Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

50. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 6, 1979

SUBJECT

• Talking Points for Vance on Cuba/Soviet Relations (C)

I understand that Vance will see Dobrynin on Cuba to foreshadow what the President will say on Cuba at the Summit. Talking points that you suggest, naturally, must be in line with what the President wants to achieve at the Summit, something no one is clear about. (S)

To the extent there is a view of an objective, it seems to be that the President should invoke the 1962/70 agreements in light of recent Soviet activity.² As you know, I researched the agreements and determined that (a) they are ambiguous, allowing both sides quite different interpretations; and (b) there is no solid case that the Soviets are breaking the letter of the understanding although their complex military relation with Cuba has broken the spirit by a large degree. Thus, chiding Brezhnev and Dobrynin about the 1962 understanding won’t accomplish much but a demonstration of our ineffective policy. (S)

I suggest an alternative aim for the Summit:

a) Make it clear to the Soviets that their relationship with Cuba is unacceptable to us in the following ways:

—Soviet military activities in Cuba have reached a level that could endanger detente and world peace unless checked.

—Cuban military activities and capabilities have reached a level that is endangering peace in the Western Hemisphere.

—Soviet-backed Cuban operations in Africa and elsewhere have reached a level that already adversely affects our bilateral relations.

b) We would welcome a Soviet commitment, private, or public, at the Summit, to reduce Soviet-Cuban military activities in Cuba and elsewhere, although there is no chance of getting one.

c) The Soviet leadership should take note of the seriousness of U.S. concerns and reach the objective conclusion that increased Soviet military collaboration with Cuba makes Cuba less secure, not more secure. Cuban security depends on the U.S., not on the USSR. (S)

We cannot hope to get a Soviet commitment on Cuba, and attempts to invoke the 1962–70 understandings will only bring Soviet ridicule because we never made them deliver the final answer on the number of MIG-23s permissible. The President let them off the hook by a press announcement before they had answered.³ (S)

We can make the Soviets aware that we know what is going on and that we will not accept it. We should avoid saying what we will do about it because there is no sign that we know. (S)

After the Summit, we can hold a series of SCCs for developing a number of courses of action. If they lead to pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, the Soviets cannot cry foul play. They will have been warned. You should notice particularly the last point, c), which hints at U.S. military action against Cuba in certain circumstances notwithstanding Soviet commitments to Cuba. This raises ambiguities about the 1962 U.S. commitment which the Soviets may try to clarify. We gain by creating and maintaining the ambiguity. It truly puts the Soviets on notice that we too can back away from the 1962 understanding the way the Soviets are doing through present military programs in Cuba. (S)

If you accept the foregoing tactic, then the memorandum at Tab I should go to Vance as instructions for dealing with Dobrynin on the Cuba issue.⁴ You also may want to send a memorandum to the President to get his approval of this tactic. Such a memo is at Tab II.⁵ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 83, Sensitive XX, 6/5/79. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bartholomew and Pastor.
2. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 36.
3. For Carter’s statement, see footnote 3, Document 40.
4. Attached but not printed. No evidence has been found that the draft memorandum was sent. Vance and Dobrynin met on June 6 but did not discuss Cuba. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 198. Documentation on the Vienna Summit, held June 15–18, during which Cuba was not a major topic of discussion, is ibid., Documents 199–208.
5. Attached but not printed.