Office of the Historian

43. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter1

Washington, December 21, 1978

1. Beagle Channel. The Pope today decided to send a special emissary to Argentina and Chile to assist them in reaching a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Argentina has accepted the emissary, and we expect Chile will do the same.2 Danger of conflict is still present. Basic differences over boundary lines remain. Hardline Argentine military officers who pushed Videla toward war retain their commands and could undermine the peace effort at any time.

Late this evening (December 21), Chile has called for a special OAS meeting tomorrow under the Rio Pact.3 We hope this will not derail the Pope’s effort.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in Geneva meeting with Gromyko concerning SALT. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.↩
  2. In telegram 10005 from Buenos Aires, December 22, Castro reported that he had met with Viola, who said, “the GOA was pleased with the papal initiative,” and “the GOA knew the USG was behind the papal move and was warmly grateful.” Castro concluded: “There has been a dramatic turnaround here in GOA attitudes as a result of the papal initiative. The basic problem is not resolved, of course, but great hope is being placed in the Vatican’s ability to break the stalemate between the two sides.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780530–0019) In telegram 9629 from Santiago, December 22, the Embassy reported that Chile had “accepted Pope’s proposal to send emissary and urges that he come now rather than after Christmas. GOC nevertheless is concerned that GOA might attack because it doubts that GOA can control its hardline generals. Therefore it plans to invoke Rio Treaty at OAS tonight or tomorrow.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528–1084)↩
  3. See footnote 7, Document 1.↩