Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

84. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 22, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

• Prince Norodom Sihanouk
• Ambassador Victor Palmieri
• Ambassador Frank Loy
• Deputy Assistant Secretary John Negroponte
• EA/VLC Director Stephen Lyne

Ambassador Palmieri (P): Our special responsibilities concern the humanitarian effort in Kampuchea. I have visited SE Asia twice in the past month. We have great interest in your views on the issue of international support for Khmer relief. This problem involves many nations. In your travels have you found an awareness of the humanitarian need in Kampuchea? Is concern being maintained or is the situation slipping out of people’s minds?

Prince Sihanouk (S): I have received many letters from Thailand sent to me by my compatriots in refugee camps in Thailand and along the Thai-Cambodian border. In some camps, people are receiving large amounts of humanitarian relief. In other camps, the people are facing difficulties as far as humanitarian aid is concerned. They do not get as much food and medicine in some groups as other refugees and armed groups receive. They must buy food and medicine which is provided by the UNICEF and ICRC. In brief, there is some discrimination between refugees and armed groups. Furthermore, unarmed refugees and so-called liberation soldiers are mixed in each camp. The armed elements are the minority, control the civilian elements or the majority. The unarmed majority depends on the goodwill or the bad-will of the soldiers and the military leaders. They are all Cambodians. According to my supporters, the Khmer Rouge and the Son Sann group get everything. Those who are not pro-Khmer Rouge or pro-Son Sann cannot get humanitarian relief. I have stressed to UNICEF and ICRC that their generosity is real and genuine but that there are difficulties when relief goes to Cambodians through the Thai. Some people make bad distribution. I myself cannot make any comment on it. I cannot support the views of my supporters; I only mention what they tell me. I don’t know the truth. I am not allowed by the Thai Government to visit the refugee camps. I cannot say that my supporters are right or wrong. In Paris there are men and women who have very recently come from Thailand to serve as liaison between me and my supporters along the Thai-Kampuchean border. They are still in Paris. They want me to get humanitarian relief for those people who cannot get it. I do not know what I can do. I simply mention it to you. I have no comment.

P: If your supporters can identify specific areas that are not receiving support, we can attempt to rectify it. Your information is correct. In the two main refugee camps, Nong Samet and Nong Mak Mun, armed groups have great influence. You are right to be concerned. We will seek to use our good offices with the international agencies and the Thai if your supporters can identify areas of concern.

S: In Paris I introduced a diplomat from your Embassy to a lady and gentleman who represent my supporters. He has their address and telephone numbers in Paris. I can provide you with the names and addresses of the lady and gentleman. If your Embassy in Paris wants information about what I have just said, I suggest that your Embassy contact the representatives of my supporters in Cambodia and Thailand. You can then have more precise information about the problem.

P: Can we talk about this effort at another level, a level above the Thai-Cambodia border or the situation inside Cambodia? Can we discuss the situation in this country and in other capitals? Let me present the problem at another level. It is the most important need from a humanitarian standpoint; it is also an opportunity from another standpoint. The great danger is that the suffering in Cambodia will disappear from public view over the next few months.

S: I know.

P: One of the things I want to suggest, and which was touched on in your talk with Mr. Holbrooke,² is that there are certain realities. There are two which I wish to focus on. One reality is that you are the only individual with worldwide recognition with positive connotations related to Cambodia. Your name has worldwide recognition. No other person can claim such worldwide favorable recognition.

Secondly, events so far have established the plight of your people as one of the great tragedies of this century. That is understood.

Everything else represents hope and speculation: getting the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, giving freedom and independence to Cambodia, all those things which Mr. Holbrooke spelled out. It is a reality on the one hand and speculation on the other.

There is a need for continuing perseverance in the world community on this humanitarian issue. It puzzles me that you have not concentrated your tremendous recognition and personal prestige in bringing the message to the world that it needs to focus on the humanitarian issue.

I want to argue, with great respect, that what the situation needs more than anything is a personality around whom future possibilities can form. We have a problem which will be competing for attention with other great humanitarian problems. It seems to me it is a great opportunity for Prince Sihanouk to pursue the humanitarian issue in this country, in Europe, in Canada. The issue on its face is not a political one. He would simply be calling world attention to this human tragedy. No one can criticize you. No one can cut you down. No one can accuse you of seeking personal aggrandizement. No one can take a position against you. You would raise the whole level of consciousness and debate. You would identify yourself with the need to support the relief effort on the border and in Kampuchea and the medical assistance efforts and the pressure to open distribution channels within Kampuchea. If you could do that, by the end of this year you would make an important difference in keeping visible the plight of the Khmer people and you would strengthen your own position and your possibilities for the future, more strongly than if you had 10,000 AK 47s.

S: Since my arrival in France, I have raised humanitarian questions. I have many contacts with all people who have compassion for my people. We have discussed ways to help the the Cambodian people.

P: I know, but there is not enough passion. I argue for more passion and less politics.

S: No. The problem is not a lack of relief goods. The problem is a lack of distribution. I do not need to push for greater amounts of aid.

Loy (L): The problem is that time may erode the sense of urgency. We need to maintain an adequate amount of food. There are large amounts involved. They must come from many countries. We need to keep up the pressure.

Negroponte (N): What exactly do you suggest that the Prince does if he wishes to make progress in terms of what you would have him do?

P: I suggest that in public statements he focus primarily on the humanitarian issue. It is a platform which will join in time with the idea of a political solution, but a political solution needs to coalesce over time around a personality. I am sure you understand. There must be a continuing effort now to raise the level of consciousness about the humanitarian problem. In maintaining this pressure you would be preserving your own position.

S: I don’t have to preserve my position. If I have to plead for a better solution to the humanitarian problem I should be allowed to visit the refugee camps. I cannot represent my people since I can’t have contact with them. I can’t understand why I must change my activities. I have no contact with the Cambodians along the Thai-Cambodian border. The plight of my people has an exact location—the Thai-Cambodian border. That is where my people are. From Paris or Pyongyang I cannot speak for my people who because of foreign powers are separated from me. I must practice restraint in my declarations.

N: Mr. Holbrooke asked me to mention that our Ambassador in Bangkok is arriving this evening. We will have an opportunity to discuss the Prince’s point.

S: When I was in Peking I had contacts everyday with TV teams and reporters. I talked all the time about the plight of my people and humanitarian questions.

P: True.

S: My voice does not have that much importance in the international field. I have already fulfilled my duty to my people. I regret that my people and I can’t see each other. I see my people here and in France, but 90% of them have no problems. The humanitarian problem exists because there is a political problem. The political problem is at the root of all the misery and plight of my people. We have to choose. We cannot liberate Cambodia with AK 47s. We have to choose. We have to either continue to search for a political solution or to dedicate ourselves only to the humanitarian effort. I cannot be dedicated only to the humanitarian effort. I would have to declare that I had no more interest in the political and military aspects of the problem and that from now on I dedicate myself to humanitarian matters. I am sorry, I can’t do that. I should be allowed by the Thais and the UN to have contacts with refugees in Thailand and along the Thai-Cambodian frontier. I should be able to have free circulation round the world like Sahruddin Khan, the former High Commissioner for Refugees. I will refrain from putting passion into my statements if I am not allowed to have contact with my people. It is ridiculous for me to be the lawyer of people I have never met.

P: That may be the key to your seeing your people.

S: There are people in France and here who want me to go to war and to examine the political aspects. You’d want me to resign as a political/military leader. If all of you agree, I should resign as a political/military leader.

P: I don’t suggest that.

S: The situation is ambiguous.

P: I like your passion.

S: I know very well the problems of my country. Some people say I have lost a sense of Cambodian realities. It is not true. Day and night I meet Cambodians. I remind you that I stayed in Cambodia more than three years with the Khmer Rouge. I was not a refugee outside Cambodia during the reign of the Khmer Rouge. I left one day before the arrival of the Vietnamese. I have not lost a sense of Cambodia realities. I know the situation.

P: I believe that that kind of passion before US audiences, what you said and how you said it, puts you above the level of political intrigue, at the level of the real issue. People here in the United States have responded to the humanitarian need. There has been an impressive display of compassion. Our hope is for a political solution. What I suggest is that while waiting we try to save the Cambodian people. This effort will involve a great many people and great many countries. Out of that kind of effort can come a political solution, if a personality can be projected on a broader basis. You are the single person with worldwide recognition that can be important for both the humanitarian effort and a political solution. I have tried to point out the intersection between the two.

L: There is no need to choose. There is no choice between a political solution and the humanitarian effort. They are related. The highest form of politics would be to insure the world remembers who is pushing the cause of the Cambodian people and insuring that the money keeps coming in to support the humanitarian effort.

P: We have given you our argument. Mr. Holbrooke has given you his argument. I am confident you can cope.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 71, Sihanouk Visit, 2/80. Secret. Drafted by Lyne; cleared in draft by Palmieri, Loy, and Negroponte. The meeting took place in the Sheraton Carlton Hotel.
2. See Document 83.