115. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci), and the Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (Clarke)1
SUBJECT
- Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuba, 31 July 1980
1. No action required, for your information only.
2. This follow-on to the meeting of 26 July, conveyed a lowered sense of urgency. Chairman David Aaron continued the movement toward comprehensive options on the Cuban refugee problem, but slowed the pace. The next meeting is scheduled for the week of 11 August.
3. Work on the “Status Quo” option had not been completed at the time of the meeting. State’s Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (Palmieri) characterized the present situation as not quite severe enough to justify either the “Negotiation” or the “Confrontation” options. In contrast, at the previous meeting, he and others had characterized the status quo as “explosive”.2
4. Admiral Costello (Coast Guard), however, held to an alarmist view. He saw already rising pressures against the Coast Guard’s infor [Page 251] mal blockade of boats seeking to move from Key West to Cuba to pick up refugees. If the early court cases go against the government and exonerate boat owners of charges of illegal action in ferrying refugees, Costello expects a renewed flood of boats and general disregard of the Coast Guard’s interdiction efforts.
5. The Justice Department representative stated he did not expect to win all the cases, and might lose most of them, because of sentiment in favor of family reunification in Southern Florida.
6. State (Assistant Secretary Bowdler) tabled a preliminary draft of the negotiation options, which reflected some of the views conveyed to State in an informal CIA paper.3 In general, State is more pessimistic than CIA on the likelihood of Castro accepting limited US concessions in exchange for regulating the refugee flow. Furthermore, there is little support within State, apparently, for extending limited concessions (e.g., minor modifications of the embargo, termination of SR–71 overflights, opening up the agenda to other non-refugee bilateral issues).
7. DOD is apparently similarly unenthusiastic about its preliminary explorations of confrontation options (e.g., a blockade of Mariel or of Cuba’s entire North Coast). DOD is concerned both about costs of deployments and about the likelihood of Cuban military reaction—including an attack against Guantanamo.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- See Document 114.↩
- Neither the State Department nor the CIA paper was not found.↩