231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Chile and Nicaragua1
212500. Subject: The Secretary’s Bilateral with Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos.
1. Entire text confidential
2. Summary: Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, discussed Nicaragua and other issues with Foreign Minister Cubillos in Quito on August 10.2 Cubillos criticized Andean Group countries for their aid to FSLN, OAS decisions as violating non-intervention principle, and USG statements concerning Somoza’s departure.3 The Secretary replied USG had seen Nicaraguan crisis developing a year ago and had sought a constructive hemisphere response to reinforce the Nicaraguan moderates’ position so as to avoid a leftist takeover. Our actions then and since, he said, have been designed to avoid a totalitarian regime coming to power. Other issues dealt with included the status of the Beagle channel negotiations, and the impending Chilean Supreme Court decision on the Letelier/Moffitt case.
3. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister’s views on the Central American situation. The FM said he would reflect his gut feelings about the matter. The GOC was not happy at actions taken by the U.S. and the Andean Group. That is why Chile had abstained in the OAS. The GOC felt the OAS actions were a blow to the principle of non-intervention. Chile had been also strongly opposed to steps taken by the Andean Group in support of the Sandinistas. Chile’s argument was that it wanted to keep its embassy open, certainly not as a sign of support for Somoza but rather to underline its concern for the principle of non-intervention, to observe and to help in the situation wherever it could, [Page 683] and with the hope that by so doing it would have a measure of future influence with the new regime. Consistent with this, Chile sent a plane with humanitarian aid along with selected Foreign Ministry officials to amplify reporting on the Nicaraguan situation. As a result, the GOC received the compliment that Chile was the first country to send “disinterested help.” Chile’s political observers were surprised to find strong anti-U.S. feeling in Nicaragua. Ambassador Pezzullo’s statement was also rather unfortunate from the GOC view. This statement was exacerbated by the Secretary’s own public statements which generally tended to confirm that the U.S. had worked to force out Somoza.
The Secretary observed the U.S. had seen the problem coming. A year ago the U.S. had tried hard to set up a situation in which the moderates would have a good chance of prevailing. But it had been a lonely vigil. The upshot was the U.S. failed to achieve a solution, a stable Nicaraguan Government, which all the L.A. countries would have been happy to see. The U.S. predicted the failure would lead to further polarization with the center driven to the left. This is exactly what happened. With the march of events, it was clear to the U.S. that the extreme left was about to take over. If the U.S. had not done what it did, we would now have a totally leftist government.
The Secretary continued that the U.S. was disappointed at finding itself abandoned. He affirmed again that he felt the U.S. course had been the correct one. As to the future, the Secretary said he felt Nicaragua could go either way but had hope that the final outcome would be an independent government. He said he was glad Chile had stayed in as it had done. He thought it necessary for all the countries to provide humanitarian aid, both because of human need and because it affords some leverage. Similarly, reconstruction assistance channeled through moderate hands also provides some constructive influence.
The Secretary further observed that the hemisphere cannot neglect the danger posed to Nicaragua’s neighbors. The Foreign Minister asked whether the U.S. could not be more subtle in its approach. A moderate in Nicaragua had observed to his people that the U.S. had gotten used to managing Nicaragua through Somoza and was now trying to do the same through moderate elements in the new government.
The Secretary said such observations depend on who one talks to. He suggested the GOC not accept a single report along that line. Changing the subject, he wondered whether the Minister had any solutions to suggest. The Foreign Minister admitted he had none. However, he admonished again the U.S. should be more subtle and not give the impression it is trying to manage Nicaragua. As for Chile, since the GOC had its troubles with the U.S., the Nicaraguans see differently Chile’s involvement in Nicaragua.
The Secretary noted that Chile’s involvement was useful and encouraged the Foreign Minister to stay in the country and continue [Page 684] talking to the Nicaraguans. He felt Nicaragua could go either way but had hope that the outcome would be an independent government. Turning to Nicaragua’s neighbors, the Secretary felt Honduras recognized the pressures building up and looked like it could manage the problem. El Salvador, on the other hand, was extremely volatile and could explode in 2–3 months.
Asst. Secretary Vaky underlined the political and social pressures which are rapidly polarizing the country. He pointed to elections, perhaps next March, as the most plausible escape valve to these pressures. If the GOES could dramatically make such elections a showcase, in essence usurping the left’s own political planks, this could have a salutary effect. The problem, continued Mr. Vaky, is that the government is stuck in the middle, a position it must abandon to avoid further polarization. Secretary Vance suggested the GOC could help out in the situation and that Chile would be listened to. The Foreign Minister said they could try but observed that Chile and Central America can be worlds apart. Asst. Secretary Vaky returned the conversation to Nicaragua, saying it is necessary that traditional Nicaraguan institutions, e.g., the press, Church, regain life as a support structure to the moderates. The more countries that aid Nicaragua the better also for these institutions.
The Foreign Minister said he planned to keep his people in Nicaragua until they are thrown out. He added the Central American colleagues he had talked to in Quito had a feeling the U.S. is pushing them too fast to make reforms.
The Secretary pointed out that similar comments had been made to the U.S. last year by the Central Americans—but they had been wrong and the U.S. had been right in its assessment. Pastor pointed out that what is pushing them is not the U.S. but the march of events.
4. Beagle Channel—responding to queries from the Secretary, the Foreign Minister said there was not much to report: The two sides have submitted their information to the mediator, who will ask for expert advice soon.4 Perhaps there will be something after summer’s end. Generally, Chile has great confidence in Cardinal Samore and faith in the outcome. The Cardinal is aware of the delicate timing question from November to March. With respect to a putative arms build-up by the Argentines, the Argentines have placed $2.5 billion in military orders; additionally, they have left in place much of the military infrastructure which they built-up in the South at the turn of the year. Chile, also, is purchasing mirages. Nonetheless, there seems to be no immediate danger of a military flare-up.
[Page 685]5. On departing, the Foreign Minister responded to a question as to when its Supreme Court would rule on the Contreras case. He said in about two weeks. The Foreign Minister referred to the different judicial systems. Their incompatibility, he said, will make it difficult for Chileans or Americans to understand the final judgement whatever it might be. Not unrelated to the outcome is the fact that the U.S. is not credible in this situation to the Chilean military. They see the USG’s objective is to overthrow the military and not the pursuit of justice. Accordingly, any overdrawn USG reaction to an independent judgement of the Chilean court would also have very bad consequences not only in Chile but elsewhere in Latin America.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot 84D241, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Box 9, Vance Exdis Memcons 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Barnebey and Fimbres; cleared by Steven and in draft by Pastor; approved by Vaky.↩
- Vance was in Quito August 9–12 to attend the inauguration of Roldos. In telegram 5398 from Santiago, August 4, Landau recommended that Vance should “limit his agenda for the Cubillos bilateral to the Letelier/Moffitt case, the overriding issue in US/Chile relations at this time.” He suggested that Vance “reiterate to Cubillos the main points” of Document 229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790353-1229)↩
- For the Andean Group and the FSLN, see Document 47. Presumably a reference to Vance’s June 22 statement at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the June 24 OAS resolution regarding the replacement of the Somoza regime. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XV, Central America, Document 223, footnote 2.↩
- See Document 43.↩