72. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
298308. Subject: Meeting With Soviet Ambassador on Humanitarian Relief to Kampuchea.
1. (S–Entire text).
2. In his capacity as Acting Cordinator for Refugee Affairs, Counselor Matthew Nimetz called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on November 15, to present a demarche on US efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Kampuchea. The meeting was attended by EA DAS Oakley, Director for Refugee Programs John Baker and Deputy Refugee Coordinator George Barbis.
3. Nimetz began by informing Dobrynin that in his activities as Acting Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, he had encountered many questions from US officials about Soviet assistance to Kampuchea and about the effect of the current crisis on US-Soviet relations. He was, therefore, interested in informing Dobrynin of the US view of the [Page 253] current situation and of learning about Soviet relief to Kampuchea. He also wanted to assure the Soviet Government that in providing aid to the people of Kampuchea, our interests were motivated by humanitarian, and not political, concerns.
4. In describing the situation in Kampuchea and the steps needed to facilitate the international relief effort, Nimetz made the following points:
—Two–three million Khmer out of the estimated 7–8 million total population probably have perished in the period since 1975.
—Thousands of old people and a whole generation of children under five years of age may have died from disease and starvation.
—35,000 Khmer have fled the famine and fighting and are now at the Sa Keo holding center just inside Thailand; 10,000 more reportedly entered Thailand November 13; and 300,000 others are poised along the border.
—This influx has imposed an enormous burden on Thailand, which has generously agreed to accept them all on a temporary basis.
—There are great dangers presented by the continued fighting along the border. This affected the lives of hundreds of thousands, as well as the security of Thailand.
—The situation inside Kampuchea is equally disturbing. Although the international relief agencies, working through the Phnom Penh authorities, have gradually begun to get some food and medicine into the country, the size of this effort to date is wholly inadequate to the requirements of the situation. Phnom Penh authorities themselves have estimated that 27,500 tons of food per month will be needed during the next six months. Despite recently increased daily flights into Phnom Penh and shipments through Kompong Som port, the target of 1,000 tons per day is not yet in sight.
5. Describing the current problems being encountered by the international relief effort, Nimetz said that problems of logistics, access and personnel will have to be resolved if the relief effort is to be successful. He pointed out that:
—The Phnom Penh authorities continue to impose an unrealistic ceiling of 11 ICRC/UNICEF people to manage the whole international relief program inside Kampuchea.
—To date, food distribution has been confined to the Phnom Penh area. Only this week have two truck convoys been permitted to go beyond a 100 kilometer radius of the city. Most of the country has yet to receive any of the food.
—We are pleased to learn that the Phnom Penh authorities have now agreed to permit food shipments up the Mekong. But unloading facilities and manpower at the Phnom Penh port, as well as at Kompong Som and the Phnom Penh airport, are inadequate.
[Page 254]—Only one airport is now being used to bring supplies, and Phnom Penh authorities continue to reject probably the most effective way of bringing food in large quantities, i.e., over the road from Thailand.
6. Turning to the Soviet role, Nimetz said we knew that the Soviet Government had some influence in the area and that it was also interested in assuring the survival of the Khmer people. He urged the Soviet Government to exert its influence to encourage the authorities in the region to:
—Permit food to be brought in by road from both Thailand and Vietnam;
—Permit relief flights to land at airports other than Phnom Penh;
—Permit direct flights from points outside of Kampuchea to airports inside the country;
—Permit more truck convoys from Phnom Penh to other parts of the country; and
—Permit more ICRC/UNICEF people in the country.
7. In response, Dobrynin said he would of course immediately report Mr. Nimetz’ views to his government. However, speaking informally, he wanted to inform the group about recent Soviet discussions with the “Kampuchean Government” and about its views of US proposals for increasing the relief effort. He said the Soviet Government had spoken to the Kampucheans, not to pressure them, but to encourage Phnom Penh to accept humanitarian aid. As for the Soviet Government, he said it had few representatives in Kampuchea (none outside Phnom Penh) and therefore did not have first hand information about conditions within the country.
8. Outlining what he said was the Kampuchean response Dobrynin said Phnom Penh:
—Placed the blame for the current situation on the past actions of the United States and China;
—Was willing to accept aid from any source, including the United States, and had opened ports and airports for that purpose; but,
—Categorically rejected the idea of establishing an overland supply route from Thailand, largely because it was suggested by the United States.
9. Dobrynin said the Soviets had raised the issue of the overland route with the Kampucheans “several days ago”. In reply, the Kampucheans said they opposed the route because it ran through areas where the Pol Pot forces are still fighting. They also were deeply suspicious of the idea because of fears that it was part of a US effort to aid Pol Pot and thereby prolong the war. The Kampucheans reported that the Pol Pot forces were herding people toward the Thai border where they created separate camps full of pitiful women and children to show [Page 255] foreigners while keeping well-fed able bodied men in other camps out of sight.
10. Turning to the Soviet relief effort, Dobrynin said that socialist countries which had sent some 200,000 tons of aid, mostly by ship, were also perplexed by Phnom Penh’s refusal to open its ports at an earlier date. However, Dobrynin said the Kampucheans want to be masters of their fate and do not want Americans or anyone else telling them what to do. In this regard, Dobrynin said, we should know that the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi/Phnom Penh was not one of master and servant and that the local authorities had their own ideas about how things should be done.
11. In the discussion that followed, Nimetz began by assuring Dobrynin that the “land bridge” concept was not an American idea, but one worked out in consultation with the international relief organizations. He said there was no question of organizing American convoys and putting in US personnel. Our approach remained one of channeling our contributions through the UN and of urging the utilization of all routes into Kampuchea not just the road from the Thai border.
12. Deputy Refugee Coordinator Barbis then informed Dobrynin that the international organizations had raised their estimates of the amount of assistance needed from 30,000 a month to 34,500 tons a month. This, he said, increased the necessity of using more than present means available to get aid into Kampuchea. Director Baker then asked what means the Soviets were using to distribute their relief supplies within Kampuchea?
13. Dobrynin replied that aid from the socialist countries was being distributed by the Kampucheans utilizing their own means. These included using men and animals to carry aid into the interior. Dobrynin said Soviet supplies were delivered to Phnom Penh where they were turned over to the local authorities. Dobrynin then turned aside questions about Soviet efforts to improve the port of Kompong Som by saying he did not have detailed information on Soviet aid projects to improve the country’s infrastructure. He did, however, appear to accept a request to provide information on the amount and type of assistance the Soviet Union planned to supply for the harbor.
14. Returning to the situation in Kampuchea, DAS Oakley said we were concerned by the fact that the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin force were using food as a weapon in their fight against Pol Pot. He said we had urged the Thais to keep combatants out of the refugee camps and to move the non-combatants away from the border. He noted that an agreement by Phnom Penh to open airports around the country, particularly in western Kampuchea, would greatly aid the work of bringing in relief supplies, even if the land route from Thailand could not be opened.
[Page 256]15. Dobrynin responded that in a perfect world it would be possible to do many things but reality was not so simple. He said the Soviet people had their own tragic experience with war and famine and understood suffering. Although the Kampuchean and Vietnamese were Marxists, they had their own brand of Oriental Communism and would do things in their own way. Speaking forcefully, he said, we would have to accept the fact that there was a war going on, and that the Vietnamese/Phnom Penh forces would do nothing to strengthen the remnants of the Pol Pot forces, even if this meant suffering and death for thousands.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 80, Refugees (Indochinese), 11–12/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Moscow, Bangkok, Beijing, USUN, and the Mission in Geneva.↩