Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

80. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 31, 1979

BRENNAN/HOLMES REPORT

EVALUATION AND ACTION TAKEN

We are in overall agreement with the analysis and recommendations in the Brennan/Holmes report “Cambodian Border Relief.”² Kampuchea faces severe food shortages at least until the December 1981 rice harvest. Khmer who flee to Thailand—121,000 are in holding camps with roughly 750,000 poised along the border—may have to rely on international aid for months or years; they may become permanent refugees. The relief organizations in Thailand must plan a long-term program as well as meet urgent needs. They must provide better conditions in holding centers; increase aid to the border concentrations to avert a mass influx of Khmer and speed contingency planning for Vietnamese military action and the feared exodus across the border.

We are already working to realize many of the Brennan/Holmes recommendations. Most require action by the international organizations (IOs) and the voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) in cooperation with Thai civil and military authorities. Embassy Bangkok was the catalyst for many improvements in coordination and contingency planning in recent weeks. We reinforce its efforts in our contacts with senior IO officials and through diplomatic initiatives on the safehaven concept. While the U.S. can motivate the IOs and VOLAGS to act, the relief organizations themselves must gear up to quicken the pace of the relief operations. We are seeing encouraging progress in some areas, but there are only limited results so far on coordination, contingency planning and increased aid on the border. Sir Robert Jackson aims at a mandate that would help considerably.

Brennan/Holmes heard serious criticism of ICRC’s approach to medical relief along the Thai-Khmer border, which gave rise to very specific proposals for changes. We endorse the rationale behind the report’s recommendations: to improve ICRC coordination and contingency planning. We have already urged ICRC to increase its presence in the border concentrations as rapidly as conditions permit; and it has already done so. Brennan/Holmes question whether ICRC methods will be appropriate for a longer term relief effort requiring more than the narrow definition of emergency care. We will look carefully at this issue in the context of the long-term planning discussions which Sir Robert Jackson intends to hold in mid-January. We would be cautious, however, about getting out in front in an effort to displace ICRC from a longer term program (if it wishes to participate).

ICRC has a valuable role in the relief effort inside Kampuchea, persistently negotiating with Phnom Penh on the difficult distribution and monitoring issues. A loss of status in the Thai relief program for ICRC could perhaps undermine its credibility in dealing with Heng Samrin authorities. We will have to consider the whole picture for the relief effort and for health care. In any event, we believe there has already been some progress in persuading ICRC to look into its relief strategy on the border and to better coordinate with the other IOs and VOLAGS.

Brennan/Holmes’ 19 recommendations and our comments on action taken to date are given below.

1. IO/Donor conference to plan for long-term needs

Sir Robert Jackson is laying the groundwork for an IO planning session in January, followed by a donor conference. Jackson urged major donor representatives December 16 to commit themselves to relief operations over 18 months. He plans to convene UN agency and ICRC representatives in Bangkok in mid-January to consider the scope and costs of all facets of the relief program. Jackson would like to be able to present to donors in early February a forecast and cost estimates through March 1981. We are privately encouraging Jackson in these plans. We would of course carefully consider our contribution to a long range relief program, including the need for front-end financing.

2. Endorse protection of border concentrations from military action; publicly applaud Thai humanitarian role

Embassy Bangkok originated the safehaven concept in November to protect the large civilian concentrations at Mak Mun and Nong Samet.³ Discussions between UN officials and the Vietnamese indicate that the SRV is unlikely to accept formal safehavens. Despite reservations on sovereignty grounds, the Thai would like to discourage Vietnamese military actions against the encampments, and have come out in favor of safehavens. We have sought declarations from other governments and international entities on the need to protect civilians along the Thai-Khmer border, in the hope that these pronouncements may deter Vietnamese attacks on Mak Mun and Nong Samet. The Japanese and the EC–9 have already made helpful statements, and we will be releasing one shortly.

We take every opportunity to highlight Thai cooperation in Khmer relief. Mrs. Carter’s trip to Thailand in November⁴ and her statements to the press emphasized our appreciation for the Thai role. Only recently Mrs. Carter repeated this theme in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations.

3. Increase the international presence in the border concentrations to create de facto safehavens

In response to our strong encouragement, ICRC now has 50–60 workers each day in the Mak Mun and Nong Samet border concentrations, a dramatic increase in the last few weeks. Shelters are under construction to protect relief workers in the event of shelling.

The Secretary General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are considering a Thai Government request to place the border concentrations under UNHCR management. We strongly supported this idea with UNHCR officials, and we understand that UNHCR is willing to take on the responsibility provided it operates solely on Thai territory. If the Secretary General approves, this change should enhance the international presence on the border, and also improve care for Khmer in the concentrations.

4. Contingency planning for a sudden influx of Khmer

Embassy Bangkok is working to focus IO attention on contingency planning for a mass influx of Khmer across the border during the anticipated Vietnamese offensive. Arrangements are still inadequate, however. About 400,000 Khmer occupy Mak Mun and Nong Samet, of a total of roughly 750,000 persons camped along the border. About 120,000 more Khmer could move to the well-constructed Khao I Dang holding center in an emergency. The UNHCR is negotiating with the Thai army to evacuate Khmer to an assembly area if fighting breaks out near the border concentrations. The plan is flawed because the route to the assembly area may be mined. Also, the evacuation must proceed quickly to avoid Khmer being caught between Thai and Vietnamese army lines.

At Embassy Bangkok’s instigation, ICRC and the United Nations Children’s Fund recently developed an evacuation plan for relief workers. The plan still needs some refinement.

5. Food stockpiles in Bangkok

Despite initial reservations, we now endorse the Brennan/Holmes proposal to stockpile a three-month supply of food in Bangkok. It takes 2–3 weeks to move new food deliveries to the border, an unacceptable delay in an emergency, and a stockpile would also reduce the possibility of price-gouging by local dealers if the World Food Program (WFP) had to make sudden large purchases for a mass influx of Khmer. If no influx occurs, the stockpile provides a secure food pipeline for border feeding. WFP will have a rice shortfall of 10,000 metric tons in January, and similar problems could arise in succeeding months. (We set aside $3 million for WFP’s use in purchasing Thai rice to make up the January rice deficit.)

6. Increase border feeding to channel food to the interior of Kampuchea

As Phnom Penh continues to impede food distribution in contested areas of Kampuchea, the volume of backdoor feeding is expected to grow. Relief workers report a large and variable transient population of Khmer along the border who collect food from the international agencies and return to their villages. The estimated 10,000 persons at Nong Chan are largely transients. While the backdoor channel is subject to Vietnamese interdiction and confiscation, it presents one of the most promising means to increase food supplies in Western Kampuchea.

Embassy Bangkok is encouraging VOLAGS to participate in border feeding through the WFP food management program, funded with a $891,000 grant from the U.S. We made a $513,500 grant to WFP this month for food processing for the border feeding program. This latter grant enables the IOs to repackage commodities in smaller amounts, thus facilitating carrying food inland. The amount of border feeding is, we believe, increasing although the IOs and VOLAGS have not yet produced comprehensive statistics. The price of rice in Battambang declined in the last two weeks, a sign of increased supplies from the Thai border.

7. Increase food outreach on the border

Food outreach programs are still quite limited, but there should be progress in the coming weeks through WFP food management and food processing programs mentioned above. The food management program will probably include soup kitchens to feed children and the infirm.

8. Timetable to improve conditions at Sa Kaeo I

The UNHCR has moved ahead on improvements at Sa Kaeo I. The Thai Government authorized expansion of the grossly overcrowded camp into a 64-acre plot of adjacent land. The camp extension was scheduled for completion December 26, and 3100 persons occupied the camp as of December 20. With the extension, camp area per person will be eight square meters. Three wells provide an adequate water supply. A sanitation team has arrived to upgrade sanitation facilities. Drainage structures and off-ground shelters for the rainy season are not completed.

9. Various improvements in ICRC coordination

In response to frequent criticism of ICRC performance during their survey, Brennan/Holmes proposed several specific changes in ICRC coordination. So far as we know, ICRC is not integrated into the UNHCR Regional Office Kampuchea Unit as recommended. However, Embassy Bangkok reports that medical coordinators from ICRC, UNHCR and the VOLAGS are in frequent contact on questions of personnel and material flow. ICRC is also engaged in contingency planning, although we have no information on whether this planning constitutes a full or part-time assignment for the official involved. It appears that medical coordination is improving.

10. Contingency planning for casualty flow from possible military action

ICRC is implementing the recommendations of the U.S. medical survey team on surgical requirements in a border emergency. ICRC has identified surgical personnel in-country and called up stand-by teams abroad. It plans to reinforce the surgical capabilities of local Thai hospitals and to obtain a field hospital. In Embassy Bangkok’s view, ICRC preparations are not sufficient to handle a crisis at this time.

11. Encourage ICRC to place permanent medical teams and clinics in the border concentrations

We have clearly informed ICRC of our hope that the international presence in the border concentrations can be increased. As noted above, ICRC has 50–60 personnel in Mak Mun and Nong Samet each day, although there is no “permanent” staff in the camps.

12. Consider whether ICRC, UNHCR or another agency should manage the long-term medical effort

We will consider our position on the long-term medical program in connection with Sir Robert Jackson’s consultations in Bangkok in mid-January and the projected February donors conference. Brennan/Holmes heard many complaints about ICRC’s concept of emergency medical care, which may in fact be inappropriate for long-term refugee care situations. ICRC is already reassessing its approach, however. We will consult carefully with Embassy Bangkok, ICRC, and other organizations on this question as well as the effect a change in the ICRC role in Thailand may have on other aspects of Khmer relief.

13. Time-phased plan to complete all holding centers within three months

UNHCR continues to upgrade facilities at Sa Kaeo I (see #8 above) and Khao I Dang, although we are not aware of a specific timetable for completion. Kamput holding center, now occupied by 2500 Khmer, has capacity in place for 20,000 persons, and its hospital is operating. The future of proposed Sa Kaeo II and Mairut holding center is unclear. UNHCR officials believe plans for Sa Kaeo II may be abandoned in favor of using the excess capacity at Kamput. Mairut has a major water supply problem, and UNHCR and the Thai Government have not agreed on the ultimate size of this camp. The Thai continue to plan to place an unrealistically large number of Khmer at Mairut.

The dilemma is that if there is a sudden large influx of Khmer, on the scale of several hundred thousand, facilities do not currently exist to accommodate them. On the other hand, building centers that may never be occupied would be a major waste of resources. A further problem is that the border encampments are on low ground, and some provision must be made for the current inhabitants either to go deeper into Kampuchea or enter Thailand by the time the rainy season begins, usually in late May.

The Kampuchean Emergency Group in Embassy Bangkok reports to Washington regularly on the status of all of the holding centers, and in the course of its liaison with UNHCR, it has the opportunity to stress the importance of completion of the centers before the rainy season.

14. Water supply improvements

UNHCR and ICRC/UNICEF December 15 appointed a joint project manager for water supply in the holding centers and in the border concentrations, opening the way for improved coordination of this aspect of the relief program. The manager is a UNHCR engineer detailed from AID. We expect that he will assume responsibilities along the lines recommended by Brennan/Holmes.

15. Press for the appointment of a UN special coordinator for Khmer relief, resident in Bangkok

The Secretary General will formally appoint Sir Robert Jackson in January as coordinator for Khmer relief. His title, mandate, and office location are still to be determined. We have closely consulted with Jackson regarding his responsibilities and urged him to consider working from Bangkok, or at least spending a maximum amount of time there. Although the Secretary General apparently intends that he work in New York, Jackson himself is coming around to the idea of a headquarters in Geneva and spending a substantial amount of time in Bangkok.

16. Improve coordination in Bangkok including a regular senior staff meeting

Embassy Bangkok reports improvement in coordination among the IOs and between IOs and VOLAGS, although there is apparently no senior staff group such as Brennan/Holmes recommend. The IOs hold regular meetings dealing with food, water and VOLAG activity which some donors also attend. Medical coordinators from ICRC, UNHCR and the VOLAGS communicate frequently. The IOs and VOLAGS are now working out a system to share information on the volume food deliveries. It remains clear, however, that UNHCR on the one hand and ICRC/UNICEF on the other have yet to establish regular meetings of fixed periodicity.

17. Encourage the VOLAGS to propose long-term programs

We agree on the importance of long-term planning for the relief program, and we will consider the role of VOLAGS in this effort in the context of the Jackson meetings in mid-January and February on the forecasts for Khmer relief.

18. Assignment of permanent personnel to Embassy Bangkok’s Kampuchea Emergency Group (KEG)

We place a high priority on staffing the KEG with well-qualified candidates who will spend at least one year in the office. So far we have met the first criterion but not the second. Mode ceilings and other limitations currently restrict the number of AID and State personnel who can be assigned to the KEG. We have analyzed the problem in writing, and made recommendations on long-term staffing of both the KEG and the Kampuchean Working Group to the newly appointed U.S. Refugee Coordinator.

19. Augment the Ambassador’s contingency fund

We are prepared in principle to add to the contingency fund (now $250,000) as needed.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 80, Refugees (Indochinese) 11–12/79. Confidential.
2. Dennis Brennan, Director of the Office for Project Development in the Bureau for Asia, and Christian Holmes, Deputy Director in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, both in the Agency for International Development, submitted a report on December 7 from Bangkok. The report, entitled “Cambodian Border Relief,” is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 20, Refugees: Kampuchea: Relief, 12/12–31/79.
3. Abramowitz recommended internationalizing the refugee concentrations and establising them as safehavens in telegram 47265 to various posts, November 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790529–0320)
4. November 8–10. See Document 71.