49. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the White House1
8114. Subj: Draft Memorandum of Vice President Mondale’s Meeting With Andean Pact Presidents
1. (Secret—Entire Text)
2. Participants:
Walter Guevara Arce, President of Bolivia; Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, President of Colombia; Francisco Morales Bermudez, President of Peru; Luis Herrera Campins, President of Venezuela; Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco, Foreign Minister of Ecuador and President Roldos’ Representative; Vice President Mondale (accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky, Ambassador Popper, Robert Pastor and Denis Clift)
3. Place and Date: El Panama Hotel, Panama City, October 1, 1979, 6:10 p.m.
4. Summary: The Vice President conveyed a letter from President Carter to the Andean leaders outlining the President’s October 1 message on Soviet troops in Cuba.2 The Vice President described the background to the President’s message and reviewed recent trends in Cuban-Soviet relations which were of particular concern to the U.S. Government. The Andean Presidents did not address the Soviet troop issue in substance. Herrera regretted that news coverage of the President’s speech would overshadow the positive impact of the Treaty Day ceremonies. The principal theme of the Andean Presidents’ presentations was the threat to democratic institutions from economic disorders, especially in the Caribbean area, and the need to attack these economic problems through joint efforts. Guevara Arze of Bolivia appealed for reconsideration of the U.S. proposal to sell 35,000 tons of tin from the strategic reserve and Morales Bermudez asked for special consideration for Peru in the administration of canal tolls. End Summary.
5. The Vice President opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the Andean Pact, a group with which the Carter Administration had sought to establish a high-level and significant dialogue. It was particularly noteworthy that this meeting should occur on the occasion of the entry into effect of the Panama Canal Treaties, an historic event for all of Latin America.
[Page 180]6. After the departure of the press, the Vice President informed the other participants of the receipt just minutes earlier of a letter to them from President Carter outlining the President’s address to the American people that evening on the subject of Russian troops in Cuba. The Vice President recalled that the administration had labeled this a serious matter and stated that the status quo was not satisfactory. The Vice President then reviewed the facts of Soviet military involvement with Cuba, its economic subsidies and its shared responsibility for Cuba’s wide-spread foreign involvements. He ended his remarks to await the arrival of the text of the President’s letter.
7. Bolivian President Guevara Arze raised the proposed sale of 35,000 tons of tin from the U.S. strategic reserves.3 He said the U.S. action could not be understood in view of the adverse impact such a sale would have on Bolivia’s democratization process. He mentioned that he had raised this directly with the Vice President during their encounter at the State Ceremony that morning, but wished to express this concern which had the support of the Andean Pact members.
8. The Vice President responded that he would fully report this concern of Bolivia and the other Andean countries. The U.S. Government was very sensitive to the concern and did not wish to place a burden on Bolivian society as it pursued an objective which had full U.S. support. He reiterated the U.S. position that the President intended to consult with the international tin authority in carrying out legislation for tin sales, and would make the sales prudently and in an orderly manner in full consultation with Bolivia. He concluded that he appreciated that this answer, which had been given to the Bolivian Government before, was not satisfactory to it, and would make that point to President Carter.
9. Guevara responded that the U.S. had taken a similar position on the previous occasions when tin sales were made. While he did not attribute ill will to the USG experience had shown that past sales had been harmful. He asked that the message be taken not only to the President, but also to members of the U.S. Congress.
10. The Vice President said he would undertake to do so and would remember the figure given by Guevara that every one-cent drop in the price of tin cost Bolivia about one million dollars.
11. President Herrera of Venezuela began his remarks by calling attention to the harmful effects of poor market situations of a whole series of raw materials of interest to the hemisphere. He then made two principal points in his presentation: The first concerned the problem of maintaining democratic forms of government in poor countries. [Page 181] Economic pressures, he said, forced those countries to turn to governments of force. These problems particularly affected the Caribbean where prospectives were poor. Governments there needed support and Venezuela wished to help them. Herrera turned secondly to the issue of the Soviet troops. He said the Panama Treaty Ceremonies had been a cause of real joy and satisfaction. The news of the event, however, would be displaced by President Carter’s statement on Cuba. While recognizing U.S. interests, he wished to express the preoccupation, even anguish he felt that the impact of the success of the treaty would be marred. He asked that his remark be accepted as the personal concern of a good friend.
12. The Vice President responded that his Government agreed with Herrera’s analysis that the success of democracy was affected by economic conditions. The U.S. had tried to be helpful in this regard in many ways, especially in the case of new democracies. Turning to Herrera’s second point, he said that the treaties were of great importance to the Carter Administration and were a vivid expression of the administration’s commitment to a foreign policy “based on fairness, not force.” It was nonetheless necessary to deal with the Russian troop situation. Cuban involvement in Africa and the Horn had been very destabilizing: the Cubans had consistently supported the cause of violence and blocked moderation. It was the trend of Cuban-Soviet military relations which caused concern. Further, the matter had now become caught up with the SALT II ratification. He said the President believed that failure to ratify treaty could introduce a dangerous phase in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. To avoid this, the U.S. had proposed many things but the Soviets did not cooperate; they had made concessions, but none were significant. Vice President concluded that President Carter was moving, in his address this evening, in a restrained way. His address reflected our deep objections but sought to contain the situation by showing that there was no threat to the U.S. and that the troop presence should not be linked to SALT ratification. (At this point President Carter’s letter was distributed.)
13. Colombian President Turbay Ayala began a discursive presentation by expressing his support for Bolivia with regard to U.S. tin sales, but then noted that Colombia had many problems, not just one. For example, while the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba was a matter for concern, he felt the general problem of world armaments should be kept in mind. World problems should be discussed at this meeting, he felt.
14. Turbay identified inflation as the first of these problems, a common enemy. Like other world issues, it could not be tackled by nations acting individually; rather, a joint effort of Latin America and the United States was needed. Serious economic problems were creat [Page 182] ing social pressures all over Latin America, including the Caribbean. These pressures were directed against local governments and against the United States. Anti-Americanism could grow in a soil of economic difficulties prompted by the price of oil, unemployment, etc. The USG faced similar economic and social tensions, but there the alternative was a democratic one. In many Latin American countries the alternative was the loss of democracy.
15. Turbay continued that a joint effort was necessary which covered not only the Caribbean but all of the hemisphere. It should not be dependent on the U.S. alone, but rather “we all have to help.” He proposed for consideration a “fund for peace” or “fund for democracy” which would be used to fight “difficult situations”. If the democracies of Latin America could become partners, he argued, others would be stimulated to join the fund or to take dramatic actions. In conclusion, he acknowledged that President Carter might see the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba as making the situation in the Caribbean more serious. He recognized that the extension of “these movements” in the Caribbean affected the entire hemisphere.
16. The Vice President in response acknowledged the importance of such international problems as inflation. The U.S. was working very hard on its domestic problem, aware that, as a large economy, it affected the welfare of others. He said Turbay’s appeal for joint consideration of the major problems should be pursued.
17. In closing, President Morales Bermudez of Peru thanked the Vice President for the opportunity to express their individual thoughts and preoccupations and to exchange views. In summary, he stated that, while appreciating U.S. interests and the significance of world problems, the Andean Pact members felt that their domestic problems could not be solved without a hemispheric approach. To a great extent, the hemisphere shared in global concerns. In urging a hemispheric approach, the Andean Pact countries did not seek a return to paternalism but rather mutual understanding. He then asked that the administration of the tolls of the Panama Canal take into account the fact that a large portion of Peruvian territory carries out its trade through the Amazon in addition to the principal commerce of the Pacific Coast.
18. Note: Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Pareja did not speak.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790456–0061. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- For the full text of Carter’s October 1 address, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 129.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 149.↩