Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 Volume XXIV, South America; Latin America Region

48. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 13, 1979

SUBJECT

• Goals for Latin America

As requested, the following are the goals and objectives I see for Latin America during the next eighteen months.

As an overall preliminary comment, let me underline the point made to you during the Quito consultations: we need to refurbish our relationship and improve the region’s perception of us. Essentially, this will mean being seen by these countries as relevant to their problems and interests.² Trade, development, economics, security—these are all major parts of our total relationship. We cannot be effective in them, however, without a) attention; b) resolution of conflicts with domestic interests to the extent possible and, c) applying reasonable resource inputs.³

Goals and Objectives

1. Central America

Deal with the regional crisis in ways that will a) prevent the consolidation of extreme left regimes in the region; b) contain Cuban/Soviet influence and control; c) prevent armed conflict within or among countries in the region; and d) promote broader political systems, equitable economic and social development and observance of human rights. The uniqueness of the Nicaraguan situation is the key to this area, but this in turn can probably only be managed in a context of stability in Honduras and controlled change in El Salvador and Guatemala. Specifically, we should:

—Seek non-communist political development in Nicaragua as well as (and through) economic recovery from great devastation.

—Seek to reduce the potential for violent confrontation in El Salvador and Guatemala by promoting freer political processes, development and elimination of repression.

—Support Honduras’ scenario of return to constitutional government and economic/social development.

—Help Costa Rica sustain its democratic system.⁴

2. Caribbean

Improve political and economic stability in the region and reduce vulnerabilities to Cuban expansion. Specifically,

—provide appropriate economic and security assistance to the Eastern Caribbean to reduce vulnerabilities; encourage sub-regional cooperation among the mini-states; and create a sense of U.S. interest and concern that affords a stable diplomatic framework for our on-going relations.⁵

—wean Jamaica and Guyana away from radical international line; and

—preserve recent democratizing gains in the Dominican Republic.⁶

3. Cuba

Seek to:

—mute or counter Cuba’s aggressive resolutionary drives; discourage Soviet/Cuban military ties;

—contain Cuban power and influence in the NAM; and

—reexamine and probe for ways to ease US-Cuban tensions and find a modus vivendi that might promise a way to affect and moderate Cuban objectives and intentions toward us.⁷

4. Mexico

Establish a constructive, effective working relationship to handle the complex, difficult set of issues that comprise that relationship.⁸ Specifically:

—confirm and implement purchase agreement on gas;

—resolve tomato and winter vegetable problems;

—secure Mexican accession to GATT and bilateral agreement within MTN framework;

—resolve tuna issue;⁹ and

—strengthen working relationship, understanding and exchange on migration and border issues.¹⁰

5. Brazil

Develop a closer cooperative relationship with this largest and significant Latin American country, drawing it into closer association with our hemisphere and global policies. To do this, we will need to reach a modus vivendi on a myriad of trade problems and nuclear policy.¹¹

6. Andean Region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia)

The Andean region is becoming an economic (Andean Pact) and political force (through coordinated foreign policy actions). It is also an area where democratization is well underway. We should recognize both its specific gravity as a useful force and the trends toward democracy.¹² This will involve:

—cooperation with the Andean Pact Common Market including resource assistance, and dealing with it as a multilateral institution;

—extending assistance and supportive bilateral relations with each of the countries, e.g., economic aid to Peru, trade policy issues such as tin with Bolivia, narcotics aid to Colombia, etc.; and

—developing a systematic consultative procedure with these countries on multilateral political issues, e.g. Central American cooperation.¹³

7. Argentina

Find ways to deal with (and hopefully improve) the human rights situation, without at the same time cutting ourselves off from a large and important country whose role and weight can affect our global policies.¹⁴

8. Chile

Seek to handle the unique problem of the Letelier extradition¹⁵ and our anti-terrorism policy in a politically charged situation,¹⁶ without at the same time acting so severely that we endanger peace in the area by indirectly encouraging Argentina, Peru or Bolivia to pursue territorial demands against what they may perceive as an isolated Chile. Nor do we wish to destroy the basis for some future relationship with the Chilean nation (as distinct from the Pinochet government).

9. Panama Canal

Implement the treaties beginning October 1 in a peaceful, constructive way and use the period to reaffirm strengthened joint Canal defense posture.¹⁷

10. As an overlay to our country-specific policies we need to pursue certain regional policies:

—Conventional arms restraint—stimulating multilateral efforts such as Mexican CAT talks.¹⁸

—Strengthening the regional institutions—OAS, IDB, Human Rights Commission—by improved consultations with appropriate resource support.¹⁹

—Pursue reasonable economic and trade policies to respond to widespread—and largely legitimate—demands for open markets and international cooperation in commodities. In particular, to find ways to deal with the disproportionate, severe impact on one country of broad policies such as sugar and the Dominican Republic.²⁰

—Strengthen our human rights approaches, seeking to reduce sanctions as human rights improvement and rewarding good performance in addition to sanctioning bad performance.²¹

—Reconceptualize our military assistance program to relate it more to objectives, to the role it can uniquely perform in our policy and to reasonable levels of effectiveness.²² Our program now is the result of accretions and amendments over several years responding to ad hoc stimuli, and has lost much coherence and intrinsic logic.

—Continue cooperation in narcotics interdiction programs.²³

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry 1979. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In an August 9 memorandum to Vance, Tarnoff and Lake indicated that they had solicited input on Vance’s goals and objectives for the next 18 months, see Document 123, Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Copies of the other bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry.
2. Vance underlined the phrase “need to refurbish our relationship and improve the region’s perception of us” and most of the sentence beginning with “essentially,” and wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin.
3. Vance underlined points (b) and (c) and wrote “agree” in the left-hand margin.
4. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.
5. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to the underlined portion of this recommendation. He also underlined the remainder of the paragraph beginning with “encourage sub-regional cooperation” and wrote “ok” in the margin next to this recommendation.
6. Vance wrote “ok” in the margin next to both of these recommendations.
7. Vance wrote “ok” in the margin next to each of these recommendations.
8. Vance wrote “Easier said than done” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
9. Reference is to negotiations between Mexico and the United States about regulating tuna fishing within Mexico’s exclusive economic zone.
10. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.
11. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.
12. Vance wrote “agree” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.
13. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.
14. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.
15. See Document 229.
16. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
17. Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
18. Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
19. Vance underlined “appropriate” and wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
20. Vance wrote “yes, requires prompt planning” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.
21. Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.
22. Vance highlighted this sentence and wrote “work with Lucy on this” in the left-hand margin. Reference is to Benson.
23. Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation. In an October 31 memorandum to Christopher, Lake wrote, “The Secretary agreed with each of Ambassador Vaky’s specific goals.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Next Seventeen Months—Mtgs w A/S)