364. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State1
7207. Subject: Consultations on Central America: Views of President of Venezuela.
1. (S–Entire Text)
2. Summary: I saw President Herrera July 28. During hour and one half conversation, he showed annoyance over former President Perez’ role in Nicaragua and what he presumed to be our support for [Page 1060] Perez, expressed moderate optimism over Nicaragua but pessimism over ripple effects of Nicaraguan events elsewhere in Central America, and said US and Venezuela should keep each other informed as they each try to keep ahead of events that will be difficult to control. End summary.
3. Herrera’s major points were:
—Except for Costa Rica, none of the Central American Governments inspire democratic support.
—Clearly, public opinion everywhere but in the US Congress, understood Somoza had to go.
—Carlos Andres Perez had been working for a year to make it happen. But Perez lacked the foresight to take preventive measures.
—Had the United States realized that Central America was so closely linked that Somoza’s departure without preventive measures would cause severe shocks elsewhere? What precautions had we taken when we suddenly decided to stop supporting reactionaries?
—As President of Venezuela, he would now do absolutely everything in his power to avoid Nicaragua going through anything similar to Cuba.2
—Although his Government became involved too late to be effective before Somoza fell, the delegation going to Managua on Sunday3 is the largest in Venezuela’s diplomatic history. Robelo will attend the Sela meeting in Caracas Monday, and others, including some military commanders, will be invited. The situation is bad but far from lost.
—Central America is another matter. After Puebla,4 the bishops thought El Salvador would blow before Nicaragua. All those countries have similar habits: Kill the moderates so as to keep the choice between the Government and Castroists.
—In El Salvador what little Government there is seems to lack a real will to open the system. He could not be sure, but violence may be inevitable.
—Guatemala simply draws up lists of names then kills them.
—Honduras is the best of the lot but carries the least weight.
—None of these Governments can survive without a political opening. We must try to provide this by focussing on the centers of power.
[Page 1061]—If Bolivia sustains its democratic process, the Andean Group may be in a position to do something, Brazil and Argentina are ready to follow the Andean lead.
—Even working together, the Latins do not have the influence of the US. But at least they are Latin.
—We should keep each other informed.
4. Comment. The acidity of Herrera’s views on Central America is due in good measure to his continued anger at Perez for his direct support of the FSLN. Some of this anger carries over to us, for he still has difficulty accepting that we could be as unaware of its full extent as he himself was. But Herrera seemed to get a load off his chest by being frank. Though he will play his cards close to his chest for a time, Venezuela’s actions will be generally in harmony with ours, and they will continue to want consultations. We will want to work with the Herrera Government to build confidence in our common purpose over the next few months.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.↩
- In telegram 7208 from Caracas, July 29, Vaky reported on his conversation with Zambrano and other Venezuelan officials, in which they discussed the “Venezuelan consensus view of how to keep current Marxist advantage from being consolidated” in Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346-0156)↩
- July 29.↩
- A reference to the meeting of CELAM, the Latin American Roman Catholic Bishops’ Council, held in Puebla, Mexico in 1979.↩