Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

73. Telegram From the Embassy in China to the Department of State¹

Beijing, November 23, 1979, 0936Z

8475. Subject: Dilemma Posed by Kampcuchea. Ref: A) State 269925, B) State 292057, C) 293370, D) State 295111, E) Manila 21721, F) State 298371.²

1. (S–Entire text).

2. We have been both enlightened and discouraged by the recent go-around of cables on this subject, including the report of the recent ASEAN COM meeting in Manila (Ref E). Our main conclusion, reluctantly arrived at, is that we lack a coherent policy³ for dealing with the issues we are confronted with in Indochina. In large measure this is because we lack the means to achieve our stated policy goals; and yet, because of the unattractiveness of realistically obtainable objectives, we seem unprepared to define our goals in terms of our capabilities.

3. Above all, we seem to lack any consensus on the nature of our interests in Kampuchea, and by extension in Indochina as a whole. Not surprisingly, therefore, we have difficulty agreeing on our objecives in that region. Vice President Mondale told Deng Xiaoping in August that we and China share the same objectives in Indochina,⁴ i.e., to create an independent Kampuchea that is not threatening to its neighbors, to prevent Laos from falling further under Vietnam and Soviet sway, to protect Thailand and other ASEAN states and to show Vietnam that its increasing dependence upon Moscow will hurt badly over time and should be abandoned.⁵

4. Unfortunately, with the possible exception of protecting Thailand and other ASEAN states we lack the means to accomplish these goals. Morever, the COM meeting in Manila reached the very different conclusion that we must avoid appearing as traveling the same path as Beijing.⁶ We can hardly expect a coherent policy to emerge if on the one hand we are assuring China we share common objectives in Indochina while on the other hand we contemplate embarking on an effort to persuade the Vietnamese that we and ASEAN do not share Chinese objectives.

5. The hard reality is that the only immediate objective we seem to have any hope of realizing is that of providing more food to the starving Kampuchean people. Even in this worthwhile effort, our actions involve political consequences which may or may not accord with our policy preferences. In other respects, we sense considerable policy confusion. We speak of “legitimate SRV interests in Kampuchea and Laos” but have not defined what these are. There is no consensus on the degree of SRV influence in these areas that we can accept, or apparently even on whether Hanoi’s brutal means have destroyed any claim to legitimacy for its ends.⁷ We talk of pressing Hanoi to accept a political solution when the reality is that Hanoi will either impose a political solution of its own or will fail because of scoundrels like Pol Pot, whom we have written out of our policy.

6. The above is not meant to suggest that we are more clear sighted than our colleagues. It is merely meant to highlight the danger of letting the unattractiveness of the available options lead us into well meaning but misguided policy paths that ignore the fundamental incompatibilities between Vietnamese and Chinese goals at this time, nor does it appear likely that we will see policy shifts in either Beijing or Hanoi in the immediate future that would pave the way for the emergence of a modus vivendi in the area. Accordingly, we agree that there are no quick-fixes on the horizon.

7. What we find missing from the recent round of exchanges is any recognition that even if our interests and objectives are not identical with those of Beijing, in most respects our goals in Indochina, and indeed in Southeast Asia as a whole, are much more compatible with those of China under its present leadership than with those of Vietnam.⁸ While Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to use force, it is not bent on the destruction of the Hanoi regime or on the imposition of Chinese puppet governments in the region. In contrast, Vietnam seems bent on establishing domination in both Laos and Kampuchea to a degree that can only be accomplished through forceful occupation of these countries. While serious Chinese errors, such as its last ditch and ultimately ineffective support for an intolerably brutal and anti-Vietnamese Pol Pot regime helped launch Hanoi on this course, this should not obscure the fact that it is Vietnam’s current efforts to dominate Indochina that are at the root of current instabilities in the area rather than specific Chinese actions (although these are contributing factors).

8. We would also strongly endorse the point made by Roger Sullivan⁹ that whereas our interests vis-a-vis Vietnam are basically regional in character, our relationship with China is of much broader significance. This does not mean, of course, that our policies and those of China overlap in every respect. On the contrary, in Indochina they diverge in two important respects: First, our own differences with Vietnam are less severe than those of China, and secondly, China’s security interests in the area are greater than our own. In short, we can tolerate what Beijing cannot tolerate. However, recognition of these differences, and awareness of Southeast Asian reservations about China, should not distort our perceptions of Chinese goals in the area, which were nicely summed up in Ref E’s summary of the COM meeting.

9. In general, we do not believe that a new and more stable balance of power can be arrived at in the Indochina regime as long as China’s and Vietnam’s goals remain as incompatible as they are. Thus, we agree with Bob Miller¹⁰ that in our approach to Kampuchea it is the stability and integrity of Thailand that should be our primary concern. But we come to a somewhat different conclusion since we doubt that any political solution in Kampuchea that would be acceptable to Hanoi under present circumstances would be compatible with preserving the security and stability of Thailand or be tolerable to the Chinese. Secondly, we agree with Roger Sullivan’s basic point that we should not lightly consider splitting with China over policy toward an area as crucial to China as is Southeast Asia.

10. We do not have a solution to offer to these dilemmas. Perhaps we should borrow a card from the Japanese, curb our activist impulses, stop trying to promote political solutions whose time has not yet come, and limit ourselves to the more modest effort of trying to define with greater clarity the basic tenets of our policy, which as a minimum should include support for Thailand, humanitarian aid to the Kampuchean people, and refusal to consider any political steps vis-a-vis Phnom Penh or Hanoi as long as SRV troops occupy Kampuchea.¹¹ From our particular perspective here, this hardly seems the time to undertake efforts to convince the Vietnamese of our good intentions.

11. Perhaps the first steps toward a more coherent policy would be to start asking the questions differently. It is not really a question of whether we are prepared to accept SRV domination in Kampuchea and Laos but rather whether China and Thailand are. In essence, our disturbing conclusion is the same as that of Mort Abramowitz,¹² i.e., that we have little hope of accomplishing what we want in Indochina in the short run. (At the same time, neither can our adversaries achieve their goals). The best we may be able to do under the circumstances is to try to keep our policy realistically grounded on our capabilities and to avoid the self-delusion that could result from defining our goals in terms well beyond our reach.

Woodcock

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 42, Kampuchea, 11–12/79. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Bangkok for Abramowitz and Woodcock, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Woodcock visited Bangkok November 27–29. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the first page: “Zbig—Send cc Cy, Fritz. J.”
2. Telegram 269925 has not been found. Telegram 292057 to Bangkok, November 9, and telegram 293370 to Bangkok, November 10, discussed the review of U.S. policy toward Kampuchea and Indochina initiated by Abramowitz in telegram 45547 from Bangkok (see Document 70). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790516–0237 and D790518–0050) Telegram 295111 to various posts, November 13, which repeated the text of telegram 16148 from Kuala Lumpur, and telegram 298371 to various posts, November 17, which repeated the text of telegram 46865 from Bangkok, also discussed the policy review. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790008–0687 and D790529–0180) Telegram 21721 from Manila, November 14, reported on the ASEAN Chiefs of Mission meeting in Manila. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790528–0127)
3. Carter underlined “we lack a coherent policy.”
4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 265.
5. Carter wrote in the right-hand margin adjacent to this paragraph, “These are still our goals + humanitarian efforts.”
6. Carter underlined two phrases in this sentence, “COM meeting in Manila” and “we must avoid.” Additionally, he wrote in the right-hand margin, “I do not agree with this conclusion,” and drew an arrow from his note to the highlighted sentence.
7. Carter highlighted this sentence. In the right-hand margin adjacent to it, he wrote, “SRV interests in Laos & Kam[puchea] should be kept at a minimum.”
8. Carter underlined the following passages in this sentence, “in most respects our goals,” “are much more compatible with those of China,” and “with those of.” In the right-hand margin adjacent to the sentence, Carter wrote, “True. Pol Pot’s being so obnoxious is a major obstacle.”
9. Telegram 293370 to Bangkok, November 10, transmitted Sullivan’s analysis (see footnote 2 above).
10. Telegram 295111 to various posts, November 13, contains Miller’s analysis (see footnote 2 above).
11. Carter placed a closed bracket in the right-hand margin around the portion of this sentence beginning with “limit ourselves to the more modest effort,” and wrote, “Sounds good.”
12. Telegram 298371 to various posts, November 17, contains Abramowitz’s conclusion (see footnote 2 above).