Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

86. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Discussions with Fidel Castro, January 16–17, 1980 (S)

Atmosphere

We met with Castro and Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez for eleven hours (4:00 pm–3:00 a.m.) with only one break for ten minutes. The discussion was wide-ranging, largely following our agenda of concerns; the exchange was candid but cordial, contrasting sharply with the more confrontational meeting of a year before.² The discussion focused on international as opposed to bilateral issues, unlike the meeting a year ago where he vented his rage on the embargo and other alleged US crimes against Cuba. (S)

However, Castro clearly indicated his interest in continuing our contacts and also in normalizing relations, although he realizes there is no prospect of this soon. He believes progress is only possible in a climate of improving relations between the US and USSR, and is deeply preoccupied over the rapid and significant deterioration in relations between the two superpowers. (S)

Afghanistan

We probed very deeply on this issue in an effort to detect any potential differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union; we also pressed him hard for a statement condemning the Soviet intervention. Castro was extremely honest and frank in stating his embarrassment with the Soviet involvement and his displeasure with the failure of the Soviets to brief him on their views. He blamed Cuba’s inability to secure a Security Council seat on the Soviet action in Afghanistan, as well as on our strong lobbying effort before that, and he did not hide his great disappointment. (S)

Castro said that Cuba was prepared to support a resolution, being prepared by a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus, which restated the NAM’s support for non-intervention and condemned violations of it, but when it was transformed into a pro-US, anti-Soviet, east-west resolution, he decided to oppose it. After we pressed him for an explanation of his Ambassador’s speech at the UN, he admitted it was anti-US, but he also pointed out that it was deliberately not pro-Soviet, and it did not endorse Soviet intervention.³ (He also said that he personally revised the speech to remove all personal criticism of you.) (S)

We pressed him very hard to issue a statement condemning the intervention, and he openly agonized over the dilemma and the contradictions of being a revolutionary, a socialist, a non-aligned leader, and a friend of the USSR. It was clear that he felt the weight of the USSR, saying “they would have real problems” with that. He tried several times to wiggle out of his dilemma by criticizing us, the French, the Chinese and others for inconsistencies regarding the issue of non-intervention. (“If there are contradictions in our position, there are also many in yours.”) (S)

We explained your recent actions and the depth of your concern about the invasion. In the end, he said that he would immediately take the initiative to meet with the Soviets and convey his view of the profound and dangerous impact their actions were having on international relations; he would “analyze” the question of whether to speak out; he would, however, not participate in any boycott or anything that would, in his eyes, “sabotage” the Olympics. He also said that he thought that your decision not to sell more food to the Soviets would “really hurt” them and others, including Cuba (since the Soviets transship some of that grain to Cuba).⁴ (S)

He cautioned us, however, to be careful about not giving the Russians a feeling they are being cornered. (S)

Cuba-US-USSR Relations

As we probed to detect differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union, Castro interrupted to address our implicit question of Afghanistan’s significance for US-Cuban relations. He said, “We will not betray the USSR; we are not opportunists, nor would you want to be our friend if we were.” He said that the Cuban revolution “would have perished without the support of the Soviet Union, and we will not forget that.” With regard to the question whether the Cubans would contemplate asking the Soviet brigade to leave, he said that it is symbolic of the Soviets’ readiness to stand with Cuba, if necessary, and he appreciated that the Soviets did not succumb to US pressure seeking its withdrawal. He expressed the belief that normalization of relations between the US and Cuba could only occur in a period of detente between the US and USSR, not in a period like the present, of rising tensions. Therefore, he wanted to work to relax tensions, and he was extremely concerned with a line in your speech after Vienna on June 18, 1979 (the date was vivid on his mind) where you said that you told the Soviets of your concern with Cuban activities in Central America and the Caribbean.⁵ Surprisingly, it was not the “surrogate” dimension of that statement which bothered Castro but rather the suggestion that it was Cuba which was interfering with detente. He sees Cuba as the victim of our rivalry with the Soviets rather than as a contributing factor. (S)

We were also somewhat surprised by how small Castro saw Cuba’s role in the world (emphasized perhaps because of Iran and Afghanistan) and how much he felt that the US was successful in isolating and hurting Cuba. (On reflection, we believe both the US and Cuba consistently under-estimate our ability to influence the other and over-estimate the other’s ability to influence international events.) (S)

Iran

Castro was totally sympathetic to the problem, but he opposes sanctions for two reasons: (1) he thinks it will solidify the resistance in Iran; and (2) he opposes an embargo as unjust (whether against Iran or Cuba). We may have convinced him of our view that sanctions would generate opposition in Iran to the captors, and we weren’t talking about a complete embargo. Castro was extraordinarily interested in the details of the problem, and in the end, he promised to devote himself immediately to try to get the Iranians to accept Red Cross visits of all the prisoners and also to seek their release. (S)

Central America and the Caribbean

We described in some detail the nature of our concerns in the region, and after disabusing him of the notion that the US was opposed to all change, we asked him whether he could support the reformist government in El Salvador and whether he would cease his support for those who pursue a violent path in Central America and the Caribbean. Though bothered by the directness of the questions, Castro said he would not lie, but he also would not answer all the questions; he provided us the fullest exposition of Cuba’s policies we have ever obtained. (S)

He said he treats Central American governments differently from those in the Caribbean because the former have pursued a hostile policy toward Cuba, participating in numerous interventions in Cuba (mainly Bay of Pigs) while the latter contain many new nations willing to deal with Cuba on the basis of mutual respect. Therefore, he has not and will not give weapons to revolutionary groups in the Caribbean, or encourage violent change, although he will maintain contact with them; by implication, he suggested he would not deny himself doing that with Central American groups. (S)

In Grenada, Castro admitted he turned down a request for arms from Bishop both before the coup and after, but Cuba did respond within moments of the coup to Bishop’s request for civilian assistance. He claims there are only six Cuban military instructors there. He said that to his knowledge Grenada had nothing to do with the Union Island incident,⁶ and he invited us to join Cuba (as we are doing in Nicaragua) to assist in the economic development of Grenada. (S)

He said that he wanted to “wait-and-see” before deciding on his response to the new Salvadorean government. He admitted that Cuba follows the principle of encouraging “revolutionary” (he refused to refer to them as “terrorists” or “guerrillas”) groups to unite, as they are doing in El Salvador and Guatemala. We stressed our great concern that we could be on a “collision course” in Central America and the Caribbean if Cuba continues to support groups seeking a violent path. Castro responded that Cuba is not interested in creating conflicts with the US. (S)

He said that the real problems in the area were poverty and the price of petroleum and that Cuba does not have the resources to compete with the US in addressing these problems. He also said that revolutionary groups do not remain in open societies, like Costa Rica or Panama, which permit the free expression of views. He said that the worst violence in Central America is not perpetrated by idealistic youth but by the armies and the oligarchy. (S)

In summary, we clearly put Castro on notice that we are deeply concerned about developments in the Caribbean and Central America. We urged him to support moderate, rather than violent, change, and suggested that the support for violent groups could lead to serious problems. (S)

Puerto Rico

At our request, Castro said that Cuba would consider publicly acknowledging your July 25, 1978 declaration on self-determination for Puerto Rico.⁷ He also said categorically that he would not encourage or support terrorism or give any weapons to groups in Puerto Rico, and he will consider whether he will make a statement condemning “acts of violence” by Puerto Rican groups. However, in his view, the prospect of statehood for Puerto Rico “offends the sensibilities of all Latin Americans,” and if this were a real possibility, he would support the status quo. (S)

Africa

We pressed him to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola and Ethiopia, and he expressed interest in doing that, but said, “it is easier to go in than get out.” He said that Cuba has reduced its forces by 30 percent in Ethiopia, has avoided any involvement in Eritrea, and is pressing the Ethiopians to bring the rest home. But while the Ethiopian government has made progress in consolidating its hold, they still want the Cubans to stay a little longer because of the struggle in the North and the unpredictability of Siad Barre. Similarly, Angola has asked the Cubans to stay because of South African threats. However, the Cubans are not fighting UNITA anymore and are, according to Castro, very careful about not interfering in Angola’s affairs. Therefore, Cuba would not even promote a settlement between the MPLA and UNITA, nor would they object to it. He said that if Namibia were settled, Cuba could probably reduce its troop levels rapidly. We strongly encouraged Castro to make his own decision to withdraw troops. (S)

Political Prisoners

In response to Castro’s concern about more ex-political prisoners above the 3500 level, we explained that as a result of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the global situation on refugees probably prevented receiving any further refugees from Cuba. He said that if this were the case, it was important for the US not to provide encouragement to Cubans to flee illegally to Florida by giving so much publicity to their arrival. We said that the US could not return these individuals to Cuba for historical reasons. (S)

Non-Aligned Movement

We criticized Cuba for attempting to steer the NAM toward an anti-US position, and explained that many of his international setbacks since then could be attributed to this effort. He said that he wanted to get the NAM to play a new and different role to foster economic cooperation and development along the lines of his October 12th speech.⁸ He said that he considered the positive participation of the West essential to that effort. We told him that he would have to dramatically change his approach—style and policies—if he hoped to create the political climate which would permit the kind of cooperation he envisaged. (S)

Conclusions and Recommendations

We believe the US should not underestimate the importance of communicating our perspective and concerns directly to Castro, and in using the opportunity to learn more about what motivates him. We now have a lot better idea of what will work and what won’t. For example, the idea of making a separate deal with the Cubans behind the back of the Soviets is out of the question. We now know, by Castro’s own admission, that the embargo hurts Cuba as does international isolation, and they really want us to change those policies. On the other hand, they will not significantly modify their foreign policies to achieve that goal, although they might do so if we can persuade them it is in their interests (unrelated to embargo). We think further contacts at periodic intervals would be helpful, and would recommend inviting Padron here to talk with Secretary Vance and Dr. Brzezinski. (S)

If the Cubans follow through as promised on Afghanistan and Iran, we should respond with a small step like approving the license for COMSAT or permitting RCA to improve their undersea cable. (S)

Castro expressed great concern about your State of the Union Address and the hope that it would not increase world tensions. If Cuba is not mentioned in the address, we should convey that point to the Cubans before the speech; it would be a small but welcome gesture.⁹ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 15, Cuba, 1/1–15/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Vance and Brzezinski. At the top of the page, Carter wrote, “Extraordinarily frank & helpful—J”
2. See Document 41.
3. In telegram 159 from USUN, January 15, the Mission reported that Cuban Ambassador Raul Roa gave a speech before the United Nations General Assembly that attacked the United States for its policy toward the Middle East, accused American leaders of publicly condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the sake of public opinion, and stressed that the United States had intervened in many nations in the past. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800025–0047)
4. On January 4, President Carter announced a grain embargo against the Soviet Union. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24)
5. See Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 1092.
6. See footnote 3, Document 373.
7. On July 25, 1978, in celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, President Carter declared, “Should the government of Puerto Rico decide to hold a referendum [on the future status of Puerto Rico], I will support, and urge the Congress to support, whatever decision the people of Puerto Rico reach.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, p. 1336)
8. See footnote 3, Document 80.
9. President Carter’s January 23 State of the Union speech did not mention Cuba directly, only making a passing reference to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 195–196) According to a January 24 memorandum from Tarnoff to Vance, Carter omitted Cuba intentionally, following the Tarnoff/Pastor negotiations with Castro. (Department of State, Records of Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, Jan/Feb/Mar 1980, Presidential Breakfasts) President Carter initially made Castro’s COMSAT request conditional on his help with issues concerning Afghanistan and Iran, but changed his mind; the request was granted in June 1980. (Memorandum from Tarnoff to Vance, January 31; ibid.)