332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Barbados1
71200. Subject: Implementation of PRC Policy Decision on Grenada.2
1. S—Entire text.
2. In carrying out the PRC decision that we distance ourselves from the Peoples Revolutionary Government of Grenada (PRG), we propose the following guidelines:
A. Embassy Bridgetown presence/contact: The primary contact between Embassy Bridgetown and the PRG should be in pursuit of the protection and welfare of U.S. citizens on the island. Consequently, visits to Grenada should be conducted primarily by consular officers who should: (A) visit AMCIT prisoners; (B) contact American residents on the island, including Peace Corps volunteers, students and faculty of St. George’s University School of Medicine; and (C) other residents. These visits should be conducted regularly, perhaps every two months. Consular officers should also report on political and economic develop [Page 808] ments, particularly the deteriorating financial position of the PRG. Ambassador Shelton or other officers (except consular) should travel to Grenada only as instructed or when the Ambassador considers extraordinary circumstances require sending an Embassy officer there.
B. U.S. assistance: We will provide no bilateral assistance to Grenada under any program, including the Special Development Activities fund.
C. Assistance through the CDB: We should attempt to diminish CDB disbursements to Grenada and slow the pace of CDB loans and disbursements to Grenada by focusing on project development assistance on other Eastern Caribbean islands.
D. Contacts with PRG officials in the U.S.: Contacts with PRG officials in the U.S. should be limited and carried out at the desk officer and office director level, except in extraordinary circumstances. U.S. officials should be correct, but should not go out of their way to meet with PRG representatives.
E. Public statements: U.S. public statements should focus on U.S. support for democratic institutions, constitutional processes, economic development, human rights and respect for territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Those statements should be related to circumstances and events in Grenada, as appropriate. We should speak out on abuses in Grenada such as indefinite postponement of elections, illegal detainment of citizens and the lack of a free press. The U.S. should, of course, vigorously deny statements alleging that we are trying to destabilize the country.
F. Extradition of Eric Gairy: The extradition case should continue to be handled in a normal manner by Justice Department officials.
G. Ship visits: No visits by U.S. vessels will be scheduled in Grenada.
H. Security assistance: We will not seek FMS eligibility for Grenada nor will we establish an IMET program for Grenada.
I. OPIC activities: We will not approve applications for OPIC insurance or financing for any projects in Grenada nor will we extend any existing coverage except in exceptional circumstances.
J. Eximbank: We should not provide any new Exim loans to Grenada and will review all requests for FCIA insurance and bank guarantee programs in Washington before approving them. (FYI: Due to lack of reasonable assurance of repayment, Exim does not anticipate approving any transactions in the foreseeable future. End FYI)
K. Other bilateral programs: The U.S. will not provide any other assistance activities to Grenada such as USDA commodity credits, facilitation of private investment, ICA cultural activities and public speakers. Exceptions will be made, however, for programs that deal with nongov [Page 809] ernmental organizations particularly opposition groups, such as a limited AIFLD program. ICA informational, outreach and IVP programs will be continued and/or expanded at the discretion of Embassy Bridgetown.
L. Demarches on international issues: The Department will generally not make demarches on international issues unless special circumstances require a demarche to the PRG. Instructions to carry out a demarche to Grenada will be contained in the body of any circular message and ARA will instruct other Bureaus to discontinue use of the caption “Bridgetown for St. Georges.”
M. Demarche to other governments: The Department will develop a comprehensive brief on developments in Grenada to be shared with other interested governments, including Barbados, Venezuela, Trinidad and, perhaps, Jamaica. We will ask these governments to raise with Bishop their concern over the direction of Grenada’s foreign policy.
N. Travel guidance: A travel advisory warning American citizens against travel to Grenada is not called for at this time. However, when asked, we are alerting the public to our concerns over the detention of Americans and others without habeas corpus and the degree of uncertainty there because of the government’s campaign of anti-American rhetoric and charges of U.S. efforts to destabilize the regime. The government, however, has not carried out any systematic harassment of American residents or tourists on the island.
O. PVO activities: To the extent that the PRG is interested in cooperating with private voluntary organizations U.S. PVOs should be encouraged to play a role in Grenada. This role would be similar to the one that PVOs would perform throughout the Caribbean and Central America. However, the USG would give a lower priority to PVO activities in Grenada than elsewhere.
P. Export licenses: No export licenses for arms or military equipment will be granted to Grenada.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800137–0218. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted in ARA/CAR; cleared by Bowdler and Pastor and in DOD/ISA, Treasury, ICA, LAC/CAR, OPIC, Exim, CIA, Peace Corps, and S/P; approved by Warne. Repeated for information Priority to London, Ottawa, USUN, Port of Spain, Kingston, Caracas, and the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.↩
- See Document 371.↩
- The Embassy’s reply generally agreed with the new policy framework for U.S.-Grenadian relations. The Embassy recommended a few changes, including the continuance of Special Development Activities (SDA) grants on an individual basis and a more flexible OPIC and Export-Import Bank policy. (Telegram 1691 from Bridgetown, April 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800167–0541) The Department agreed to permit SDA projects on a “very selective basis.” (Telegram 210535 to Bridgetown, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800379–1170)↩