47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua1
211262. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting With Andean Foreign Ministers: [August] 11. Military Assistance to Nicaragua
1. Entire contents Confidential.
2. Summary. During his August 11 meeting in Quito with the five Andean Foreign Ministers, Secretary Vance asked for views on possible military and police assistance to Nicaragua. He said USG has been approached informally by GNR to provide such aid and we are considering how to respond. Ecuadorean ForMin Pareja and others said they had not been approached for such aid, and believed Andean efforts at this stage should instead be focussed on humanitarian and reconstruction aid. End summary.
3. The Secretary, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, continued his discussions with the Andean Foreign Ministers (see Septel)2 in a discussion of possible military and/or police [Page 172] assistance to Nicaragua. The same Andean Foreign Ministers mentioned in Septel participated.
4. The Secretary discussed the possibility of direct military assistance to Nicaragua, explaining that USG had been approached informally to provide such assistance. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja said that the Andean Group had not been approached by the GNR for such assistance, and asked if other LA countries had been approached. The Secretary replied that Panama had been asked for assistance and had responded with a modest program. He said USG had come to no conclusions about our response to this Nicaraguan inquiry. He added that he believes there are good reasons to be responsive, and that others should consider providing what they can (jeeps or bulldozers, arms or whatever a donor country might decide upon). He said USG considers this a serious issue and he would welcome views of the Andean Foreign Ministers on this subject.
5. Assistant Secretary Vaky said that the problem has a deeper dimension; the GNR must reform its military forces and police, and the manner in which this is accomplished is of interest to the entire hemisphere. Vaky said that this request for assistance would meet a legitimate need, and in the case of police assistance this is not possible for USG in view of our legal restrictions. He asked whether, since USG is thus impeded from certain kinds of assistance, would it not still be in the best interest of hemisphere democratic countries to help, so that GNR need not resort to Soviet and Cuban sources.
6. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja said that it would be difficult to give an immediate answer. He commented that to aid an army is a political act, in this case recalling assistance in the creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard. He said that public opinion would recall the circumstances of the formation of the GN (read the USG role). He said the matter is a serious one which should be studied by the Andean Group, but he did not see any way in which the GOE for its part could render such assistance.
7. Assistant Secretary Vaky stressed that he was not suggesting forcing any aid upon Nicaragua, but rather asked how LA countries might respond to the GNR’s own felt needs. Peruvian FonMin Garcia Bedoya replied that GNR must eventually re-equip its armed forces in order to have a stable army, and will organize its military forces to that end. He said that to meet these needs, if democratic countries cannot provide them, GNR “might have to go elsewhere.” Garcia Bedoya listed various unknowns: whether the FSLN will become a regular army, whether new units will be formed, what type of equipment they would need, and whether they would seek equipment from USG or other sources. He asked if Nicaragua’s armed forces would only comprise the guerrillas as at present, or that group plus others [Page 173] in some new institutionalized system. He asked if USG had information on this point. The Secretary said we have no clear indication, but rather only a request in the most general terms for USG assistance. The Secretary recognized that a USG decision is involved in this case, but such a decision affects the entire hemisphere and the views of others are important to us. Finally he asked if a multilateral effort might be made to provide equipment, if that were found to be Nicaragua’s principal need.
8. At this point Colombia FonMin Uribe dwelt on a list of difficulties in hemispheric relations. He said that democracies are in danger due to excessive arms inventories. He said that arms procurement was causing problems, as in the case of the high prices countries have to pay for their essential arms. He said that to offer arms in Central America would go directly athwart hemispheric and world initiatives for disarmament. He said that LA democratic countries cannot become policemen, but should stress social measures in support of their democracies. He said it would be very difficult for LA democracies to mount a military action when it is precisely this which the democracies have opposed for so many years. He said that this is the GOC position, but each country in Central America and elsewhere will have to decide for itself on the subject. He concluded by saying that hemisphere should not overemphasize “traffic accidents” in Nicaragua but the larger social economic problems of the hemisphere.
9. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja countered that he has sometimes “had to walk with the devil.” He said that a case might arise, say in an unnamed neighbor of Nicaragua, where former GN personnel might try to invade Nicaragua, and thereby the GNR may need help for its defense. He said Andean Group Foreign Ministers would have to consult among themselves and with GNR in that event. He said no decision could be taken today and the matter is not pressing, and that instead humanitarian assistance should be relied upon to help establish democracy in Nicaragua. When GNR sees humanitarian aid provided without conditions, Pareja said, the GNR reaction will be favorable, and decisions on arms can be delayed until more information is available. Pareja then suggested a high-level commission, possibly to be set up in San Jose with Andean Group and USG participating, to analyze developments in Nicaragua. He said that this is merely an idea which has not yet been elaborated.
10. The Secretary asked what the purpose of such a group would be. Pareja replied that he did not know, but that a special commission to study the aid needs of Nicaragua might be useful. Bolivian FonMin Fernandez spoke up, insisting that all actions regarding Nicaragua should be coordinated through the Andean Group Foreign Ministers, and any such committee as suggested by Pareja would be “misinter [Page 174] preted” in the Andean countries. Peruvian FonMin Garcia Bedoya agreed, asking why such a group should be in San Jose, what attributes would it have, why countries other than the US were not involved, etc. Pareja persisted that his suggested commission would avoid delays in Andean Group consultation and provide flexibility in Andean Group dealings with the GNR. He acknowledged that coordination can be accomplished in other ways as well.
10. Bolivian FonMin Fernandez stressed that the Andean Group Presidents’ recent agreement at Cartagena provides that only the Foreign Ministers can consult on political questions. He said that as there is a need for daily information on the “evolution of cooperation” in Nicaragua, Andean technical organs could provide this information. Pareja said he disagreed “a little,” in that the commission should also deal with political subjects. The Secretary added that such a commission obviously involves an Andean Group decision, but that he thought this is an interesting idea and that we would like to follow it up if the Andean Foreign Ministers go this route.
11. Venezuelan FonMin Zambrano urged that this improved liaison could be obtained by assigning—as Venezuela is doing—high-level, experienced ambassadors to Managua to ensure close relations with the GNR and a flow of information back to the Andean countries.
12. Pareja then concluded the meeting by urging his colleagues to keep talking about this problem of coordination. He said that the Andean Group countries’ ambassadors might be a workable substitute. He then thanked the Secretary and other foreign ministers for attending this meeting. With the Secretary’s in turn thanking the chairman, the meeting adjourned.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts except addressees. Drafted by Barnebey; cleared by Pastor and Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.↩
- In telegram 211259 to Bogotá, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Managua, and Quito, August 13, the Department summarized Vance’s discussion with the foreign ministers regarding “Nicaragua’s needs for humanitarian, reconstruction, and long-term development assistance.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979)↩