42. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba to the Department of State1
4098. Subject: Castro Takes Pessimistic Line on US Relations.
(C) 1. Begin summary: Castro, following signature of GOC-Cuban exile “Final Act” (septel),2 states that relations with US are “going badly”. Cuban leader’s renewed criticism of US administration—heavily laced with sarcasm—is less than evenly balanced by accustomed [Page 95] favorable comments on certain aspects of administration’s policies vis-a-vis Cuba.
(C) 2. Castro, for first time publicly discloses and castigates SR–71 overflight and characterizes his failure to fire on aircraft as act of restraint and gesture to avoid embarrassing President Carter. He emphasizes that there is no guarantee that this restraint will continue. Castro also condemns USG fishery policy and recalls USG challenge to his personal integrity during Shaba events. Castro says he will not release four of (six) USG political prisoners “for now”, but is willing to talk about matter with USG. Overall, Castro’s attitude toward USG is harshest we have seen since 26 of July speech3—in part possibly due to conscious effort on his part to place what may be perceived as conciliatory gestures towards exiles (and indirectly toward USG) in appropriately “revolutionary” framework.
End summary.
(U) 3. Fidel Castro, following signature of “Final Act” with Cuban exile community “representatives”, December 9, held press conference for resident and visiting US and Spanish journalists. In addition to spelling out details of Final Act (septel), Castro discussed his current view of US-Cuban relations.
(U) 4. Most significantly, Castro declared—contrary to assumption of questioning journalist—that, despite US acquiescence in his political prisoner release/departure plan, US-Cuban relations are not improving, but rather are “going badly”. Castro cited “farce” of MIG–23 issue and SR–71 overflight (“a flagrant violation of sovereign air space”), untrue accusations of Cuban involvement in Shaba (“equal to saying we are liars”), and US fishery policies toward Cuba (“a deception”) to prove his point.
(C) 5. His references to President Carter, although not devoid of now customary praise on certain points (particularly with regard to curtailment of alleged former USG support for Cuban exile “terrorists”—a step, Castro says, which made his current prisoner release moves possible), contained new elements of ambiguity. He said, for example, that he is not sure how things will turn out with current administration and stated that, although this administration is best he has dealt with, “this has begun to change”. In most sarcastic comments we have ever seen here regarding President Carter, Castro responded to question as to whether he would be willing to invite President to Havana by mocking President’s supposed inability to come here in [Page 96] face of “reactionary and anachronistic” forces in US. When questioner persisted, Castro added . . . “if Carter wants to come as a tourist, he can come to Cuba anytime he wants.”
(LOU) 6. Castro elaborated on the following specific developments souring relations with the Carter administration:
A. SR–71 overflight—Castro said suspension of overflights was one of most appreciated gestures of Carter administration. He allowed there has only been one overflight (November 12), but said such flights are “flagrant violations” of Cuban airspace and Cuba does not recognize US right to monitor Cuban arms. (He repeated that MIG–23 is “tactical defensive” aircraft.) Castro said that he would be within his rights to fire at SR–71, but he has not made a decision to fire because he does not want to “complicate Carter’s position.” On other hand, Castro stated that he is “not disposed to give any guarantee or assurances (regarding safety) of those spy planes.” (Castro, somewhat ironically, said creation of artificial crisis over MIG–23 spurred by “leak” was probably not best move for Carter because domestic political enemies can now portray him as “weak”.)
B. Fishing—Castro claimed that US promised to respect Cuban “historical fishing rights in US 200 Mile Fishery Conservation Zone when GIFA signed (in 1977).4 This, he says, was a “deception”. Instead, Castro said, “conditions and requirements” imposed by US are so rigid that it has proved “absolutely impossible” for Cuba to fish in US zone.
C. Shaba—Castro criticized leak of his conversation with USINT Chief last May5 and again lambasted “brutal accusation” of Cuban involvement—an “imputation” equal to statement that “we are liars.” Again, sarcastically, Castro said that he would never lie to a child—much less to the “all-powerful master of a great empire” (yet another sarcastic reference to the President).
D. Embargo—Castro recognized that President Carter inherited “the blockade” but charged he is maintaining it and trying to use it as a “weapon of pressure” against Cuba. Castro labeled this as a “crime” and an “indecency”.
(LOU) 7. On pending policy issue of US political prisoners, Castro said he is not prepared to release them now. (Comment: He referred to four political prisoners. This could mean that Cuban-US dual nationals—Armas Estevez, Hernandez and possibly Blanco-Boix—will be handled with other Cuban prisoners. Other dual national—Juan Tur—is apparently being linked with resolution of cases of single-source AMCITs Lunt, Jackson, and Rodriguez Morales.) Castro stated, how [Page 97] ever, that he is willing to talk over AMCIT political prisoners question with USG.
(LOU) 8. Regarding GOC-exile “Final Act”, Castro pushed hard for US acceptance of ex-prisoners and families who were “dragged into counterrevolution by US.” He said that, in light of US “moral obligation” flowing from past policies and Carter’s acceptance of another relic of past policy (Guantanamo) (yet another barb), US cannot reject ex-prisoners. Castro commented that opening up of Cuban port to allow exiles to pick up relatives not documented for entry into US (as was done by Castro in early 1960’s in face of USG slowness in documenting Cuban emigrants) is not yet necessary. He suggested that, if only, say, 100–150 current prisoners per month wish to go to US, Washington can use remainder of monthly (parole) quotas of 400 for ex-prisoners. (FYI He said that only 82 of first list of 400 prisoners now wish to go to US—but that final number could rise to 150. End FYI.) This first list was apparently given to the Cuban community representatives, but has not yet been published or provided to USINT.
(C) 9. Begin comment: Castro’s barbed solicitousness of President Carter’s supposed domestic political problems plus his taunting if not ridicule of President over other issues strikes us as marked departure from past public statements by the Cuban leader. Previously, Carter administration has been attacked on single issues (Shaba, human rights, et cetera), but Castro’s criticism has not taken on such a programmatic or personal form. Castro’s December 9 statements come close to such an across-the-board attack and are the harshest we have seen since his July 26 speech. Nevertheless, the Cuban leader kept his options open by again acknowledging President Carter’s positive policies, such as ending of support for exile terrorists and acceptance of Cuban political prisoners. Castro’s unwillingness to write off cooperation with the administration (and his prisoner/emigration gestures—though these are probably motivated also by domestic problems) reflect strong desire on his part to continue opening to US which could bring lifting of trade embargo. At same time, Castro’s escalation of criticism of US may be intended to counterbalance perception among some here that reconciliation with exiles is sell-out to USG or will ideologically or economically deform Cuban revolution. Criticism, of course, also reflects real Castro hostility to recent US policy toward Cuba and US failure to acquiesce in Cuban activism abroad.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511–0654. Confidential; Immediate.↩
- In telegram 4089 from Havana, December 11, the Interests Section reported the signing of the “Final Act” regarding the release of Cuban political prisoners. Approximately 3,600 prisoners were freed and permitted to leave Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511–0197)↩
- In telegram 2157 from Havana, July 27, the Interests Section reported that Castro gave a July 26 speech in which he lambasted President Carter’s human rights policy as hypocritical and attacked the United States for criticizing Cuba’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780308–0628)↩
- See Document 15.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 32.↩