguards situation,4 about lack of coordination between US and USSR Missions in Vienna, and about management of the IAEA safeguards department, particularly role of IAEA Deputy Director Rometsch. Text of Morokhov comments (which were handed over as a Non-Paper)5 being hand-carried to department by Boright.
2. In a separate evening session with Belov and Kalinkin, Boright (US) described in detail US reasoning on the LWR compromise and on importance of other safeguards issues, and noted complexity of safeguards issues and need for some flexibility. Soviets were apparently receptive to these arguments, and appreciative of reassurances as to US desire for continued consultations.
3. At subsequent bilateral meeting with Soviets Dec 16, Morokhov expressed satisfaction with discussions of previous day, calling them useful and timely. He appreciated that US and USSR both attach excep[Page 920]tionally great importance to nuclear non-proliferation and are aware that further joint actions, both in IAEA and elsewhere, are essential.
4. On EURATOM, Morokhov said that, during Dec 15 discussions, two sides had reached the understanding that it is necessary to work out stringent verification provisions in complete accordance with model IAEA safeguards agreement. Both sides also concluded that it is necessary for IAEA–EURATOM agreement to be implemented in very near future because large number of materials and facilities, including sensitive ones, are involved.
5. He said Soviets were willing to hold consultations with US Mission on number of technical questions related to application of safeguards to light water reactors and to chemical reprocessing plants. Appropriate instructions would be given to Soviet IAEA Mission, and he expected US Mission to receive instructions as well. Soviet side was prepared to discuss jointly the measures which must be taken by board of governors, but this must be done very soon, so that board can adopt appropriate recommendations in February.
6. Warnke said that we agreed entirely with the Soviet side on the importance of IAEA safeguards. We further agreed on the central importance of independent verification by the IAEA, and we believed this should apply in EURATOM as elsewhere. Warnke continued that we were generally in agreement with Soviet view that the IAEA inspectorate staff should be increased, and evaluation functions strengthened. We were aware that management of the safeguards department had not always been optimal, but this was due to many factors, and not to a single individual. He agreed on importance of post of Deputy Director General, and said we should think carefully and well in advance about a proper replacement when Mr. Rometsch leaves the agency.
7. With regard to light water reactor safeguards, Warnke maintained that the compromise proposal under consideration would allow the IAEA to do its basic independent verification with an acceptable three month timeliness of verification. We hoped that the Soviet side would not take a rigid position on this point, since that could delay agreement unnecessarily and endanger more important safeguards issues.
8. Warnke added that we regarded safeguards principles for sensitive facilities to be very important. On this matter, EURATOM had accepted the agency’s proposal for continuous inspection. We should consider how the board might provide some guidance on timeliness of detection for such facilities.
9. Warnke concluded that, in view of shared objectives on non-proliferation matters, US and USSR should work closely together in that field, and he agreed that our IAEA missions should consult on safeguards and other matters.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770471–1027. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Moscow, Vienna, and Brussels. On December 15, the Department of State had instructed the Mission in Geneva to sound out Morokhov about the Soviet position on safeguards on nuclear power reactors. (Telegram 298736 to the Mission in Geneva; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770466–0182)↩
- See Document 428.↩
- Telegram 8369 from the Mission in Vienna, September 15, reported that the Soviets had criticized EURATOM’s “failure to bring into force safeguards agreement with IAEA.” The Soviets also worried that “safeguards evaluation section be given resources and authority sufficient to carry out its task.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770335–0485)↩
- Telegram 10069 from Vienna, November 18, reported that the Soviets “have put strong pressure on Agency to be less flexible regarding acceptance of validity of cassettes” of the surveillance equipment on each light-water reactor “brought out by EURATOM inspectors alone.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770429–0808)↩
- Not found.↩