93. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

PA 80–10353

Vietnam in Laos: Problems With a Model Client[portion marking not declassified]

Key Judgments

Under Hanoi’s domination, the Lao regime is confronted by serious problems—a stagnant economy, stubborn and debilitating armed re [Page 334] sistance, a continuing exodus of refugees, a demoralized and largely inefficient bureaucracy, and chafing within the leadership over Hanoi’s influence. [portion marking not declassified]

Vietnam is determined to control Laos but prefers to maintain a reasonably self-sufficient regime there. It has forged a “special relationship” based on close ties with the most senior Lao leaders, an authoritative role for Vietnamese advisers, and the presence of some 45,000 Vietnamese troops. [portion marking not declassified]

The doctrinaire political and economic policies of the Lao leaders, however, have caused widespread disaffection and driven nearly 10 percent of the population out of the country. The bureaucracy functions poorly or not at all, and many officials are increasingly hostile to the Vietnamese. [portion marking not declassified]

Within the leadership pro- and anti-Vietnamese factions have avoided direct clashes, but some mid- and low-level officials have been purged and tensions are continuing to build. Hanoi’s proteges clearly have the upper hand. [portion marking not declassified]

China is waiting in the wings to take advantage of any political instability. Future Chinese support for Lao resistance forces could add considerably to Hanoi’s already heavy military and economic burden in Indochina. [portion marking not declassified]

Hanoi’s grip on Laos probably will remain firm, even if political infighting erupts. Over the longer term, the regime’s weaknesses probably will require a more direct Vietnamese role that will increase the potential for a nationalist backlash. Without extensive Chinese support, however, anti-Vietnamese groups cannot seriously threaten the regime’s stability or Hanoi’s control. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the Assessment.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R: Production Case Files, Box 1, Folder 23: Vietnam in Laos: Problems with a Model Client. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center.