Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

48. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT

• Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba

The CIA assessment strikes me as a benign view of a malignancy in its early stages.² Their paragraph 7, which lists explanations in descending order of likelihood, is not at all convincing. The first four explanations have no precedent and make little sense from a practical Soviet viewpoint. The last two explanations are conceivable, but they don’t explain enough. (TS/[portion markings not declassified])

The Soviet ground force training must be put into context with improvements at Cienfuegos harbor, the MIG-23s, HIP–E ground assault helicopters, and more frequent Soviet naval deployments in Cuban waters. We should also consider the support and operational coordination between the Soviet and Cuban military in Africa. This overall perspective inclines me to believe that we are witnessing a growing Cuban-Soviet military relationship which will surprise us in a number of ways in the future. Just because Cuba is geographically small by comparison with the U.S. does not mean that it is an insignificant island as a military citadel and a Soviet power projection base.³ (TS/[portion markings not declassified])

Many students of the 1962 crisis insist that U.S. regional conventional military superiority was the major determinant of the outcome. We cannot always assume that we shall enjoy such superiority in light of the emerging Cuban-Soviet military relationship. (S)

I suggest that:

(a) the Cuban-Soviet military relationship be made one of the highest intelligence collection priorities;

(b) the political and military implications of that relationship be examined as a U.S. security and foreign policy problem.

(c) Cuba, as a Soviet military base in this hemisphere, be given much higher priority in our bilateral relations with Moscow. (S)

The issue is worth an SCC. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 8/78–4/79. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. Outside the System. Sent for information. At the top of the page, Aaron wrote on April 4, “ZB—I find this very troubling. I would like to pursue it first with CIA and after clarifying the issues for us probaly have an SCC.” In the left margin, Brzezinski wrote, “RI [Inderfurth]—WO is right. Task the CIA for an in-depth assessment—also DOD, DIA—pointing toward an SCC.”
2. A reference to a March 13 memorandum entitled “Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba.” (Ibid.)
3. A paper entitled “Reappraisal of U.S./Cuba Relations” prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and sent to Gates on March 16, concludes, “In sum, Cuba provides the USSR a cheap proxy to carry out Soviet policy objectives with little direct Soviet commitment.” See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 194.