41. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter 1
SUBJECT
- Our Trip to Cuba, December 2–4, 1978 (S)
On Saturday,2 we held five hours of discussions with Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Raul Valdez Vivo, Secretary of Foreign Relations in the Central Committee. President Castro received us for five very full hours of a wide-ranging discussion from 10:00 p.m. Sunday evening to 3:00 a.m., Monday.
Mood. The Cubans were generous and warm in their private contacts with us; and in informal conversations, they were quite open and friendly on issues we raised.
The mood of the first conversation was diplomatic and correct. We reviewed the purposes of our trip, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained Cuba’s positions and its perception of the state of our discussions. In order to let our responses sink in and because we sensed that Rodriguez was relatively restrained and would be transmitting his conversations with us to Castro, we deliberately tried to create a mood with him that would encourage the Cuban side to demonstrate a more [Page 92] positive attitude on the issues of most importance to us: the U.S. political prisoners and Africa.
After hearing a report of the meeting, Castro evidently decided that our positions were “unacceptable” to him and that we had not heard or perhaps had not understood the depth of Cuba’s commitment to its current policies. He, therefore, was deliberately aggressive, painting his mood in terms of disappointment with you, whom he considered moral and interested in a new relationship with Cuba. “Disappointments” which he listed included the SR–71 flight, which he said was a deliberate provocation since it could not provide any information which we could not get by satellites, the Gulf-Ex Naval Exercise,3 Shaba II, press distortions of MIG’s, and others. As he spoke, it seemed to us that we were viewing a man who had bottled up 20 years of rage and was releasing it in a controlled but extremely impassioned manner. It is clear that he has given the issues we discussed a lot of thought, and that he had been waiting for many years to have the opportunity to vent the pressures that had been building in him to USG officials. His presentation seemed almost like a catharsis, something he needed to get out of his system.
His principal message was that Cuba wants to be treated with respect, as an equal, by the same rules. He views the embargo as “morally indefensible”—“a dagger at Cuba’s throat”—the single fact which denies Cuba the opportunity to negotiate on a basis of equality. In short, he seeks legitimacy for Cuba; he believes his quest is just, and our position isn’t; he knows that only the U.S. can bestow it and that rankles. The amount of time which the President and Rodriguez devoted to the talks and to preparing for them is an indication of the importance they attribute to this point since it was their principal message.
Castro is tall and physically imposing, but his manner in private talks seems almost shy and demure. When he speaks, however, he comes alive and though he speaks softly, it is with great power.
Because his words were precise and his arguments were well thought out, we strongly recommend that you read excerpts from the transcript. The summary which we will provide below does not convey [Page 93] the emotions which are an essential part of trying to understand his position.
Summary of Results. There was no give on any issue, nor very much that we hadn’t heard before. We were unsuccessful in achieving the principal purpose of the trip: to secure the release of the prisoners. We do, however, believe that the trip was worthwhile because our positions were repeated to the highest levels of their government, and because we received the first direct communication from Castro to USG officials on the full range of issues before us since the beginning of your Administration.
The major point that we made was that progress in lifting the embargo required progress in other areas, and two issues of special concern to us were Africa and Puerto Rico. The major point the Cubans made was that Cuba’s African policy was not negotiable, and the embargo must be lifted because it is immoral. In short, we missed each other.
Issues.
—On U.S. prisoners, the most forthcoming statement we heard was from Castro at the end of our conversation, when he said that under “more favorable conditions” (SR–71; Gulf-Ex Naval Exercise; press treatment of MIG’s had “created” the current unfavorable conditions), Cuba might try to find a solution. At other times, Castro reiterated Cuba’s interest in a parallel release of Puerto Rican prisoners. We do not expect them to be released soon, unless we release the four Puerto Rican prisoners of interest to Cuba.
—On Africa, they reaffirmed their determination not to make any explicit commitment with regard to future intentions. They said they were not opposed to a peaceful and political solution and would not create any obstacles to peace. Castro pointed to several recent events as indications of Cuba’s desire for peace in the region (e.g., Zaire-Angola). He denied that Cuba’s military presence or future intentions were obstacles to peaceful negotiations; indeed, he suggested the opposite: that South Africa and Rhodesia would be unrestrained in their external and internal repression if the threat of Cuban troops were not present. He and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez expressed considerable pessimism in their assessment of the situation in all of Southern Africa.
—But on Ethiopia, Castro suggested that there might be a draw-down of Cuban troops soon.
—On Rhodesia, Castro said that under present circumstances, he did not see a need to get involved, but that would change if South Africa got involved. He stressed his preference was to see independence achieved by local forces.
—He showed keen interest in our policies on Namibia, but said that he felt the South Africans had been duplicitous and that the U.S. should join with Cuba in seeking sanctions in the U.N.
[Page 94]—On Puerto Rico, there was considerable disagreement over the role Cuba has been playing. They said that Cuba could not put out fires at the U.N.; and we said that we acknowledged the different approach to the subject and were mainly asking Cuba not to start fires, which we believe it has done.4 Rodriguez said that Cuba would try to find a less controversial way to express its position, but our inference was that this issue would be the barometer of our relationship: when relations were bad, Cuba would be hostile and aggressive; when good, Cuba would be quieter.
—On Guantanamo, Rodriguez said that it is “an essential point; but not a prerequisite” to normalization. Cuba has not made this a “hot” issue not because it is uninterested, but because it recognizes the “broader implications” of such a strategy.
Summary. While there are a few minor items raised in the discussions which require follow-up, we believe that everything of importance has been said. Positions are clear, and neither side looks like it will budge. We therefore do not see the need for any more meetings at this time.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 8–12/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent through Vance and Brzezinski. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
- December 2.↩
- On November 16, U.S. officials announced the resumption of photo reconnaissance flights over Cuba to determine if the MiG-23’s violated the 1962 understanding. (Richard Burt, “U.S. Photo Flights Resume Over Cuba,” The New York Times, November 17, p. A11) In telegram 283384 to Mexico, November 7, the Department described Operation Gulf Ex-79, a naval exercise conducted across the Gulf of Mexico and northwestern Caribbean between November 14 and December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780460–316)↩
- During the Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) consideration of Puerto Rico, which began in New York on August 28, Cuba pressed for Puerto Rican independence.↩