331. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State (Habib), and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)1

SUBJECT

  • Presidential Finding on Grenada

REFERENCE

  • DDCI Memorandum dated 9 October 1979, Same Subject

1. Since we have received no objections as solicited in the referenced Agency memorandum of 9 October 1979,2 and since the policy concerning Grenada has been reaffirmed in the 13 November 1979 Policy Review Committee meeting, this Agency plans to reactivate its proposed program as approved in the Presidential Finding on Grenada, signed 3 July 1979.3

2. Concerned committees in Congress have been briefed on the outline of this proposal and further briefings are not deemed necessary. The imprisonment of [1 line not declassified] will necessitate the development of new channels through which to implement our political action program. The identification, contact and recruitment of alternate channels in the political sphere will result in time delays before we carry out the program. The international covert action infrastructure, how [Page 807] ever, will continue to be used for implementation of the agent of influence and propaganda aspects of the program.4

Frank C. Carlucci5
  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Box 26, Grenada, 5/31/1979–11/29/1979. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note attached to a cover page reads, “David, CIA moving forward on the Grenada finding. D. Gregg.” A note on the cover page reads, “DA has seen 11/26/79.”
  2. See Document 328.
  3. See Document 325. For the Summary of Conclusions of the November 13 PRC meeting, see Document 371. In a November 16 memorandum to Turner, Jack Davis provided a summary of the meeting. He wrote, “Also regarding Grenada, the DDCI asked for a lifting of the Presidential Finding, which had not been activated because of State resistance. Nobody objected, though it was not clear how the lifting was to be effected.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 10: (SCC) Caribbean)
  4. In a memorandum to Carlucci, December 9, Newsom summarized a November 26 discussion with Vaky, Bowdler, and Sanchez. He wrote, “At that time it was agreed that it is not possible to proceed with the political action part of the finding because no assets were available with which to do so. It was further agreed that the first task would be to recruit and establish new assets.” (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Box 26, Grenada, 5/31/1979–11/29/1979)
  5. Printed from a copy with this typed signature.