Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

78. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Staff work backing up your speech regarding the Soviet brigade in Cuba (C)

My latest speech draft, which we have discussed, gives a recommended package of actions, which I have discussed with Ham, Jody, and Pat Caddell.² Four of the items, i.e.:

A) seeking augmentation of the Rapid Deployment Force;

B) enhancing our intelligence capability;

C) increasing economic assistance to Central American and Caribbean nations; and

D) giving additional security assistance to those nations;

require supplemental funding for AID, Defense, and Intelligence, in my view and that of Cy, Harold and Stan, respectively. (S)

Jim McIntyre’s position is that we could accomplish the same objectives without asking for Intelligence and Defense supplementals, and that the proposed aid and security package for Central America and the Caribbean can be cut in half.³ (S)

My staff is now in the process of examining these issues with OMB, State, Defense, and CIA. We have not come to any conclusions and have yet to receive formal recommendations and requested back-up papers, which we should have by mid-morning on Thursday. But given the time constraints we are under, I thought you should have a preliminary idea of the kinds of programs that we are thinking about so that your views can influence our final product.⁴ (S)

Jim’s opinion to the contrary, I can see political advantages in having the Congress approve the proposed supplementals without any important opposition. Such an action would have an important symbolic value in showing our determination in the face of the Soviet challenge. (S)

In any case, once we decide on what we plan to do (presumably by Friday, after Cy has seen Gromyko tomorrow evening),⁵ I think it essential that we confer with the Congressional leadership to let them know what we have in mind. I could see Byrd and Nunn, and suggest that Fritz be instructed to contact Cranston, in an effort to get immediate Senatorial approval. (S)

Intelligence

We have Stan Turner’s package for a supplemental and will be going over it in detail with his people and with OMB. He proposes an increase in FY 1980 spending [1½ lines not declassified]⁶ to increase and improve analysis, provide greater support to the analytical process, increase human source and covert collection, improve our worldwide contingency capability, expand reconnaissance, and other technical collection, of Cuba and the Mideast, and provide for greater crisis support.⁷ (S)

The supplemental is focused on providing direct and relatively immediate improvement of our intelligence coverage of Soviet and Cuban activities worldwide and is divided into near-term [number not declassified], mid-term [number not declassified], and long-term [number not declassified] payoff categories. The supplemental contains items of three general types: (S)

•Support for activities that are directly related to increasing collection and analysis on Cuba and Soviets in Cuba. These include funding for additional flights by reconnaissance aircraft, CIA operations, and expanded analysis of ship and aircraft movements.⁸ (TS)

•Support for activities that respond to the broader threat raised by the Soviet/Cuban military relationship. These include accelerating improvements in our para-military capabilities, expanding CIA operations resources to direct against Cuban and other targets, and improving collection and exploitation of Cuban and Soviet communications.⁹ (TS)

•Support for activities that enhance our ability to do general analysis or provide crisis support, in anticipation of a period of heightened US/Soviet tension. Many of these items involve acceleration or expansion of programs already underway or planned. (TS)

Our preliminary judgment is that a viable minimum level—as a signal of intent—should include at least a substantial portion of the near-term and a portion of the mid-term items with a heavy focus on manpower to strengthen our analytical, linguistic and HUMINT-oriented needs. [2½ lines not declassified] Beyond this level, there remain some questions as to the justification, which we, the DCI and OMB are in the process of examining. (S)

Defense

We do not as yet have the package from Defense. But I understand that Harold has looked at how we can enhance the RDF within the framework of an FY 80 defense supplemental, and has concluded that the following four items would be most appropriate.¹⁰

1. Forward Afloat Equipment Stocks and Ships (there is evidently a problem here with the Marine Corps, and Harold will reportedly be recommending that you talk to the Commandant about it).	$100M
2. Advanced Tanker Aircraft Program (four KC–10)	$226M
3. Two additional FFG–7 Convoy Escort Ships.	$400M
4. Expansion of the JCS Exercise Program.	$90M
Total—	$816M

In addition to the above, JCS, in response to our request to examine the possibilities of increasing our military and naval presence in the Caribbean, is reportedly considering recommending:

A. Expansion of P–3 flights

B. Expansion of facilities at Key West NAS.

C. Expansion of facilities [1½ lines not declassified]

D. [1 line not declassified]

E. [less than 1 line not declassified]

F. Increasing reconnaissance flights over Cuba and the Caribbean. (S)

State/AID

We are still working on the proposed economic and security assistance supplemental for Central America and the Caribbean, and are in the process of laying out for your decision the various options involved in a dispute between State, AID, and OMB on what the most effective package might be. The following line items are being considered:

A. A supplemental ESF for Nicaragua (up to $120M);

B. Supplementals for Honduras and El Salvador designed to give impetus to a broader multilateral development effort in Central America;

C. ESF of $5M to address balance-of-payments problems in the Eastern Caribbean;

D. FMS, MAP, and IMET programs which could help to equip and train an Eastern Caribbean Coast Guard—a proposal which is currently being considered by several governments in the region and the UK;

E. An additional $10 million project to address Caribbean unemployment through immediate high-impact development projects. (S)

The total Caribbean supplemental proposed by the State Department is $30.6 million, and the total for Central America is $145.6 million. OMB and Henry Owen think this should be cut.¹¹ (S)

As noted, we are examining all the above proposals carefully and will try to have the options fully staffed out for you by c.o.b. tomorrow so that we can move ahead on Congressional consultations on Friday. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Cuba, Soviet Brigade (Policy/Options Papers), 9/20–28/79. Top Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the page, President Carter wrote, “Zbig—This is a typical (and unacceptable) bureaucratic response—J.”
2. Presumably a reference to a draft of the speech to the Nation on the Soviet combat troops in Cuba and SALT that President Carter delivered on October 1. See footnote 2, Document 80.
3. In the margin, Carter wrote, “I agree with Jim.”
4. In the margin, Carter wrote, “Everyone will naturally want more $.”
5. Vance and Gromyko met in New York on September 27. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 227.
6. [text not declassified]
7. In the margin, Carter wrote, “This is silly. [1 line not declassified]”
8. In the margin, Carter wrote, “Refocus planned capabilities.”
9. In the margin, Carter wrote, “Publicity on intelligence activities should be minimized.”
10. In the margin, Carter wrote, “I prefer no supplemental—change priorities to accomplish goals if possible.”
11. Carter underlined the words “OMB” and “Henry Owen” and in the margin wrote, “Sound thinking.”