363. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassies in Nicaragua and Costa Rica1
6407. Subject: Nicaragua: Turning the Corner With the Andean Group. Ref: Caracas 63982
1. S–Entire Text.
2. Zambrano just called to say that he thinks he has tentative agreement for the Andean Ministers now to go to Costa Rica today. He has not yet had telephone contact today with d’Escoto or Ramirez so that he cannot determine whether their visit would be welcome. I sense that this change of course is a reaction to our conversation this morning and my expression of concern and belief that our sense of timing and urgency is valid.3 It is essential, therefore, that I provide him a read-out as soon as possible as to the environment in Costa Rica for receiving some or all of the Foreign Ministers. I said that I hoped that Zambrano could go with the group to Costa Rica with some or all of the Ministers since he, Zambrano, is much closer to developments and since Venezuela is such a key actor.
3. Zambrano also asked for more details about Somoza’s departure. I said I could not give precise details but I suspect the departure would be very soon, possibly tomorrow, and that we are negotiating details of departure and entry into the United States in a way that suggests to us that the man is definitely leaving. I said from past experience, we would never exclude his deceiving us but the time is fast approaching where he has no alternative. Zambrano said that he agreed fully with my earlier discussions with him, that he, Zambrano, should not go to Managua if Somoza was going to use his presence to delay his own departure. On the other hand, if Zambrano’s presence could provide a convenient additional excuse and justification for departure, Zambrano would be very prepared to go. He now would like to ask advice and even have us check out whether his arrival in Managua [Page 1059] could or should coincide very closely with the departure of Somoza. I said I would check with our Ambassador in Managua and Pete Vaky and get back to him immediately with our advice.
4. Comment: Zambrano is obviously a bit frustrated with his Andean colleagues and anxious not to be behind the curve on developments in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. He is fully prepared to work with us on the timing and would like our urgent advice on the situation, both in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Please provide guidance as soon as possible.4
5. Finally, Zambrano said he has been in touch with Dr. Calvini who has the visiting Nicaraguan leaders in town at a conference at the hotel Avila in Caracas. He is urging Calvani and the Nicaraguans to plan to return immediately to Nicaragua so that they will be present at the crucial moment. Obviously, for all these actions, Zambrano is depending very much on the accuracy of our reporting and judgments.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2082. Secret; Flash; Nodis.↩
- Dated July 16. Luers reported that Zambrano was having “difficulty” getting agreement among the Andrean Pact foreign ministers for joint action to support the junta in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua once Somoza had departed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2084)↩
- In telegram 6398 (see footnote 2, above), Luers wrote: “Apparently, the other foreign ministers are so badly informed they do not understand the extent of the FSLN strength in Nicaragua or the fact that the moment has arrived for action.” When Zambrano said “he could not get Andean agreement to move,” Luers told him that “it is time, therefore, for Venezuela to go it alone.” (Ibid.)↩
- No response from the Department was found. In telegram 6427 from Caracas, July 16, Luers reported that he had told Zambrano “that Bowdler had already received urging from Ramirez for the group to go to San Jose immediately. I repeated that the time was right and he should delay no longer.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2080)↩