Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

77. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 24, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

• John J. McCloy, Sullivan and Cromwell Attorneys
• Robert Perito, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State

At Marshall Shulman’s request, I met with John McCloy this morning to allow him to review the file of transcripts of his conversations with the Soviets during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, McCloy was designated by President Kennedy as his personal representative to negotiate the removal of Soviet missiles and IL–28 bombers from Cuba. In this capacity, McCloy spent an extended period at USUN where he and Ambassador Stevenson negotiated with Khrushchev’s personal representative V. V. Kuznetsov.² Our meeting, however dealt with the related issue of the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

McCloy said the documents confirmed his recollection that the principal focus of his efforts in 1962 was, first, the removal of the missiles; and, second, the removal of the IL–28 bombers. The subject of Soviet military personnel in Cuba arose only incidentally and then, in the context of their role in protecting the missiles. In this context, McCloy told the Soviets that the troops would have to be removed because their presence opened the possibility that the missiles might be reintroduced at a later time. The negotiations on removing Soviet military forces occurred after the missiles and bombers had been removed and McCloy had withdrawn from the negotiating process. McCloy said he had little to contribute to our current effort to complete the record on our 1962 discussions with the Soviets on this issue.

Turning to present confrontation over the presence of a Soviet brigade, McCloy said he was not worried about a few thousand Soviet troops in Cuba since they presented no strategic threat to the United States. What did concern him, however, was the Soviet training mission in Cuba and its role in training Cuban troops which could be deployed to trouble spots around the world. McCloy said the training of a force of Soviet surrogates which could intervene in areas where the US has vital economic interests was a strategic threat equal to that posed by the missiles in 1962. Quoting “West Germans” whom he said had information from East German and Soviet sources, McCloy said the Soviets were preparing Cuban forces for use in oil producing areas of the Middle East. This effort, he said, posed a real danger to the United States and should be the subject of our immediate concern.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810138–0216. Confidential. The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club.
2. For documentation on these meetings, which began in late October 1962, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.