Attached at Tab A is the first installment on the papers which I promised
you.2 I have tried to keep it brief, but we have covered a
lot of territory in a short time. The third section identifies the new
agenda which we will need to face in the second term. My next paper will
provide some proposals for answering the questions on that agenda.
I also recommend that you send a copy of the assessment to Secretary
Muskie, as he will be
undertaking his trip to Latin America without much of an idea of what we
have tried to do in the last four years.3
While I have some reservations about the timing and the itinerary of his
trip, nonetheless there is no question that his conversations could be
extremely useful in sounding out some of the most important leaders in
the hemisphere on the central issues which we will try to address in a
second term. I have checked with ARA,
and they are also a bit confused on the trip, and have not provided him
much focus. I think the assessment at Tab A could help. I would also
like if you could ask him whether I would be able to accompany him and
sit in on the meetings. It would be enormously useful to try to develop
some ideas on what we should do in a second term, and I also expect that
I would be of help to Muskie as
the “historical memory” of the Carter Administration’s approach to Latin America.
(Since 1977, there have
[Page 184]
been
three Assistant Secretaries of ARA and
about fifteen Deputy Assistant Secretaries.)
Tab A
Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council
Staff7
Washington, October 28, 1980
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN
AMERICA: AN ASSESSMENT
I. Introduction: A Brief Summary of Four
Years
During the last four years, your Administration gave more time to
Latin America and the Caribbean and pursued a more active, coherent,
and consistent approach to Latin America than any previous
Administration.
—In 1977, you gave a new direction to U.S. policies to the region.
The foundation was set by your decision to give a high priority to
negotiating new Canal treaties. After a sometimes difficult
interagency review (PRM–178), you enunciated a unique new approach to Latin
America in your Pan American Day speech to the OAS, which described the three central
principles that have guided our policies: a recognition of the
individuality and a respect for the sovereignty (principle of
non-intervention) of each nation, a commitment to try to improve
respect for human rights and extend democracy, and a willingness to
consult on the global economic issues of central concern to the
area.9 Rather
[Page 185]
than a slogan to mask the diversity of
the region, you suggested a flexible approach more attuned to the
important changes that have occurred in the Americas in the last two
decades, specifically to the self-assertiveness of nations
interested in shaping a new world rather than being satisfied as
just members of an inter-American system. Through Mrs. Carter’s trip
and your personal meetings in 1977, you personally engaged twenty
heads of state in the region, explaining your approach, especially
your personal commitment to human rights and democratization, and
becoming conversant in the gamut of bilateral, regional, and global
issues of concern to our countries. We began a dialogue with Cuba
and opened Interest Sections to permit regular communication. You
began to define a special approach to the Caribbean, and initiated
what has since become known as the Caribbean Group for Cooperation
in Economic Development, led now by the World Bank with 31 nations
and fifteen international institutions involved. You signed the
American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco; both still await ratification in the Senate. The amount
and the quality of attention which you and your Administration gave
to Latin America in 1977 probably exceeded that of any other
Administration’s first year, including that of Kennedy and the Alliance for
Progress.
—1978 was largely spent implementing the initiatives taken in 1977.
The Canal Treaties were ratified and exchanged during your trip to
Panama. You travelled to Venezuela, where you gave an important
speech on North-South relations (calling for shared responsibility
to implement a new economic order) and announced the Humphrey North-South Scholarship
Program, and to Brazil where you lent additional credibility to your
human rights policy.10 Also, we moved to
strengthen U.S.-Mexican relations through the Consultative
Mechanism. In consultations with Mexico and the Ayacucho countries,
arms control initiatives began to be seriously considered. The
Caribbean Group took shape.
—In 1979, we faced our most serious crises and challenges—Nicaragua,
Grenada, and the Cuban brigade—and we distinguished ourselves only
in that we didn’t veer too far from our original objectives. All
three forced us to focus on the security dimension of inter-American
relations in a not always constructive way. At the same time we were
wrestling with these three issues, we also were strengthening our
relationships with the Andean Pact as a group (particularly because
of the trend toward democracy in Ecuador and Peru) and with
Venezuela,
[Page 186]
Mexico, and
Brazil. Your two meetings with Lopez
Portillo,11 the
strengthening of the Consultative Mechanism, the appointment of a
Special Ambassador12 to
coordinate U.S.-Mexican relations within the U.S. governments and to
ensure that it be given the deserved priority, the conclusion of a
gas agreement and an extensive science and technology pact as a
result of Frank Press’s
efforts—all those led to more attention and results than the
relationship has seen for a long time. Vice President Mondale’s trip to Venezuela and
Brazil and Frank Press’s
follow-up trip also served to deepen our relationship with the two
key countries in South America.13 The Brazilian
Foreign Minister was moved to say in April 1979 that U.S.-Brazilian
relations were “excellent.”
—In 1980, your attention has largely been focused on the hostages,
Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the economy, and the campaign. The
Administration’s attention to Latin America has been focused on the
Caribbean basin—instability in Central America and the Caribbean,
Cuban and Haitian refugees, and Cuban subversion. After Grenada, we
have managed to turn the tide back in favor of democracy in the
Eastern Caribbean and to halt the revolution in Central America by
fostering moderate change in El Salvador and Honduras and by trying
to play a positive role in Nicaragua. Through your personal
initiative, “Caribbean/Central American Action,” a unique experiment
in people-to-people diplomacy, was launched to improve the quality
of our peoples’ relationships in the area. We have done a good deal,
but hardly enough. The Caribbean Basin is one area in need of your
attention in 1981.
In summary, you have set a course in 1977 and kept to it even through
the trying times in 1979. We have made remarkable progress toward
our goals. Still, there is much that remains to be completed, and
many new issues that remain to be confronted. Let me discuss these
within the context of an assessment.
II. An Assessment
This assessment will proceed by examining the goals associated with
each of the three basic principles.
(1) Peace. Recognition of the individuality of
each relationship. Respect for non-intervention.
[Page 187]
A. Overall Approach—Slogans, Global
Consultations. The Carter Administration has avoided the temptation to
reduce its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to a slogan, but that has a
downside: our flexible, global approach is not easily grasped; our
approach has therefore become known not by its principles but by its
most salient features: human rights and democracy by those who like
our policies; Nicaragua, Grenada, and Cuban refugees by those who
don’t.
Recognizing the increasing international role of many of the region’s
governments, we set a clear objective of consulting on a regular
basis on global and regional political and economic issues. We have
probably done more of this than any previous Administration, but we
haven’t done enough, and we have not yet built a systematic
mechanism for ensuring such consultations on a regular basis. Given
the region’s increasing importance in the UN, the NAM and
Socialist International (SI), it is
essential that we consult regularly on US policies and on
developments in controversial areas like Southern Africa, Middle
East, East-West relations—issues where our briefings and
consultations are likely to produce a confluence of
perspectives.
Despite many efforts to forge a coalition of like-minded democracies
(especially Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil) to pursue a
common policy to Central America and the Caribbean, we have not been
successful. Mexico views the region’s turmoil from a totally
different perspective. Brazil is focusing on its borders and
believes the Caribbean is our problem, not theirs. Colombia is
preoccupied. And Venezuela, which is playing the most constructive
role in the area, enjoys consultation, but prefers parallel rather
than a common policy.
During the Nicaraguan crisis, we were pulled into playing a more
direct role in an internal matter than what we had originally
preferred, but we have still clearly maintained the integrity of our
pledge of non-intervention during the past four years, unlike many
other in Latin nations.
B. Non-Proliferation. The Senate has not yet
ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is not clear
whether our efforts to discourage Brazil and Argentina from
obtaining a full fuel cycle without full scope safeguards has had
much effect, but it is clear that both governments have scaled down
their initial nuclear programs considerably. At the same time, both
nations established a cooperative program in nuclear power. This is
just one more indication that the longstanding rivalry between
Argentina and Brazil may have passed into history, thereby reducing
our concerns about the explosive implications of a possible nuclear
arms race.
C. Arms Control. We lent strong support to two
regional arms control initiatives (by Mexico and by Venezuela), and
we made a pre
[Page 188]
liminary
effort to discuss the issue with the Soviets; all three initiatives
got nowhere. Nonetheless, we have exercised unilateral restraint,
and this conceivably could have helped restrain overall arms
expenditures in the hemisphere. At the same time, the US was
overtaken by five other nations in arms sales to the region. Despite
your explicit decision (in PD–52)14 to reverse the
decline of the amount of FMS
allocated to Latin America as a percentage of the global amount
(from 2% to 4%), this has not been done. State is once again
recommending a level of 2% for Latin America in FY 82. We need to take a hard look at
this issue again; perhaps the Secretary of State can initiate
consultations on this issue during his trip.
D. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Before
your Pan American Day speech, the US had refused to play much of a
role in settling the many territorial disputes in the hemisphere.
Since then, we have played a very active role, trying to stimulate
the negotiating process from the side while keeping a mediator in
front—the Pope on the Beagle Channel, a former Peruvian President on
the Honduran-Salvadorean dispute, and the British on Belize. We have
already raised other disputes, including Ecuador’s desire for access
to the Amazon, Bolivian access to the Sea, and we have encouraged
dialogue where only silent confrontation had existed before.
E. Central America. We tried to find a
peaceful path through mediation in Nicaragua, but failed for several
reasons: Somoza was too intransigent; the middle class too ready to
accept the promises of the Marxist left; and most importantly, our
friends, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama, were so obsessed in
getting rid of Somoza and pre-empting Castro that they unwittingly played Castro’s game, successfully
insulating him from us. We are having a little more success in El
Salvador, but it’s by no means clear that the middle will prevail
there. Honduras is making the transition from military to civilian
governments, but the pettiness of the politicians, the arrogance of
the military, and the machinations of an emerging left could derail
that. Guatemala is polarizing very rapidly as the rightists
assassinate anyone who suggests there is a middle way. We are
pursuing a delicate experiment by encouraging peaceful democratic
reform in a region of violence, obsolete sociopolitical structures,
and gross inequalities. The Marxist left have dressed themselves in
our human rights banners, and Fidel
Castro has concentrated his energies on helping them
seize power. We are still intransit. The problem of helping to
maintain democracy in the Caribbean has proved easier than creating
it in Central America. The Cubans succeeded in subverting Grenada,
but the same strategy failed
[Page 189]
in Suriname; and more importantly, Cuba’s radical allies were
decisively beaten in free elections by moderate, pro-US groups in
St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, and St. Kitts. The
Caribbean Group has added stability to the region. Still, we haven’t
done nearly enough to enhance the security of the region or to
assist its development. Despite your promise to increase aid to the
area in your October 1, 1979 Soviet brigade speech, we maintained
aid at the same level as the previous year. We need an imaginative
new approach to the area which takes into account its special
importance in security as well as in immigration matters.
F. Cuba. While we have had great success in
the human rights area in Cuba, we are further away from our
geopolitical goals than in 1977. Cuba has more troops in more
countries and is more actively pursuing its revolutionary goals
today than in 1977. This is another area in need of a new look.
G. Summary. With the exception of Central
America, LAC is, by and large, a
more peaceful and less militarized place than in 1976. The Panama
Canal is safer; the border areas in dispute are subject to heated
negotiations; South America is focused on development rather than
internal security.
(2) Human Rights and Democracy
A. Overall Approach. The effective pursuit of
human rights is clearly the most successful achievement of your
Administration. You have finally, and with some cost, imprinted your
commitment to human rights on the consciousness of all the leaders
in the hemisphere. Repression is now much more costly, and there are
fewer disappearances and political prisoners and less torture. You
have restored the image of the US as a nation that stands for human
rights, social justice, and democracy.
B. Regional Norms and Institutions. When you
signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977,15 while Mrs. Carter was in San Jose,
only two nations had ratified it. Even though the Senate still
hasn’t acted, at our urging, 14 nations have ratified the
Convention, bringing it into force, and establishing a new
institution, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In addition,
we have significantly strengthened the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights which has done five important country reports.
C. Refugees. We have born the burden of the
refugee problem largely on our own. We have not been successful in
getting other nations or the OAS to
play an important role. This is one of the “new” set of issues which
we will have to address early in the second term.
[Page 190]
D. Democratization. We have tried to use every
opportunity to show that democracy pays, and the trend is clearly in
a positive direction—the first time in at least two decades. Brazil,
Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Dominican Republic—all have made the
transition. We have also engaged the Andean Pact in trying to help
facilitate this democratic process. Our success is due to letting
people know where the U.S. stands rather than from helping to build
political parties or train young leaders or fund private
initiatives. However, when a young political leader in Nicaragua
asked us to help him organize a political party, we lack means to
help. Our approach is strict neutrality with respect to political
parties and candidates, but we are partial to free elections, yet we
have no mechanism for either training people to conduct free
elections or observing them, and the OAS has shown no interest in this. This is another area
worth pursuing.
E. New Forces. New international political
forces have emerged recently and are having an impact on the region,
though not very favorably from the perspective of our interests. The
Socialist International, the Conference of Latin American Political
Parties (COPPAL—Mexico in the
lead), the German SPD and CDU Foundations, the Non-Aligned
Movement—all these organizations seem to have accepted as their
working premise that the U.S. is the problem; some of them think
Cuba may be the solution. We have tried dialogue with them and
should continue, but we also should reassess our approach to each of
these organizations to see whether they will listen, or just speak,
and to try to comprehend why we are so often the whipping boy.
(3) Economic Cooperation
A. Aid. You promised to double foreign aid,
but Congress and your intention to balance the budget prevented you
from fulfilling that promise. During the 1970’s, we have been
gradually phasing out our bilateral aid programs to the
middle-income developing countries (most of LAC), and with increased priority to Africa, Egypt, and
Israel, the overall levels to LAC
have declined markedly. At the same time, we have been reasonably
successful in shifting these declining resources to the sub-region
of highest political priority, Central America and the Caribbean,
although, even there, we are talking about funding levels which were
much smaller than during the Alliance. We have improvised by
eliciting additional support from the IFI’s and from other Western donors.
B. Trade. The MTN in Geneva was primarily a negotiation among
industrialized countries and last minute efforts to encourage the
LDC’s to participate did not
disguise that fact. The overall reduction of trade barriers will
certainly help all nations, but not as much as a set of arrangements
designed to specifically assist the LDC’s. We consulted, but frankly did not take them too
seriously.
[Page 191]
C. Commodities. We have been able to negotiate
agreements on coffee, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and a Common Fund, but
in almost all cases we were the most conservative and inflexible.
More importantly, none of the agreements seem to be working.
D. Science and Technology. Frank Press’s efforts have been
exceptional, particularly when one realizes he had so little to
offer in aid. He has helped to establish a framework and to build
linkages which will serve our interests in collaborative
relationships in this field very well for years to come.
E. North-South Relations: A Summit. The
resurgence of East-West relations combined with Congressional
constraints placed the North-South dialogue on the back burner.
Unfortunately, we have little economic aid to offer and so we should
begin to examine political and symbolic options, particularly
because these often have a greater importance than we think and
perhaps than they should. A North-South Summit is definitely one way
to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in a dialogue; it would be a
terrible mistake if we were to sit that out.
III. Second Term Agenda
I believe the objectives and the course we set to LAC in the last four years is the
correct one, and we have made great progress. We have consulted
often with the nations in the region and encouraged them to play a
more active role in international affairs, and while their policies
have often diverged from our own, we are generally well served by
this new assertiveness.
Your re-election will, in and of itself, strengthen our ability to
enhance human rights and extend democracy in the hemisphere as
leaders who had hoped our commitment would dissipate will find
themselves having to adjust to its institutionalization. Secretary
Muskie’s trip and the
OAS General Assembly (opening
in Washington on November 19) offers an opportunity to begin a major
new effort to enhance human rights and facilitate the extension of
democracy in the hemisphere. We should try to develop a number of
specific ideas for the Secretary to suggest in his consultations,
and if the response is positive, perhaps you could develop them in a
speech to open the OAS General
Assembly. In that forum, you could also announce a renewed effort to
obtain Senate ratification of the human rights conventions (and also
Protocol I).16
[Page 192]
A major new initiative to Central America and the Caribbean is
urgently needed, and we have a number of opportunities to enunciate
such an approach: the signing ceremony on November 19 of the
Honduran-Salvadoran Peace Treaty, which could initiate a new effort
toward Central American integration and Caribbean/Central American
Action’s important conference on November 23 in Miami which a large
number of heads of state from the region will attend. We will send
you a paper on this soon.17
Another “now issue” which we need to address concerns the flow of
people for economic and political reasons, most of it illegal, to
the US. Other areas in need of work include: Mexico, Cuba, a new
approach to the military regimes in the region, and North-South
relations.
