Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

116. Summary of Conclusions of an Interagency Meeting¹

Washington, August 7, 1980

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is discussion of Iranian demonstrators.]

Cuban Refugees

Mariel Harbor remains open and despite vigorous efforts by the Coast Guard, there remains a continuing flow of Cubans to the US, which averaged about 500 a week until it recently increased to about 1100. There are now about 37 boats in Mariel. There is no indication that the Cubans will do anything provocative like sending all the boats at once, but there is also no indication that Mariel will be closed. In addition, we have a continuing problem with the fact that the Government of Cuba will not accept the criminals or other undesirables who have been brought to the US. (S)

We reviewed three sets of options for dealing with the problems of the continuing flow of Cubans and the repatriation of criminals and other undesirables: (1) Modifications on Current Policy. Apparently, we have the legal authority and with substantial cost the capability to keep boats off of Rt. 1 and to close all ports in South Florida in order to stop the flotilla, but the economic impact of such an act and the political consequences would probably make this option prohibitive. Justice does not believe that a new, more specific law would be any more helpful in deterring another flotilla. State does not think that we could induce a third country such as Honduras to accept many future refugees for re-settlement, but they have agreed to take another look at it. (2) Diplomacy. With regard to diplomatic negotiations with Cuba, State has prepared a paper with options, all of which call for alterations in our overall policy to Cuba (particularly on the embargo) as a way to induce Castro to the bargaining table on the refugee issue;² these options do not offer anything useful. We are seeking support from OAS countries for a resolution which would reaffirm the basic principles of respect for other nations’ immigration laws, which Cuba has violated. We intend to press for that resolution in the OAS and then seek additional support from the ASEAN countries for a UN resolution, which we hope will have the effect of embarrassing and restraining Castro. (3) Military Options. We examined a number of options prepared by DOD to forcibly return to Cuba the criminals and other undesirables, but concurred with DOD that these involved unnecessarily high risks of a military confrontation in a way which would make us appear ineffective or needlessly provocative. Harold Brown will reexamine several other ideas suggested at the meeting and forward them for further consideration on Monday.³ Coast Guard and DOD indicated that they could significantly reduce the flow of Cubans to the US⁴ if you so direct, although only with substantial additional cost.⁵ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 19, Cuba: Refugees, Mini-SCC Meeting, 8/20/80, and SCC Meeting 8/28/80 [I], 8/80. Secret. A list of participants for this meeting was not found. A covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter reads in part, “The meeting was difficult. There was considerable resistance on the part of the various agencies, since the unusual nature of these problems requires actions and decisions outside their normal operating procedures. If we are to get the kind of coordinated action that we require to deal with these two complex problems, we will need your firm guidance to set the tone.” Carter underlined the sentence “The meeting was difficult” and wrote, “cc Zbig, Lloyd—I expressed my wishes clearly in staff meeting Thursday. Act to carry them out—I will issue directives or ask Congress for clear law as needed—J.”
2. Presumably the paper tabled at the July 31 Mini-SCC meeting. See Document 115 and footnote 3 thereto.
3. The Department of Defense prepared a paper on August 9 about Cuban refugees, in anticipation of a Monday, August 11 meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 18, Refugees, 8/80)
4. Carter underlined the phrase “significantly reduce the flow of Cubans to the US.”
5. Carter drew an arrow pointing to the phrase “although only with substantial additional cost” and wrote below the paragraph, “How, and at what cost?”